Skip to main content

tv   CNN Newsroom With Brianna Keilar  CNN  February 23, 2021 10:00am-11:00am PST

10:00 am
sergeant-at-arms to request the assistance of the national guard and mr. irving said he was concerned about the optics of having to deploy, is that right? am i remembering that correctly? >> yes, sir. on the 4th, it wasn't a phone call, it was an in-person visit to his office where i went in and requested the national guard. >> mr. irving, when you used the term optics, and maybe you didn't, do you recall being concerned about the optics of the national guard and could you just elaborate on what you meant by that? again, this is monday, january 4th, now. >> on monday january 4th, senator, safety was always a deciding factor in making security plans. the issue on the table was whether the intelligence warranted troops at the capitol. and the conversation with mr. sund was not -- i did not take it as a request, he was merely informing me that he had received an offer from the
10:01 am
national guard. then when we included mr. stenger, the three of us discussed the specific issue on whether the intelligence warranted the troops and the answer was no. it was a collective answer no, and then mr. stenger put forward his recommendation of having them on stand-by, and my recollection is mr. sund was very satisfied with that. in fact, he briefed the day that he was satisfied, and i heard no concern anytime thereafter. >> this use of the word "optics," the appearance, what it would look like to have the guard, there was reluctance to request assistance because of the appearance. was there something -- what's the appearance that you were concerned about, mr. irving, if indeed you were? were you concerned that having the guard present would look too militarized, were you concerned about the guard being deployed
10:02 am
prior to that in 2020? >> i was not concerned about appearance whatsoever. it was all about safety and security. any reference would have been related to appropriate use of force, display of force, and ultimately the question on the table when we look to any security asset, is does the intelligence warrant it? again, the collective answer was yes. >> mr. chairman, could i just ask one final question? >> yes. >> thank you. madam chair, thank you. speaker pelosi has asked retired lieutenant generous sell to honor an immediate review of campus security in light of the attack. the general has said that the leadership of the capitol police, thalt would be you, mr. sund, and both gentlemen, the house and senate sergeant-at-arms, he is quoting
10:03 am
you for of complicity during the attack and you had complicit reactions. mr. sund, were you complicit during the attack? >> no, i was not. i've heard that and i think it's an insult to the department. >> mr. stenger, were you complicit in the attacks on january 6? >> mr. irving, were you complicit in the attacks on january 6? >> absolutely not, senator. >> of course, none of you were. there is absolutely no evidence to that effect. and, mr. sund, i think your reaction was appropriate to allege that any of you were
10:04 am
complicit in this violent attack from this mob on this building. it's really quite shocking and this person has no business leading any security review related to the events of january 6. thank you for your indulgence, madam chair. >> thank you very much. next, a new member of both committees, senator padilla. >> thank you, madam chair. there's been a lot of questions from multiple committees understanding about intelligence, what was known, what was shared, et cetera, and differing opinions. i'll try not to be too repetitive. first a quick question for chief sund and the two sergeant-at-arms. i imagine, like most people, you saw most, if not all, of the house impeachment managers' presentations before the united
10:05 am
states senate as they sort of laid out the case. the impeachment question aside, we know how that was resolved, but in terms of how january 6 didn't just happen, but the lead-up to january 6, is there anything from that presentation that you would disagree with? >> just to make sure i understand, the video i watched, the video that was portrayed is all accurate video. as far as any of the other commentary associated with the video, i can't say i watched every single bit of it, but i can tell you the video, a lot of that video was video from the united states capitol police and it was all accurate. >> thank you. mr. stenger, mr. irving, same question. >> the video i saw certainly was what i could see from my window on january 6.
10:06 am
>> and from my perspective, senator, i have not diagnosed the attack at the time. we left all the information to the intelligence agencies we had at the time, and now i would say leave it to the investigations to make a determination. >> a question fror the chief specifically. there is an intelligence division within the department, correct? >> yes, sir. >> now, having read your letter to speaker pelosi, you make reference to events on both november 14th as well as december 12th that you had sort of comparable intelligence in terms of risk assessment, threat assessment and the events of november 14th and december 12th, not leading into anything near what happened on january 6?
