Skip to main content

tv   CNN Newsroom With Kate Bolduan  CNN  February 23, 2021 8:00am-9:00am PST

8:00 am
>> yes. >> yes. >> okay. would you agree that this was a highly dangerous situation which was horrific but could have actually been worse without the courage of the officers that you commanded? >> yes. >> okay. >> yes. >> thank you. so now let's look at what we knew leading up to it or what you knew leading up to it or what people that worked for you knew leading up to it. we knew leading up to it that on january -- leading up to january 6th, the president trump sent nationwide tweets telling people to come to washington on january 6th and saying be there, it will be wild. and according to public reporting by "the washington post," the fbi norfolk field office issued a threat report on january 5th that detailed specific calls for violence online in connection with january 6th including the protesters, quote, be ready to fight and, quote, go there ready for war, end quote.
8:01 am
i guess i'll start with you, mr. sund, when a critical intelligence report is received by the capitol police, from an intelligence community source like the fbi, who usually would receive it and i guess i'll start with did you receive this report? >> thank you very much for the question, ma'am. i actually just in the last 24 hours was informed by the department that they actually had received that report. it was received by what we call -- it is one of our sworn members that is assigned to the joint terrorism task force which is a task force with the fbi. they received it the evening of the 5th. reviewed it and then forwarded it over to an official at the intelligence division over at u.s. capitol police headquarters. >> so you hadn't seen it yourself. >> no ma'am, it did not go any further than that. >> okay. and then was it sent to the house and senate sergeant at arms. >> i don't believe it went any further than the sergeant at the intelligence division. >> and mr. irving and mr.
8:02 am
stanger, did you get that report? beforehand, mr. stanger, did you get the report? >> no. >> mr. irving? >> i did not. >> okay. okay. so, i think that may have contributed to the lack of information but i'll leave that for the future. now let's go back to another report. i know on january 3rd mr. sund, you said in your written testimony that the capitol police published intelligence assessments of the event including one on january 3rd. do you mostly rely on your federal partnerslike the fbi to gather potential threats to the capitol and members of congress? >> yes. i think what is important to realize as a law enforcement agency, we're a consumer of intelligence and information provided by the intelligence community. the intelligence community is 18 federal agencies that collect
8:03 am
information, due to the analyzing of the raw intelligence and so we're reliant on that information to be complete and accurate. >> but in that report, we know according to your testimony, that tens of thousands of participants were likely to descend on washington. is that correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> okay. and that january 3rd memo, according to "the washington post," made clear that supporters of president trump see january 6th as the last opportunity to over turn the results of the presidential election, and that, quote, this sense of desperation and disappointment may lead to more of an incentive to become violent. that correct? >> yes, it is, ma'am. >> and it quoted the memo as stating that unlike previous post election protests, the targets of the pro-trump supporters are not necessarily the counter protesters but rather congress itself is the target on the 6th, is that right. >> that is correct. >> and have any indication that many of these protesters might
8:04 am
arrive armed or that members of extremist groups might be there? >> we knew members of extremist groups would be there and there was social media calls for people to come armed, yes. >> you've also said that at a january 5th meeting with capitol police, the sarergeant at arms d law enforcement and military officials all present at the meeting indicated there was no new intelligence to report for january 6th, is that right? >> that is correct, ma'am. >> but your testimony states that the capitol police took a number of steps after these assessments, like what you said was the largest number of civil disturbance unit platoons possible, increasing and coordinating with the d.c. police and ordering all hands on deck status for capitol police, is that right. >> that is correct. we took extensive efforts to prepare for the events based on the information and much of which you just reviewed. >> okay, good. so if the information was enough to get you to do that, why
8:05 am
didn't we take some additional steps, why didn't you and others involved to be better prepared to con front the violence? >> we expanded our perimeter and when we expanded the perimeter, we knew there would be maybe limited violence. but we did. we expanded the perimeter and took a number of steps to outfit our personal with hard gear and developed a plan for if we had protesters that may be armed and that was one of the reasons that the expanded perimeter and the heightened risk that i went to the sergeant at arms and requested the national guard. >> and but now you realize it wasn't enough. the security measures, is that right? >> that is now hindsight being what it is and you look around the capitol right now and you see the resources that are brought to bear based on the information we now from january 6th. >> mr. sund, you stated in your written testimony that you made a request for the capitol police board to declare an emergency
8:06 am
and authorize national guard support on monday, january 4th and that request was not granted. >> that is correct, ma'am. >> your testimony makes clear that the current structure of the capitol police board resulted in delays in bringing in assistance from the national guard. would you agree with that? >> yes. >> that is one of the things that we want to look at. >> yes, ma'am. >> do you think that changes are n needed to make clear that the capitol police officer has the authority to call in the national guard. >> i think in these circumstances there needs to be a stream lined process for the capitol police chief to have authority. >> and mr. stanger, do you think that reforms are needed to the structure of the capitol police board to make that clear? >> i think review of the capitol police board and their statutory authorities probably would be a good time to do this now. there is a lot of statutes out there on the capitol police board that go back many, many