10:07 am
is that a correct interpretation of your letter? >> that's a correct interpretation. both indicated that we were going to have various militia groups and extremists in attendance. in addition to the fact that as chief contee had testified to earlier, weapons were recovered during both those events. >> and so to the best of your recollection, in the lead-up to january 6th since it was assessment-comparable intelligence, roughly, you therefore proceeded with comparable posture. >> that is correct, we proceeded with the posture that the scene could have incidents of violence. we knew it would be focused on the capitol. we knew there would be members of proud boys, antifa participating. as i said before, not capitol police, not metropolitan police had any indication we would be facing an insurrection of
10:08 am
thousands of people. >> if we take our experience with terrorism globally and look at case studies both that were implemented and executed across the united states, is it plausible -- and i know hindsight is 20/20 -- is it plausible that the november 14th and december 12th incidents may well have been trial runs, that the very extremist organizations you've referenced involved with the organizing and participation of november 14th, december 12th to gain counterintelligence on how you and your partner agencies would be planning and preparing for such incidents? >> as you rightly point out, when you look at some of the
10:09 am
terrorist attacks that occurred, there has been pre-planning, pre-surveillance, pre-collection on the security features. i don't know if november and december were two incidents of that, but i would suspect with the fact we're finding this is a coordinated attack, i wouldn't doubt there was pre-surveillance. >> we don't know there were, we don't know there weren't? >> correct. >> this was all together in your letter and your testimony earlier today, you bluntly said the intelligence community missed this. >> that is correct, sir. that's the way i feel. >> now, who was commander in chief on december 6? >> when you say commander in chief? >> who was the president of the united states? >> donald trump, sir. >> overseeing the intelligence community that missed this? repeat your answer. >> for the entire 18 agencies that represent the intelligence community? yes, sir, it would be commander in chief.
10:10 am
>> and who was that again? >> president donald trump. >> let me ask a couple questions on a different topic. i think it's obvious to many across the country -- if was on of three senators who was not in chambers on january 6. i had the benefit, if you will, of watching the events occur in realtime both inside the capitol and outside the capitol on television. one thing that was not lost on me and many people i've talked to is the difference in both police presence and response on january 6 compared to events from last summer when peaceful protesters were demonstrating in the nation's capitol in the wake of george floyd's murder. last summer they were met with significant force. a couple data points. to date some 250 individuals who were involved in the capitol insurrection of january 6 have been arrested.
10:11 am
more will likely be arrested in the coming weeks and months, but only a small number, about 52 of these individuals, were arrested on january 6. by contrast, during the largely peaceful protests of last summer, 427 people were arrested. excuse me, on june 1st alone, 289 people were arrested. similarly, some 300 protesters were arrested during the kavanaugh hearings in 2018. a question, mr. sund, can you tell us how the capitol preparation s on january 6 diffr from the protests over the summer? if you could specifically address whether they were the same or different use of force guidelines on january 6 compared to the protests of last summer or any criteria for making
10:12 am
arrests on january 6 versus the protests from last summer. >> okay, and if you could do that in about a minute. thank you, senator. >> yes, ma'am, i will do that very concisely. i want to look at it from planning and preparations. we plan before every demonstration the exact same way. it doesn't matter the message of the person, it doesn't matter the demographics of the grievance in the administration. we develop our information, we develop our intel and we base a response plan on that. so let's transition to preparations. i will tell you we handle 15 major demonstrations involving black lives matters groups following the death of george floyd over the summer. we had a total of six arrests. no use of less capable abilities. everything we put in place for january 6 far exceeded any planning we did for events in 2020.
10:13 am
with a full activation of deployment, with an application of less lethal had far exceeded any event that i can rektcollec on the nation's capitol. >> we're going to go to senator hagedry and senator king who have been very patient. >> thank you, senator klobuchar. thank you for having us at this hearing. i want to begin by thanking all the law enforcement officers that are represented here today. you and your families, thank you for your sacrifice, and certainly my heart goes out to those loved ones who lost their lives in this. in the spring and summer of 2020, many people criticized the use of the national guard in washington following some of the worst rioting in decades.
10:14 am
the mayor said the national guard was unnecessary and possibly counterproductive. they said some of our d.c. national guard may not agree with their deployment. top pentagon officials emphasized that on january 6, the guard would have a, quote, far more muted presence than in june, saying, quote, we've learned our lessons. we'll be absolutely nowhere near the capitol building. mr. sund just stated that despite asking for the national guard, he was unable to get deployment on january 6. my first question is directed at mr. sund. do you think deploying the national guard in the summertime
10:15 am
lessened the request to have national guard at the capitol? >> i have nothing regarding decisions made over the summer or the issues on the 4th, however, there was no other word about the 6th. >> we are here today to examine those issues. speaker pelosi has also appointed a retired army lieutenant general, russell onre, who is going to lead the investigation of the insurrection that happened. he said, once all this gets going again, it was implicit actions by police.
10:16 am
you, my sorn, was complicit alog with the house and senate. do any comments like these suggest someone who was in charge on january 6th? >> i found the comments he made regarding myself and also the campus police officers highly disrespectful to the hard-working men and women to that police department. i welcome and look forward to an after-action that will move this agency forward, move our partnership with the federal agz for -- agencies forward, but it has to be done in an unbiased fashion. >> i couldn't agree more, mr. sund. any other responses? >> i would disagree with the general's -- what he said. i don't believe that's true. there are a lot of people that
10:17 am
found themselves in very much danger on that day, and i think saying something like that is not in good taste. >> i can't imagine that being said myself, implying that you all were complicit in this. i thank you for your answers and for your service. i yield back, madam chair. >> senator king. you may be muted. >> i got it. >> okay, great. >> thank you, madam chair, and i want to thank the witnesses first for their patience this morning and their answers. this has been a long hearing and i really appreciate it. and i appreciate the fact that although you all are no longer, other than the chief in washington, no longer in your positions, that you've come forward to give us the benefit of your observations.
10:18 am
it seems to me one of the clear -- i'm not going to plow this ground again, but one of the clear pieces of information we've learned today is an intelligence failure. not necessarily a failure of intelligence but a failure to communicate intelligence. and i think that's something that we all need to think about, and you can be very helpful to us in suggesting what should be the chain of communication in terms of intelligence? you can't adequately prepare if you don't have the information, and it clearly seems to me there were some failures. chief sund, i have a specific question for you, and it's more forward-looking, but i'd appreciate your insights. the question is, how do we protect the capitol from either an angry mob or, probably more likely, one or two or three
10:19 am
malignant actors without turning it into a fortress? how do we allow the american people to go in the rotunda to tour the capitol, to picnic on the grounds, to play with their kids? it seems to me going forward that's really one of the challenges. we want security but we don't -- i would hate to see the u.s. capitol turned into a fortress. your thoughts, mr. sund? >> i think you need your mic on. >> i think we ever thhave the p in place from the intelligence
10:20 am
that we need to have. we need to work on where this is coming from when we face a deadly insurrection. the capitol police are well trained on what you're talking about, a mumbai style attack, shooters, things like that, those are the types of things we're ready for. it's the thousands of people storming a capitol that creates a big issue with us. when you're talking about physical security, and i me mentioned in my opening statement in one of the original questions, i think there are options for maintaining an open environment, an open campus type of environment while putting in substantial, physical security measures in place for both the skin of the building as well as farther out. time and dance is our best friend, and the most important thing is to provide some kind of protection farther out so the officers have more time to deal with it. that's something, i think, that should be discussed in a closed or classified session.
10:21 am
>> i understand. but -- and i hope that is a discussion, madam chair, that we can have. i think that's a very impo important -- because, as i say, we don't want the united states capitol to be so protected that it's inaccessible to the american people. amplify on your intelligence answer. it seems to me you're saying it's communicated adequately but we didn't have the collection that we needed. for example, the norfolk, virginia letter. how does it get filtered and where does it get filtered? >> again, the norfolk field office letter, that's something to consider, because on the 5th, at noon on the 5th, i held a joint conference call with members of the board, my executive team, a dozen of the top law enforcement and military officials from washington, d.c.
10:22 am
where we discussed the upcoming events on the 6th, the upcoming events for the inauguration, any threats or issues we may have. even though i had the director of the field office for the washington field office of the fbi, nothing was mentioned about it. so i think my big point is, i think we need to look out. there is significant evidence coming out that the insurrection that occurred on the 6th was planned, coordinated well in advance, coordinated almost to the point where you're looking between the number of states where you're having events coordinated, and it's that detection that i think would have been key to put the effective security in place for this event. >> finally, when we're talking about providing this level of security, is there a playbook, is there a contingency plan that's literally sitting on a shelf somewhere that says demonstrations around the
10:23 am
capitol, here's what you do? some of the timing things, for example, the kbedeployment of t national guard, might have been faster had there been a predetermined set of phone numbers, actions, steps to be taken. does that exist, and if not, should it exist? >> to the level where you're including the national guard, there is a process where we handle special events and demonstrations, but i tend to agree that we need to streamline the process that we request of the national guard in the future. >> yeah, because clearly there was a delay there that was an important part of the response at the time. madam chair, again, i want to thank these witnesses. i think they really made a contribution and they made a contribution when they were serving in their respective positions. thank you, i yield back. >> thank you.