8:07 am
years. things have changed and it is probably to make the board a little bit more nim ble and nota bad time to take a look at that there. >> that is probably an understatement with what happened. thank you. mr. irving, your views? >> i would certainly agree with both chief sund and michael stanger. i think a review would certainly be warranted at this time of the capitol police board. >> mr. sund, your written testimony states that you had no authority to request the assistance of the national guard without an emergency declaration of the capitol police board. on what rule, regulation or authority did you base that view? >> i'd have to go back and look at the specific rule but it is a standing rule that we have. i cannot request the national guard without a declaration of emergency from the capitol police board. it is kind of interesting because it is very similar to the fact that i can't even give my men and women cold water on a excessively hot day without
8:08 am
declaration of emergency. it is just a process that is in place. >> and apart from the capitol police board he wanted authorization for the national guard from the department of defense. that correct. we'll be hearing from them next week. >> yes, ma'am, that is correct. >> would you agree there were serious issues at the pentagon that guard troops did not arrive at the capitol until about 5:40 that day after most of the violence has subsided. >> i don't know what issues there were at the pentagon but i was certainly surprised that at the delays i was hearing and seeing. >> and my last question just of all of you in addition to the reforms of the police board, which are very clear, need to be made, any other suggestions that wouldn't involve classified information you have for us, mr. sund? >> as referenced to some of the recommendations? >> mm-hmm. >> i would look at, again, one of the big things that i think was a contributing factor was
8:09 am
intelligence. as you meet with the intelligence community and law enforcement in the intelligence community, we have a good relationship, i think the apa tour needs to be opened up. january 6 was a new day and a change of what threat we face and i think getting them to open to look a little bit harder and looking at our policies and procedures and processes for how we handle command is stuff that we could do and looking at physical security of the buildings and the grounds is going to be critical. a know a lot of people have talked about the fencing, the open environment. i understand and i know that goes way back and members of congress the open environment. i think there are ways to develop a more secure campus while keeping an open environment. but i would leave that for a more classified or restricted hearings. >> thank you. anything that you would add in addition, just any other thing that you would add in addition to what the former police chief
8:10 am
laid out here, mr. stanger. >> i would be very supportive of those areas that the chief mentioned. i think he's right on. i think there is maybe another area for use of force that probably needs to be coordinated better in the region here. but certainly intelligence needs to be taken a look at as to how it works. we have a lot of people that we've ramped up since 9/11. and i think maybe it is time to take a look at how efficient it is on the gathering of intelligence and collection of intelligence. >> okay. thank you. i'm going to allow my colleagues to ask the same question of you, mr. irving and you, chief contee, because i've gone over my time. thank you. >> thank you. madam chair, mr. sund, you've made or brought up the issue of
8:11 am
intelligence throughout your testimony and the gaps that were there and how we need to strengthen the intelligence. but i was struck by the fact that you said the fbi report, my understanding is that that report had some fairly specific information that was troubling. that you said that the report did get sent to the capitol police, that it went to the folks in the intelligence department, but then you were not aware of it. which raised a really big question. had something coming in like that right before an event, that i think is significant, it does not get to operational commanders who are there to deal with it? how could that happen? how could you get not get that vital intelligence on the eve of what is going to be a major event? >> well, thank you, sir. i know that is something that is going to be looked at. i think that information would have been helpful to be aware of it. again, looking at the information for the first time yesterday, it is strictly raw
8:12 am
data. it is raw intelligence information that has come in, seen on a social media post. a lot of people post things on social media, that need to be corroborated and confirmed. so it again, it is coming in as raw data, so please keep that in mind. but i agree, that is something that we need to look at, what is the process and how dough we stream line that information to get it where it needs to go. >> i understand it is raw data. but it is the eve of the event. you don't have the time to do the analysis that you would normally like to do. that is information that has to get to you. so that is clearly a major problem. and my question is also related to the report that was put out by capitol police, by your intelligence folks on january 3rd. the intelligence division of the capitol police issued a internal report which reportedly stated and and this is been out in the public domain, that instead of targeting counter-protesters, as you've seen in the prior events that occurred that you've
8:13 am
referenced earlier, that, quote, this is, quote, though it is in the public domain that congress itself is the target on the 6th by trump supporters. congress was the target. the report also mentioned that members of the proud boys, white supremacist groups, other extremist groups would be in attendance and may be inclined to become violent. so you have your own report. did you see that report? that was put out on 3rd? >> yes, i did. >> how is that not a warning of some extraordinary measures. now i understand you increased and you had folks there and you increased your presence. but how was that not really a big warning flag and if it was, what exactly did you do when you read that report? >> that report contributed to the fact that we expanded our perimeter. and looking out it, i reach out to the metropolitan police department knowing before that report, knowing what that --
8:14 am
that extremists were likely to be there in the previous reports that has been called for on social media for people to be armed in talking with our partners at the metropolitan police department i reached out to say, hey, will you provide us some support and we coordinated the additional support the morning of the 6th. so, yeah, we did take that into consideration as we developed the extensive security plans for this event. >> so you changed plans on january 3rd after getting that report. >> yeah, just our perimeter. we did a number of things. we were adjusting a perimeter before that as well. >> so we're going to want to know more specifically when you get that. and i think we'll see you get additional information from the fbi for example. but that did not get to you. >> right. >> so i understand that. and i think it is important for us to understand and i heard all of you mentioned this in your testimony, this is not just -- in response to chairwoman klobuchar's question, it is not just a random violent attack, it
8:15 am
was coordinated. that you saw. and i believe in your testimony as well, i'm going to ask other witnesses to respond to this, too, because you all mentioned. how do you define coordinated. what did we see from the folks to lead you to believe it was coordinated and in your testimony now you just mentioned military style coordination. that would mean command and control, understanding the layout of the capitol and it may mean knowing the internal operations of defense perimeters, of folks that are engaged. talk to me, what did you see that leads to you believe this is a coordinated attack and i would like our other witness engage in that as well. >> i would provide a quick overview of why i think it was a coordinated attack. one, these people came with equipment. you're bringing climbing gear to a demonstration and bringing explosives, your bringing chemical spray such as what captain mendoza talked about.
8:16 am
you're coming prepared. the fact that the group that attacked our west front, 20 minutes approximately before the event over at the ellipse ended which means they were planning on our agency not being at full strength, watching the other events and that is ending and everybody get on post, they're marching our way knowing that we may not be at full strength at that time. and also the fact that we're dealing with two pipe bombs that were set off the edge of our perimeter so what i suspect draw resources away. i think there was a significant coordination with this attack. >> anyone else -- chief contee, i believe you think it is a coordinated attack. >> oh, absolutely. my view is from the day of the incident. i think there were hand signals that were being used by several of the insurrectionists. there were radio communication by several individuals that were involved. the coordinated use of chemical
8:17 am
admissions to include bear spry by several people that were out there. i certainly believe it was coordinated. to chief sund's point regarding the placement of the pipe bombs in the areas, their discovery prior to this event, all of those things. and plus adding to that, what we know in hindsight now as a result of the ongoing investigation handled by the fbi as they continue to scrub social media, i think we're learning more and more this is clearly a coordinated effort. >> real quick, mr. irving and then i'll ask another question. mr. irving? >> based on the information provided by chief contee and sund, i would agree, the evidence would indicate a coordinated attack. >> so we're looking at folks that were coming out in the intelligence reports, that groups like the oath keepers, proud boys, others were engaged, the violent extremist groups, can we clearly need to collect
8:18 am
more intelligence on, the subject of another hearing that we'll do regarding this. but if you look at what the doj is now prosecuting, 200 federal case an the fbi has linked 40 to extremist groups and 59 to other defendants that have connections on social media or violent rhetoric and conspiracy theories. this is clearly an ourarea of w we did not have more information about these groups that were coming here, planning and usually you leave a trail when you are planning. either that you're sophisticated using encrypted devices but those are things that we'll have to look at. chief contee, in my remaining time, a question and you mentioned this in your testimony, but in an earlier statement you stated that you were stunned by the, quote, the tepid response of the army
8:19 am
officials in response to chief sund's request for assistance while the violent siege was -- was escalating. clearly here we have a coordinated attack, all of you saw this immediately the way they were doing, i could imagine the conversations with the national guard and chief, you were stunned by the tepity response. you could clarify that and tell us how those conversations went? >> yeah. so just after -- sometime after 2:00 p.m., i had left the west front of the capitol after initially being at the scene. assessing what was going on, looking at just how violent -- looking at the violent actions that were taken place. shortly thereafter there was a phone call convened between several officials. chief sund was on the call, literally pleading for -- there were several army officials on the phone. i don't know all by name who were on the call. several officials from district government that were on the scene and chief sund was pleading for the deployment of the national guard.