10:24 am
>> senator sinema is recognized for her questions. >> what coordination was taken leading up to january 6th to share intel across federal and local law enforcement, and what security planning took place and with what agencies? >> thank you for that question. there were a series of several meetings that took place leading up to the events of january 6th. there were weekly law enforcement partners calls where our federal partners are part of that. there is the first amendment coordinating calls that took place, at least two of those, prior to this event. there is a national parks service permit call that also took place prior to this event, and as chief sund mentioned, several calls involving several
10:25 am
of the law enforcement entities leading up to the events of january the 6th. so there are a significant amount of phone calls or virtual meetings that took place, all leading up to january 6. >> thank you. and could you talk a little bit about what you see as the mistakes that were made or the holes that didn't help connect all those dots in those meetings in coordinating prior to january 6? >> i think the major issue, at least from my perspective, i think that in terms of the sharing of information, how it's shared, i think that is where the focus should be. again, we're talking about a report that came from the office on the day before, that night, after 7:00 p.m. that was sent to
10:26 am
e-mail boxes. as the chief of police for the metropolitan police department, i assure you that my phone was on 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and i'm available for my phone call from any agency that has information with respect to something of this magnitude happening in our city. certainly if there was information about one of our police stations being overwhelmed or a federal building being overrun that was related to the metropolitan police department, i assure you i would be on the phone directly with the officials that are responsible for the law enforcement response to give them that information firsthand. i'm not really relying on technology in the form of an e-mail in hopes that that information makes it to where it needs to be. so i think that's critical to chief sund's point. there were several phone calls leading up to this and no specific information that talked about the events that we saw and experienced on january the 6th,
10:27 am
and i really do believe that there should be a lot of attention given to that. >> i appreciate that. my next question is for mr. sund. you outlined the fbi report was sent via e-mail to the capitol police the evening of january 5th and that you never received the report. is there an understanding within the system of how that report did not make it to you or to other individuals in leadership in the capitol police the night of january the 5th? >> i appreciate that question, ma'am. actually, as i mentioned earlier in the discussion, this is a report that i am just learning about within the last -- you know, they informed me yesterday of the report. so i'm not sure what investigation may be going on. since january 8th, i have left the department. what investigations, i know the chief has put additional safeguards in place to ensure something like that doesn't happen again, but i'm not sure
10:28 am
what the outcome was, why that didn't get if you should farther. >> was there an expectation or proper procedure prior to january 6 that should have gotten that memo brought to your attention the night of january 5th. >> there is a process that ensures that, it gets moved from our intelligence division and based on that information, he could push it to the officials directly from me. we talk regularly. >> ah mentioned, you were just learning about this recently, but would it have been an expectation that the fbi would have called capitol police or someone on the joint task force to alert the new intelligence in an expedited fashion, knowing that this information made it to the capitol police intel team on
10:29 am
the 5th -- what i'm trying to understand is how it did not get to the higher levels to make preparations the night of the 5th. >> i'll just go ahead and echo what chief contee had mentioned, that i do think that deserves na additional focus. i think if we have information coming in the day before a major event that it has a level of specificity, that it could get a little more attention than just being handled in an e-mail or electronic format. >> uh-huh. was there any intelligence you did receive in the several days leading up to january 6 that caused you to change any of the security plans amongst the united states capitol police? >> yeah, just to reiterate, all the intelligence and all the information we had been receiving during the development of the event for the 6th outlined very similar to the intelligence report that was published on the 3rd outlined. we were expecting large numbers of protesters coming in, we expected a potentially violent
10:30 am
group. we knew they were being focused on the capitol, and we knew that somebody may be armed. that was what was really driving, regardless of what was put out the 3rd. this is information we knew, we were developing our security plan around that, and that's when we looked on -- based on our november and december maternity events. that's when i requested the national guard knowing we would need support for the fence line. >> chief contee, you stated that the intelligence you had received on january 6 didn't differ from the previous maga marches, the two previous. was there any conversation or consideration about the fact that the january 6 was scheduled on a vel. and was that different in a
10:31 am
consideration around security than the other two marches which had been done on january 6. >> for the other two maga marches, the metropolitan police department department, we did not call other officers in other jurisdictions to be stationed specifically within a foot of the district of columbia. we did not do that before. the mayor, in addition to calling up those additional resources, again, called upoff e national guard which would allow the metropolitan police department to be a lot more nimble in our response. that enabled us to be able to respond quick toll aly to be ab assist the capitol police
10:32 am
officers. those who were armed in our city, in violation of the order, on federal grounds. so the metropolitan police department's posture certainly was escalated beyond what we did the prior two marches. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i appreciate your indu indulgence. i've gone through my time. i have a couple extra questions i'll submit. thank you. >> thank you, senator sinema, and thank you for your emphasis on the fbi report and issues everyone here seems to acknowledge with getting that that didn't go to the right place and just putting "send" isn't enough for a report like that. next we have senator cruz and after that will be senator ossoff, and if there are any other questions, you should tell us, because those are the last two senators we have.