8:20 am
and in response to that, there was not an immediate yes, the national guard is responding. yes, the national guard is on the way. yes, the national guard are being restaged from traffic posts to respond. the response was more asking about the plan, what was the plan for the national guard, and the response was more focused on in addition to the plan, the optics about how this looks with boots on the ground on the capitol. and my response to that was simply, i was just stunned that i have officers that are literally fighting for their lives and we're kind of going through what seemed like an exercise to check the boxes and there was not an immediate response. when i asked specifically, steve sund, chief sund, was he requesting national guard and was that request being denied. the response was no, we're not -- from the u.s. department
8:21 am
of army, was no, we're not denying the request, but they were concerned, they did have concerns so again i was just stunned at that response. >> thank you. >> senator blunt. >> chief sund, if i have your testimony correct this morning, i think what i'm hearing you say is based on intelligence you saw on january 3rd, after that on january 4th, you decided this was going to be a different kind of protest than we had seen in november and december and that is when you ask for an expand the perimeter and national guard assistance, is that correct? >> so the information we received, yes, it was very similar to the previous assesses. it was just a little bit por detailed. we had been analyzing how we responded to the previous maga marches and decided to expand the perimeter. when you expand a perimeter as
8:22 am
large as we expanded it, it created a large area you have to defend and that is the primary reason knowing that the protesters are coming here and we're the focus of the protests and the expanding perimeter and we knew this was going to be a long day. the -- >> so did you know from the time you expanded the perimeter that you were going to have to have more help in all likelihood to defend that perimeter than your force would be able to provide? >> we knew the additional support would be -- we could utilize the additional support, yes. >> so why did you believe that you needed the approval of mr. irving and mr. stanger to request assistance to the national guard? >> that is always been the case. we only request the national guard for very specific events. usually the inauguration and that requires a declaration of emergency from the capitol police board to utilize those resources. >> do you know if there is a statutory requirement for that? >> i could look into that and get you that as a follow-up. >> i don't know that there is.
8:23 am
but i do know that if you get the approval to expand the perimeter and you don't have the assistance to do that, that is obviously a problem. why didn't you contact the third member of the police board, the architect of the capitol mr. blanton. >> thank you for that question. my conduit to the capitol police board was through the house and senate sergeant at arms. they were the ones have the communications with the department especially law enforcement related issues. they're both law enforcement. and also the fact that mr. stanger at the time as the capitol police board chairperson, but outside of the monthly capitol police board meeting that we have, unless it was an if issue specific to the architect, regarding building tr structures, my conduit was the house and senate sergeant of arms. >> why do you think the capitol is on the police board. >> as one of the voting members in providing over sight. >> but apparently not enough over sight that you thought you
8:24 am
needed to involve him in the conversation. >> like i said, my usual conduit was going through the house and senate sergeant at arms. that is already two people i have to go to. going to three, in the future, i guess if that is something that is going to be -- that we'll implement, then i will implement it. i was just following my usual course of action. >> so mr. irving and mr. stanger both, let's start with mr. irving. why was the request for national guard assistance not approved at the same time you approved the expansion of the perimeter? mr. irving. i think you're muted mr. irving. now you're definitely muted. now you should be fine. go ahead. >> am i okay now. >> yes. >> thank you. i apologize for that. senator, i did not take the call from chief sund on the 4th as a request. chief sund called me to tell me
8:25 am
that he had received an offer from the national guard to provide us 125 unarmed troops to work traffic control in the perimeter of the capitol. shortly after that discussion, i said let's cler sergeant at arms stanger at chair of the board and another senior official with quite a bit of experience. the three of us talked it through. and during that call, the number one question on the table was did the intelligence support it? did the intelligence support that additional offer for those 125 troops? >> did you discuss this with anybody except sergeant at arms stanger and chief sund? >> no. it was just this one phone call and during that call we all agreed that the intelligence did not support the troops and
8:26 am
collectively decided to let it go. michael stanger then said how about we put them on stand-by just in case and that is what we ended up doing. but what happened -- very satisfied that we had a robust plan, security plan that was consistent with the intelligence that we had at the time. >> mr. stanger, why did you think that -- that the troops were on stand-by? they must have been standing way away from where we needed them if it took hours to get them here. what did that mean, they were going to be on stand-by? >> well i did when i spoke to the chief, when the chief were up to the -- this attempt to get the national guard and wasn't going forward, i suggested to them that we reach out and to
8:27 am
the national guard commander and the previous -- the metropolitan police department and i suggested to reach out to the national guard commander for a couple of reasons. one of them was i had read in the paper or heard on the news that the the national guard in d.c. was rather reticent engage with demonstrations at this time because of the issues that had arisen there in the white house demonstrations a month ago. and that -- that we needed to make sure that the national guard was engaged in this and that they would be willing to -- >> do you think you did make sure that they were engaged and would be willing. i'm going to have to go to one more question here. did you think they were engaged and would be willing if called on? >> yeah, that is what i think -- what i asked the chief to
8:28 am
determine from the general. >> mr. irving, you said in your testimony that when asked for national guard assistance, you approved it. mr. sund tated that he asked for the national guard assistance at 1:09 and approved -- and it was approved at 2:10. why would it take an hour to approve national guard assistance on your part in that moment of crisis? mr. irving. >> senator, from my recollection, i did not receive a request for approval for national guard until shortly after 2:00 p.m. when i was in michael stanger's office. >> let me get that straightened out. mr. sund, do you know when you asked for national guard assistance? was it 1:90 or 2:00 p.m. >> it was 1:09. >> and who did you ask for assistance. >> i believe mr. irving, in the company of mr. stanger at time.
8:29 am
>> and why would you not remember that? >> senator, i have no recollection of a conversation with chief sund at that time i was on the floor during the electoral college session. and my conversation with chief sund in that time frame was shortly before 1:30 when i recall he was describing conditions outside as deteriorating. he may, in fact, be submitting a request and i carried that forward and that was as much as i could tell you. i have no phone record of a call from chief sund. the first record -- >> did you discuss that request at 1:09 or did you and mr. stanger make that decision then. >> i did not get a request at 1
8:30 am
1:09. the time was 1:28, 1:30. and at that time conversation he indicated that conditions were deteriorating, he might be looking to -- for national guard approval and approval of a mutual aid agreement with local law enforcements and i went awaiting an update. >> and this is time, i'm sure my colleagues will want to follow up on this because i'm out of time. but this is a time when the difference in 1:30 and 2:00 makes a big difference. i'm going to tell you what i'm thinking. is that in a moment like this, if your focus is chiefly on the safety of house members and i would certainly understand that, and mr. stanger is chiefly on the safety of senate members, maybe that is a problem here where the board really can't function as a board because you
8:31 am
have such diverse areas of immediate responsibility. but whatever happened here doesn't seem to me to be in agreement with the various time frames and i'm out of time, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator blunt. and i wanted senator peters and i to trade off chairing here with the votes and we have a set order that all of the senators staff have based on a melded set of rules between the two committees, and i'd like to submit for the record a written statement from the united states capitol police labor committee dated february 23rd, 2021. thank you. >> without objection. >> ranking member portman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first of all, with regard to the conversations we just have on the discrepancies with regard to national guard assistance, i would request that both chief sund, you and mr. irving provide us with those phone records. i know there has have been some
8:32 am
interviews conducted but the phone records would clear up some of the confusion. i want to shift gears a little bit and talk about preparedness. chief sund, in your testimony you talked about the need for a better intelligence and better coordination. that was your conclusion and i think that is true. and certainly everything that we have learned indicated that that is part of the problem. but what about preparedness? we've received information that prior to january 6th capitol police officers were not trained on how to respond to an infiltration of the capitol building. is that correct, mr. sund? >> when you talk about infiltration talking about a large insurrection like we saw on january 6th, no. >> and why not? would wouldn't be prepared for infiltration of the capitol given the risk that is out there to mr. irving and mr. stanger, both of you have distinguished
8:33 am
careers with the secret service, i would ask you all to just give me a quick yes or no answer, does the secret service have training regarding infiltration as an example of the white house, yes or no? mr. stanger? mr. irving? >> senator. >> i'll take that as a yes. if it is a no -- >> yes. >> mr. stanger, are you a yes also in. >> yes. >> it seems obvious that you would have training responding to an infiltration. um, so i think if nothing else comes out of this process, we've got to figure out how to deal with again the real danger that is out there and it seems to me intelligence reports but also just the previous demonstrations would indicate a need for that kind of training. let me ask you about something
8:34 am
else, if i could, mr. sund, and that has to do with the u.s. capitol police officers that i saw on video and the world saw fighting against this attack in street uniforms or soft uniforms. many of them did not have riot gear. i'm told by contrast d.c. metropolitan police department provides all of the officers with such gear including helmets, shields and gloves and gas masks. having seen those incredibly disturbing videos and photographs of your brave officers attempting to hold the line, to defend the capitol without that kind of riot gear, are all capitol police officers outfitted with riot gear? >> no, they are not, sir. >> they're not. and why are they not? >> so, if you look at way we outfit our officers, it will probably be similar to find even with metropolitan, i've been with metropolitan for a number of years, they'll have a certain
8:35 am
number of officers, cdu platoons, it is not the entire force that is ouft fitted to the level one cdu about the protective gear, the helmet and things like that. so we outfit a number of our -- we have seven cdu platoons that would can he activate and people in a platoon are activated to level one it requires expensive cost and training to keep and maintain that level for us, a number of our officers are in screen postings where that gear wouldn't do them -- provide them any support. so we have determined up until january 6th that that number of cdu platoons have sufficed for all of the -- >> i would just say, obviously those officers who you say had interior posts needed it that day. so it is not accurate to say that they didn't need it. but i know that you activated
8:36 am
seven of the civil dis -- civil disturbance unit platoons. and only four of them had riot gear. i don't know why you would have a civil disturbance unit platoon that didn't have riot gear. but you've just testified that that is true. that only four of them had it, is that correct? >> that is correct. and just one additional point, since i've been chief i pushed for every member in the department to have riot helmets, i ordered those back in september, we had been looking at delays because of covid from the manufacturer getting them delivered and they were delivered january 4th and distributed to our officers days before this with limited numbers being given to the officers prior to the event. >> too late for many of the officers. chief couldn't e, i thought the officers did have access to riot gear. you could comment on that. >> so we have seven platoons
8:37 am
that have the hard -- all of the officers have ballistic helmets and all have batons and all have deployed with gloves as well and a gas mask. so our entire department are deployed with that level and when you talk about harden all of the extras, we have seven platoons that have the additional, that is a different layer of protection. >> but every officer has a helmet, the protective gloves and -- >> and gas mask, that is correct. >> it appeared to the metropolitan police department, i'm told, that the capitol police officers did not have the training and civil disturbance tactics that they had. that is what i told by some of the interviews that we have. chief contee, is that correct? >> yes.