10:33 am
senator cruz. >> thank you, madam chair. thank you all for being here, thank you for your testimony, and thank you also for your service. i want to thank each of you and each of the heroic officers who demonstrated extraordinary courage in fighting to repel the terrorist attack that unfolded on the capitol on january 6. we are grateful for the bravery and the courage in the face of a truly horrific attack. in the aftermath of that attack, there is naturally a process to assess what could have been done to better prevent that attack, to better secure the capitol. and i think everyone recognizes t
10:34 am
that hindsight is different from what actually carried out and from learning from them what can be done differently to ensure that an attack like that never again occurs. chief sund, i want to focus on what occurred in the days preceding january 6 and on january 6. in your written testimony, you say on monday, january 4th, i approached the two ser sergeant-at-arms to assist the national guard. you say, i approached the sergeant-at-arms to request the national guard. he was concerned about the optics of having national guard present and didn't feel the intelligence supported it. he referred tome to the senate
10:35 am
sergeant-at-arms and i spoke to mr. stenger about deploying the national guard. mr. stenger asked then how quickly we could get the help if needed. can you describe in a little more length those conversations with the two sergeant-at-arms on january 4th? >> absolutely, sir. the first conversation occurred monday morning. i went over -- i would have to refer to my notes, but sometime maybe around 11:00 in the morning, i met with mr. irving in his office. that's where i made the first request for the national guard. he had indicated, i don't know if i really like the optics. i don't think the intelligence really supports it. like we had said, he recommended i talk to the senate sergeant-at-arms. i went over and met with later on in the day -- i'm trying to recall if it was in person or on the phone, i would have to go
10:36 am
over my timeline -- where i reached out to him, and they may have already talked because he said, do you know somebody over at the d.c. national guard? i said, yes, i do, i have a good friend general william walker. he said, could you give him a call that if we need assistance, how quickly could we get assistance and what could he provide us? i went ahead and called general walker and spoke to him and said, hey, general walker, i don't have authority to request national guard, but i want to find out if we needed them on wednesday, how quickly could you get them for us, and is there a way you could kind of be prepared just in case we put in the request? at that point he advised me he had 125 national guardsmen who were supporting the covid events, and if we needed them, he could get them sworn in and get them to us as quick as
10:37 am
possible. we ended our call. the next day i met with mr. stenger. he came over to the office for the 12:00 video call that i hosted with the law enforcement officials from the national capitol from d.c. we spoke about it briefly there and told him what william walker had told me, as well as i passed on to mr. irving, i think later on that afternoon, and they both seemed satisfied with that response. >> so, mr. irving and mr. stenger, mr. irving, as i understand it, you have some disagreement with the characterization about the concern about the optics, so i would invite both mr. irving and mr. stenger to relay your best recollection of that conversation on january 4th. >> senator, my best recollection on january 4th was a phone call from chief sund indicating he had received an offer for 125
10:38 am
unarmed guard that could be positioned around traffic perimeter checkpoints at the capitol. my recollection again is, as we followed up with mr. stenger, the three of us engaged in a conversation whereby we looked at the offer in light of the existing intelligence. and the decision, the collective decision among the three of us, was that the intelligence did not warrant the national guard. and my recollection is that ended the discussion relative to the offer, and the only question on the table is should we perform any follow-up? and mr. stenger recommended that we ask that they be placed on st standby. and that was the end of the discussion. >> so to the best of your recollection, did you make the comment about optics, and if so, what did you mean by that? >> i cannot remember my exact verbiage. had i used any language to the
10:39 am
ef effect, it was all in reference to whether the intelligence was matched to the security plan. >> let me ask mr. irving and mr. steng stenger, did you have any discussion with leadership about bringing in national guard either on january 4th or realtime on january 6th? >> on january 4, no, i had no follow-up conversations, and it was not until the 6th that i alerted leadership that we might be making a request, and that was the end of the discussion. >> mr. stenger? >> for myself, it was january 6th that i mentioned it to
10:40 am