8:38 am
i've heard the same thing with respect to the training of the u.s. capitol police officers. >> are all of your metropolitan police officers trained in civil disturbance tactics? >> we have platoons that are trained for every -- for every patrol district and special operations division. some officers do not have the civil disturbance training, those officers will generally work traffic duties or assignments back in patrol. >> chief sund -- >> if i could add -- if i could add, too, one other thing. all of the officers who leave the training academy, they get the basic training but we might have some members for example who have been on for 30 years and they haven't been cdu trained but all of the members coming off of the academy, they
8:39 am
will receive the civil disturbance unit training. >> mr. sund, is that true with capitol police officers also, are they all trained in civil disturbance tactics. >> that is a process being implemented, i could check and see if that is for new recruits out of the academy. that is one of the initiatives we were working on. >> so you were working on this but it training is not for new officers much less -- >> i believe the new officers were, but i need to confirm that. >> yeah, i think that the bottom line here is that unfortunately our officers who were not given the proper training with regard to infiltration of the building or the complex with regard to dealing with civil disturbance and they didn't have the equipment necessary to push back and most importantly to protect themselves. so my hope is that, again, one of the ways that this joint hearing and this committee report can be helpful is to bring the capitol police
8:40 am
department up to speed and look, i appreciate the sacrifice and the bravery of that day. but i think we also owe it to the officers to provide them the training and kwixequipment theyd to protect themselves and the capitol. thank you, mr. karm. >> thank you, ranking member. the chair now recognized senator leahy. >> thank you, chairman. i would like to call upon what senator portman said. i agree with his concerns. but i might ask a question from the appropriations committee and i know time is limited so these could be yes or no answers. the appropriations committee is always working in bipartisan fashion to get money to the -- to the police. so mr. sund, yes or no, appropriations committee, ultimately the congress have met your request for salaries and
8:41 am
operating expenses in every fiscal year, is that not co correct? >> yes, sir. >> and mr. stranger, the appropriations committee and the congress has met your request for salaries and operating expenses every fiscal year, that correct? i don't hear an answer. so i'll ask mr. irving. mr. irving, the appropriations committee and ultimately the congress, for your request for salaries for operating expenses in every fiscal year, is that correct? >> yes. that is correct. >> mr. stanger. >> yes, that is correct, sir. >> thank you very much. so, i have to think that we had -- not that we have inadequate resources, but a failure to deploy the people
8:42 am
that we were supposed to. i look at those who appeared, i looked at the lives that were lost, the police who fought, who protected our capitol saw this as a violent and i would say planned and organized attack on the united states in the united states government by domestic terrorists, i hope they're all going to be prosecuted as fully as they can. but when we see people encouraging them, including from the former president of the united states, who urged his followers to fight and to show strength, i really wonder why we didn't take this seriously enough to be prepared for them, the hours it took to bring in the national guard and everything else.
8:43 am
so, i would, mr. sund, i read your detailed letter to speaker pelosi. but you said there wasn't enough intelligence shared. but in your same letter you stated that the intelligence sesment that i'm quoted here, indicated that members of the proud boys, white supremacist groups, antifa and other extremist groups were expected to participate in the january 6th event and they may be inclined to become violent. how much more intelligence do we need than that? >> yes, sir, that is correct. that is what the intelligence assessment said. it was very similar to the intelligence assessments that we had for the november and december maga marches. the intelligence assessments that we had developed for the january 6 event all the way up
8:44 am
until january 6 were say the same thing and that is what we planned for. we planned for the -- the possibility of violence, the possibility of some people being armed. not the possibility of a coordinated military-style attack involving thousands against the capitol. >> violence -- strike me as a pretty strong thing and i would suggest everybody get together and look at the future because if you have something that goes on for months and the president calling them and everybody else calling them, i am worried there is not more there. i think until we root out the hate and throw the rioters to the door that day, no fence or or tank or barrier is going to provide the safety we need. not just safety but also talking about -- those who give up the
8:45 am
liberty to have safety deserve either liberty nor safety. but i know a vote is on and before i close i do want to commend chief contee for your response. you don't have an easy job protecting a city as large as washington, d.c. and balance the delicate balance of dozens of other law enforcement. i think that i commend the two chairs and rank and members for having this hearing. we'll hold more in appropriations. but we're going to look very closely at the request this year and so, what do we do if we have another one of these. i thank you and i yield back my time. >> thank you, senator leahy. chair recognizes senator johnson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to start off by just thanking our law enforcement witnesses for your service.
8:46 am
i know there is -- 2020 is hindsight and it is easy to monday morning quarterback and i want to guard against doing so. i've seen from testimony it seems like there is a fair amount of thought, a fair amount of due diligence that went into this. so i appreciate your service. i also want to say, i find the videos as you said, chief sund, sickening, the violent reprehensible and the racial slurs repug nantz and i want to make sure the perpetrators that engaged in the violence are prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. i have a long list of questions which this format doesn't lend itself to asking so i'll be preparing a letter for the committee chair and hoping that they will ask those questions an investigate these issues that i'll be listing. but in terms of asking, questions, want to start out by reading excerpts from what i thought was a very interesting eyewitness account by j. michael
8:47 am
waller. he is a senior analyst for a strategy at the center of security policy, his areas of concentration include political and psychological warfare and sub version and a professor from the institute of world pole ticks at the naval graduate school and at ft. bragg and he saw provauk tours on january 6 and he arrived at 11:30 from union station and a walk from near union station and noticed a small number of capitol police dressed if full riot gear with shin guards and shoulder guards. then i walked up pennsylvania avenue toward an empty freedom park. he noticed that the speech had broken up and so a crowd was walking down constitution avenue. he joined them at 13th street. but said that the mood of the crowd was positive. and festive.
8:48 am
of the thousands people who passed me along constitution avenue, some were indignity and contempt of congress but many were families with small children and elderly or over weight or plain frail and not attributed to the riot prone. many wore pro-police shirts or black and blue flags and although there was a brought section of americans mostly working class, some people stood out. a very few didn't share the jovial friendly demeanor of the great majority. some obviously didn't fit in and he describes four different types of people. plain clothes militants. agen agents provauk tours and then disciplined uniform column of attackers. i think these are the people that probably planned this. he goes on, the d.c. metropolitan police were the usually professionally detached selves standing on curbs or
8:49 am
street crossing and exchanging occasional greetings from marchers. where the capitol police have jurisdiction, i noticed to police at all. they opened the scene like a courtesy gesture from congress that controls security. that made no sense. yet no capitol police awe're peered anywhere from what we could see. i'm taking these excerpts in order. but there is a lot more to this piece. what looked like tens or even hundreds of thousands people surged down the avenues as far as one could see. but almost everyone seemed talkative and happy. no police could be seen on the platform people kept surging in from constitution avenue and the plaza quickly flowed onto the lawn. everyone squeezed closely together, with most in high spirits. some trouble began up in the front near the base of the inaugural platform itself, but we could not see what was
8:50 am
happening. then something happened at the front of the crowd. it seemed like a scuffle, but from 40 feet back, i couldn't see. people started chanting, usa, usa and other slogans. for a few seconds i saw what looked like police in a tussle with some of marchers up front, what looked to be an organized group in civilian clothes. i would call them the plainclothes militants. they fit right in with maga police. suddenly is the anti-riot police visibly tensed up. one fired a tear gas canister, not at the front line, but into the crowd itself. then another. flash grenades went off in the middle of the crowd. the tear gas changed the crowd's demeanor. there was an air of disbelief as people realized the police who they supported were firing on them. what are you doing? we support you, someone yelled. all of a sudden pro-police people felt that the police were attacking them, and they didn't know why. more tear gas. a canister struck a girl in the
8:51 am
face, drawing blood. the pro-police crowd went from disbelief and confusion to anger. i'll stop there. the last five pages is titled "provocateurs turn unsuspecting marchers into a mob." i ask everybody to read that and put it into the record. chief, i want to ask you, the house managers made a big deal that thfis was predictable, thi was foreseeable, which i don't believe. do you believe that what happened -- the breach of the capitol, did you believe that's foreseeable and predictable? >> no, i don't, nor do -- if you look at some of our other partner agencies, i think acting chief conti actually made the statement that the breach at the capitol was not anticipated, nor do i think any of our partners expected it. >> is part of that what you experienced in the past what mr. waller experienced, that the
8:52 am
vast majority of trump supporters is pro-law enforcement and the last thing they would do is violate the law? >> i will say information i received from my officers, they were trying to prevent people from coming into the building, and they were saying, we're pl police, let us through, and still violating by going into the building. >> i have a question for the sergeant of arms. i knew these committees would start an investigation. i waited a couple weeks. i didn't see an oversight letter go out, so i wrote my own on the 21st, and i just have a question for the former sergeant in arms. did you get my oversight letter with my questions? >> i did not receive your letter. i left town right after i resigned, but i certainly look forward to working with you and your staff to answer your questions. >> if you would give us an address because we sent it to
8:53 am
the acting sergeant in arms. the acting sergeant in arms won't let us know if they passed that on to you, apparently they didn't. mr. siegel, did you receive my letter? >> i don't recall, senator. i might have. i don't recall. >> chief, one last question to you. do you regret resigning? >> yes, i do regret resigning. i love this agency, i love the men and women of this agency, and i regret that i left. >> first of all, look for my letter and i'd like an answer to that as quickly as possible. thank you. >> thank you, senator johnson. we're waiting for senator warner and any other member. i see senator rosen. would you like to go ahead? you're the first member on, senator rosen. >> perfect. thank you very much, senator klobuchar, and thank you, everyone, for being here today and bringing this hearing.