leader mcconnell's staff. >> so there is some disagreement about what time phone calls occurred. i know senator portman asked earlier. i know each of you have phone records. it would be helpful if each of you forward the relevant phone records to this committee, and chief sund, you also said in your testimony that you sent an e-mail to congressional leadership. if you could forward that to the committee as well, i think that would be helpful. thank you. >> thank you. senator ossoff. >> thank you, madam chair, thank you to our panel. i just to want take a moment and echo the sentiments of so many of my colleagues expressing appreciation for the men and women of the united states capitol police who endured a great deal on january 6th and showed great heroism. and also , madam chair, if i
10:41 am
might express an interest in working with you to make sure they are well taken care of and their needs are met. this discussion of the conversation the three of you had regarding supplementry security support on january 6th raises the question of who is in charge. is consensus between the two sergeant-at-arms and the chief of the u.s. capitol police required to make such a request? mr. sund? >> the request for the national guard needs to go to the capitol police board for approval, yes. >> who has ultimate responsibility for the security of the u.s. capitol complex, which individual? >> i believe that falls under the capitol police board. >> the capitol police board. so there is no individual that has personal responsibility for the security at the u.s. capitol complex? >> that's the way i interpret it, yes.
10:42 am
>> had the u.s. capitol police conducted exercises msimulating comparable events such as a violent riot on or at the capitol complex. >> part of our training involves dealing with riotous groups, so we do that training. we do training on people trying to gain entry into the building. officers are trained on how to handle it if someone comes through the door unauthorized, but training for thousands of people coming through the doors, we haven't had that prior to january 6th, but i'm sure they'll find a way to do that now. >> so, mr. sund, officers had gone through capitol training regarding rules of engagement, but had any comprehensive
10:43 am
exercises that included command, that included procedures for coordination with supporting agencies, that included requests for support, that included communications with the department of defense or white house officials or guard units been conducted? >> yes, we have. we do exercises that are very similar to what you're talking about before some of our national special security events. those are the nnsses, such as te inauguration. we'll do tabletop exercises that go through the process of what you're talking about, yes. >> thank you. had the capitol police held any such exercises not pertaining to specific national security special events, so in order to deal with emergent contingencies like a riot not associated with one of those moments specifically identified as requiring a whole of government security response? >> one of the most important
10:44 am
aspects you're talking about that we train our individuals to is what we call the incident command system. that is one of the systems we feel really unprecedented pressure that they exhibited on january 6 began to break down. the incident command system is established specifically so you have people that have the clearest understanding of what's happening, either in the field or inside the building, in control of the resources to utilize to defend against whatever issue you're having or respond to whatever incident you have. it's really an all-hazards approach, but that is something that's trained. we have it as part of our general orders. that is something we'll need to look back on to see how it broke under this pressure. >> and i ask this question in part because of the account that's been shared regarding the coordination with the guard unit, which was here for covid-related mission. if i recall correctly, you related that you had a conversation with the commanding officer and discussed mobilizing
10:45 am
that unit if necessary, first via a military stop and then to come to the capitol, if necessary, on january 6. were there not preexisting channels of communication and procedures in the event you, not at a moment of inauguration or state of the union, but on a given day needed quick reaction to provide security support? >> i think it's the established process where, if you're going to request them in advance or request them for an incident, i think what you need to look at is those emergency requests. but there is a process for going through the secretary of the army, placing an official request. ultimately we did that. we had to do a letterhead after the fact. we did the oral request first and set it up that way, but i think what i did by reaching out to general walker was to get an idea, much like i was requested to do, if we requested them on the 6th, what kind of resources could they give us and what type
10:46 am
of time frame were we looking at? i agree, there are already existing processes and channels to make a request of the national guard. >> you, in fact, anticipated there might be some need based on intelligence your department was seeing. but on any given day, if a for fin -- foreign agency is consulted, could they make a request sufficiently? >> yes. >> what is the budget for the capitol chief and what did you have while you were chief? >> i would have to pull that information. we had a number of people that work there as a sworn-in civilian. >> approximately how many personnel are in the intelligence division, please?