8:54 am
it's much needed and i think this is the first of many. but i'd like to start off by saying my thoughts are with the brave capitol police officers. they put their lives on the line to protect us on january 6, and their heroic actions like the ones of officer goodman, they put those rioters away from us, and we know these courageous men and women are really hurting in the aftermath of the insurrection, and i've been particularly heartbroken to hear about the death of capitol police officer howard leningood. he was stationed by the door of my office. my thoughts and prayers go out to his loved ones. when they stormed the capitol on january 6, they came not only with weapons but they came with hate. the world watched in horror as a
8:55 am
rioter inside the capitol proudly wore a camp auschwitz shirt as he and others violently pushed forward on the house and senate floors. all the while, the rioters are waving confederate flags, are hanging nooses on the front lawn. they're verbally assaulting a reporter on front lawn. they referred to the cattle cars that used to transfer jews. these are followers of the a anti-semitic qanon. leader turillo, leader of the proud boys hate group. the next day they shared with fbi concrete secrets about their plans on january 6, including specific threats on members of
8:56 am
congress. maps of the tunnels under the capitol complex. if they were tracking possible violent extremist activity, what exactly did you know on january 5th and why didn't you alert anyone? >> thank you for that question. what the fbi said now on january 5th was in the form of an e-mail. i would certainly think that something as violent as an insurrection in the capitol would warrant a phone call or something. but as chief sum mentioned earlier, it was uncorroborated information, it was raw information that we had, that we received through the same lines, through the jttf. that information was not fully vetted and had not been sent through the chains of the metropolitan police department. what the metropolitan police
8:57 am
department was prepared for was the larger violence and demonstrations that we expected to see in our city. >> i have to ask the same question. what did you know on january 5 this? quickly, chief sun, what did you know on january 5? what did you expect? >> i was concerned. we had the intelligence coming out, the intelligence we would be planning for. again, keep in mind the intelligence assessments we had developed at the end of december, and the one for january 3rd, were very, very similar. they just provided a little more specificity, so we had already been planning for the threat for violence, the threat for armed people protesting. that's what we were planning for. if you refer to the norfolk letter, again, i just became aware that the department was aware of that 24 hours ago, so on the 6th or the 5th or the
8:58 am
4th, i was not aware that memo existed. >> so you're saying there is a breakdown between you and the fbi, because we have rallies, protests and things happening in washington all the time. how many -- could both of you just maybe give a guess, how many do you think were actually armed insurrectionists or came heavily armed out of the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of rallies that we see in washington through the year? >> you know, the last three incidents, the first two, the women of the metropolitan police department recovered firearms from several people who were attending the demonstrations at the first maga rally as well as the second one. aside from that, those have been really the only demonstrations of where we've seen individuals coming are. >> do you think this was an intelligence breakdown or a
8:59 am
resource issue? >> i think that the intelligence did not make it where it needed to be in terms of -- >> you think the fbi did not raise this to the level they needed to with metropolitan police department, in your mind? >> we received in the form of an e-mail that came as an alert bulletin at 7:00 p.m. the day before. al foster of the metropolitan police department, again, i think is reflected in our deployment, not just the national guard that was deployed, but as well as other officers in other jurisdictions. that's what we were expecting to see in the city. >> mr. sund, can you tell me, do you think this was a resource issue or intelligence breakdown or something else? if you'll be brief, because this is very important -- >> yes, ma'am, i'll be very brief. it was part of my introduction. i think it was more than just a norfolk letter.
9:00 am
i think we need to look at the whole entire intelligence community and the view they have on some domestic extremists and the effect that they have. i look at this as an intelligence problem that impacted this event, yes. >> so what information would you have had to have heard to have raised up the flag to get more resources for the capitol police? because thank goodness -- i mean, we saw loss of life, and thank goodness there wasn't more, but one is too many. so what is your threshold? what should be the threshold at the capitol that protect your officers? >> i did in advance reach out to the washington, d.c. police to coordinate resources, and i did also go to both the house and senate sergeant in arms to request the national guard. >> mr. contee, i think i have five seconds and we can take this off the record, but i believe there are some plans by qanon for something to happen at the capitol on march 4. wa


info Stream Only

Uploaded by TV Archive on