10:47 am
>> i would say 30 or 35 people. >> 30 or 35. does the u.s. capitol police have the ability to do any collection as well as making any request to the other branches for intelligence collection? >> we are an intelligence community. we do have the ability to go and look at, say, open source, seeing what people are talking about on open source, but going and collecting in-depth specific intelligence is something we rely on for the consumer community. >> thank you. i yield back. >> thank you very much. that was our last set of questions, and we're going to conclude this hearing. i wanted to say a few words at the end. first of all, i want to thank chairman peters and senators ranking members blunt and portman for conducting this
10:48 am
hearing in such a professional way. we had a bipartisan agreement on how this hearing would be conducted, who our witnesses would be, and also the plan to have additional hearings, including one next week that we'll be announcing tomorrow with the department of defense, department of homeland security and the fbi. because clearly we have, and our members have, additional questions. i want to thank the witnesses, as i said, for voluntarily appearing before us. i want to thank captain mendoza for her moving words and bravery. in many ways she represents all of the officers that were there that day. a few things that are very clear to me. the first is the statements at the beginning from all of the witnesses. they may have disagreed on some details and, you know, okay. but there is clear agreement that this was a planned insurrection. so i think most members here very firmly agree with that, and
10:49 am
i think it's important for the public to know that this was planned. we now know this was a planned insurrection. it involved white supremacists, it involved extremist groups, and it certainly could have been so much worse except for the bravery of the officers. secondly, we learned about the intelligence breakdown. so many members of both committees asked about that, particularly the january 5th, the fbi report that had some very significant warnings from social media about people who were coming to washington who wanted to wage war. the fact that did not get to key leaders, either the ser sergeant-at-arms or the capitol police chief is really disturbing, really, on both ends. you can't just push "send." as we know, we get tons of
10:50 am
e-mails and we can't hope it gets to the right person, especially when we're dealing with something so serious. the january 3rd intelligence report that came right out of the capitol police also contained, according to "washington post" reports and other information some pretty foreboding details that i would have thought would have resulted in planning and more preparations. the delays capitol police board and department of defense, the fact the sergeant in arms was focused on keeping the members safe in both chambers while the chief was trying to get some emergency approval, to me you can point fingers but you can also look at this as a process that is not prepared for a crisis. and i think out of that, there's some general agreement just based on talking to a number of
10:51 am
members, that there should be changes to the capitol police board, approval process and the like. and it's clear that that action must be taken not only to protect our capitol, but also to protect the brave officers charged with protecting the citadel of democracy. better intelligence sharing, always an outcome when there's failures of intelligence, we know that. but i think we'll get more details in the coming weeks. some security changes at the capitol, requests have been made for a while on those changes that i think we have to seriously consider. i know, it does not have to be barbed wire. of course, this is a public building and you want the school groups and veterans and people to visit here but that doesn't mean we don't make smart security changes to this building. the use of the national guard. we know after 9/11 the national guard helped for quite a while.
10:52 am
we also know that we have to have a plan going forward, as well as consider what happens when we need a greater number of national guard in a crisis and how those approvals are made. those are just some of my takeaways. i'm sure many others will have more. but i do want to make it clear that there are some items of agreement between most of us on this committee, and i don't think we should let the words of a few become the story here because i think this has been a very constructive hearing and i want to thank our witnesses for coming forward as they did. >> thank you, senator klobuchar. it's been good working with you and entire team and rules administration committee. certainly want to thank ranking members who came here today to work in a bipartisan way to ask
10:53 am
tough questions and to get answers. i want to thank captain mendoza, certainly a very i formative way -- informative way to start this hearing. and the witnesses who came here today willingly and be willing to be asked the tough questions and we appreciate you for that effort. while this hearing certainly shed some new light and offered some new information on what happened to the lead-up as well as the response on the january 6th attack on our capitol, it's also raised a number of additional questions that need to be asked. for the last two years i have been working to draw attention to the rise of domestic terrorism. and specifically violence driven by white supremacists. we've only seen the threat of this violence grow, not just
10:54 am
from white supremacists but anti-government groups and people who have been swept up by conspiracy theories and just simple outright lies. the events of january 6th that we heard today only further highlight the grave national security threat that our current homeland security apparatus is clearly not fully equipped to address. our national security agencies were overhauled and they were forged in the aftermath of the september is he of the september 11th attacks. they've been slow to adapt to this evolving threat of domestic threat of terrorism we've seen the last few years. the homeland security committee was created to oversee reforms and fix the intelligence failures that led to 9/11. now i tend to ensure this committee oversees the failure that's led to the january 6th attack. there's no question our federal counterterrorism resources are
10:55 am
not focused on effectively addressing the growing and deadly domestic terror threat. the january 6th attack marked a once-in-a-lifetime failure, and now we have the dut whyy to ens the federal government is doing everything in its power to make sure another attack like this never happens again. we must align our counterintelligence resources and our intelligence gathering efforts to make sure week focused on this dire threat, fbi, department of homeland security and national counterterrorism center. right now are eight months late on a report to assess the threat posed by domestic terrorism. we will continue to push them to complete this report as soon as possible so we can take meaningful action. there's no question in my mind that there was a failure to take this threat more seriously despite widespread social media content and public reporting that indicated violence was extremely likely.
10:56 am
the federal government must start taking these online threats seriously to ensure they don't cross into the real-world violence. i also plan to keep the pressure up on social media companies to work harder to ensure that their platforms are not used as a tool to organize violence. so this investigation does not end here today. and i look forward to our next hearing, where we will continue to seek answers to important questions that were raised today and others that need to be answered. before we adjourn, however, i have to do a bit of quick housekeeping. it's my privilege to announce the members of the subcommittees of the homeland security and government affairs committee for the 117th congress. the following senators will serve on the permanent subcommittee on investigations -- jon ossoff will be chair. ron johnson, ranking member, tom carper, maggie hasan, alex
10:57 am
padilla, rand paul, james lankford and rick scott. the following senators will serve on the emerging threats and spending oversight subcommittee. maggie hasan, rand paul -- maggie hasan will be chair. rand paul will be ranking member. >> you've been watching here the first of what will be many hearings on the deadly insurrection on january 6th. we've been listening here to the former sergeants at arms for both the house and senate, the former capitol hill police chief and acting d.c. metro police chief. all of them answering lawmakers' questions here. some of the questions we have not had the answers to until now. this is what we heard so far in this hearing. the witnesses agree it was a planned and coordinated attack, that white supremacists were involved in this capitol attack. there's accusations of bad intel that didn't indicate an insurrection, missed intel warnings from the fbi, capitol police lacking training and equipment. there was red tape within the
10:58 am
capitol hill police board leadership, and the national guard request was not immediately approved. let's talk about all of this now with cnn's chief political analyst gloria borger, our cnn law enforcement analyst and former philadelphia police commissioner charles ramsey and peter la cottia, who is a cnn law enforcement analyst and former supervisory agent at the fbi. charles, to you first, i want to listen first and i want to get all of your reactions to something senator ron johnson said. let's listen. >> many of the marchers were families with small children, many elderly, overweight or plain tired for frail, traits not typically attributed to the riot prone. many pro-police shirts or pro-police plaqblack and blue f. although they represented mostly the working class by manner and speech, some stood out. didn't share the jovial, friendly and earnest demeanor of the great majority. some obviously didn't fit in. he describes four different
10:59 am
types of people, plain-clothed militants, acts provoke tours, fake trump protesters and then disciplined uniform calum of packers. i think these are the people who probably planned this. the vast majority of trump supporters are pro law enforcement and last thing they would do is violate the law. >> i will say the information i received from some of my officers, they were trying to prevent people from coming into the building and people are showing up saying we're police, let us through, and still wanting to violate the law to get inside the building. >> charles, you have the former chief there completely contradicting what senator ron johnson is saying. what did you think of that really conspiracy theory that senator johnson is propagating? >> well, first of all, i didn't think much of it. i think it's pretty clear not everyone who shows up at a rally is there to commit acts of violence or even thought about trying to breach the capitol. there was obviously a very
11:00 am
significant number of people that really did want to do that, and there was some planning that was associated with that. so this is a very serious issue that hopefully can kind of keep politics out of this as much as possible, and that sort of thing. this was a very serious incident. there were a lot of breakdowns that took place. we're lucky more people weren't seriously injured or killed as a result of this. so this is no place to be trying to put some kind of political spin on what took place. i think most reasonable people would understand to begin with the majority of people that show up for a rally whatever the cause aren't there to really cause damage or insurrection or things like that, but it doesn't mean it didn't take place and it doesn't mean there was a radicalization that took place that really, i think, really caused a lot of this to take place. >> gloria, what do you think? this is also, we should mention, the same senator who q


info Stream Only

Uploaded by TV Archive on