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tv   Joint Oversight Hearing on Security Failures During Attack on U.S....  CSPAN  February 24, 2021 12:49am-2:23am EST

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somehow all of the intelligence was gathered and never found its way to. thanks particularly to the office, the capital police and others the joined in trying to protect us on that saturday. >> i know we have several members ready to go and we want you to go as quickly as possible. there's been a request from the witnesses that have been here a long time if we can give them a five minute break and then we will reconvene in five minutes with additional questions. we will recess for five minutes.
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we are going to bring the hearing back to order. to the remote folks it's good to see you. welcome back. senator markley you are up for questions. thank you mr. chairman and thank you to the witnesses.
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on january 4th, npd arrested the leader of the proud boys for the destruction of property and fire magazines and on the following day on january 5th the fbi issued a report for the joint terrorism task force which includes going to the u.s. capitol police and that report noted that on the far right media included things such as the comments congress needs to hear glass breaking, doors being kicked in, blood, slave soldiers being spilled, violence, stop calling it a march or rally or protest. go ready for war. we get to the president or in we die. nothing will achieve this goal. did you get that intelligence
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report? >> the united states capitol police did get that report i was just invited to that in the last 24 hours. it made it on the joint terrorism task force over to the intelligence bureau and ceased moving forward at that point. no leadership myself included is aware at the time of the event. you referred in your testimony to the individual who is the head of the director of intelligence on the u.s. capitol police. did he receive that report but didn't pass it on to you as the head lacks. >> i have no knowledge that he received that report. it went over to the official rank of the sergeant and didn't move from there.
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for the head of the intelligence to review it especially when there were significant other indications of potential violence and make sure that you as the leader had that knowledge on which to develop additional plans if additional plans were needed? >> i'm sure that is something they are looking at. but as i mentioned before, that was role intelligence and taken in consideration with everything else none of the other intelligence was showing that we were looking at this type of a broad insurrection. >> i know that you are saying folks are looking at that now, but my question was did you have a procedure for important intelligence to be directly brought to your attention and did that a system breakdown and that's why you didn't see the warnings about blood being
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spilled? >> there is a process in place. that is something that would have gone to the development and analysis. >> let me turn to the rules of engagement. so, officers are out there and there's an expanded perimeter you have referred to and you have those parameters that look like bike racks and in a normal situation this is where you stop. is there any sort of discussion or training about what to do if they start picking those things up and opening the holes in the perimeter, what were the rules of engagement if i'm a police officer that day on the line how was i supposed to, was i trained like what do i do when those
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perimeter fences are breached, do i use a stun gun, teargas, what do i have a clear sense of how i'm supposed to respond? >> there is a use force policy and civil disobedience unit training with hand control techniques and application of chemical spray. you issued rules of engagement. i'm an officer what was i supposed to do if the barricades were breached. >> they don't very based on threat analysis? >> no sir. they are spread out over larger areas so once it was breached, what are the directions to be
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able to retreat to a defensible point? >> what we had is the command established for the exterior and the resources on the exterior of the building that would provide those officers with specific directions on where to go and what is the next step which is what they were told to do as well as the system and slide handling the joint session and activities going on inside so i'm out on the plaza and they pass me. i have an assigned place to retreat and on where to retreat to make the next stand. so no advanced information. how do you avoid the situation of those guarding the door leaving officers stranded outside of the perimeter?
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>> how do you prevent that, is that what you are saying? >> protesters try to get through it so they try to lock that and prevent it so there isn't a preplanned to deal with officers stranded outside of the doors. do you have drills on that, set instructions, again that's something i would look for the on-site official to provide the directions of where to relocate to. >> have you held a drill to respond to the situation where the crowd pushes past the barricades? >> we've had activities on the ground stirring the civil disobedience trainings. >> i'm going to turn with a few seconds left.
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at the time we were in the senate chamber and reach the perimeter of the senate, there was a quick rush to try to lock the doors and people searching for how do you lock the use and have there ever been any sort of girl with the sergeant at our steam or in partnership with the police on how to secure the doors to the chamber as a last point of defense? >> the action drill where they would work together with the capital police to do a lockdown so they know when they should lockdown. >> is it an actual drill where people have to run and get the keys and lock the doors and they
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know which doors to guard from the inside or outside or so forth? when was such a drill of that nature conducted? >> i think once a year. >> i'm out of time. thank you very much to the chairman. >> thank you, senator. senator scott, you are recognized. thank you, chairman. >> first i want to thank everybody for your hard work. we have national guard since around the sixth. can you tell us how you made the decision to bring the national guard here and how the decision was made? the presence that we have now as a result they've put up the fencing and all that.
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that began to be developed the evening of the sixth and we made the request we got the national guard in and started looking to the future. we started talking about bringing the first section that went around capitol square that is first and we started looking at the national guard resources with the representatives so that was developed with capital police and surgeon arms at the time in the evening going into the seventh. ..
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>> the first was the threat assessment so now it seems like they would be here months on end. >> my departure date was the eighth raised on - - based on the mass insurrection on the sixth wasn't aware of any additional intelligence at that point. they were just concerned though the extremist regrouping staging another attack on the capital. >> so you haven't seen anything that would give us a threat assessment now we need to have a national guard presence cracks you haven't seen anything? >> no sir.
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not in that environment. >> anyone else do you have a threat assessment there's a reason to have national guard here today? is that a no from everybody nobody has any idea why we have the national guard here? >> my guess is in response to all the things that have happened but to your question specifically about specific intelligence i personally have not seen anything to suggest that. >> are you involved in the decision at all why the national guard is here? >> no sir i am not. >> they have not shared any threat assessment with you at all with regard to why the national guard is here? >> that has not been shared with me, no.
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>> does that surprise you? >> i can't say it really surprised. we talk about intelligence in terms of what we expect to see. there are several law enforcement to the police department and other partners but the capital police and that structure they are not the holden to the mirror to the district of columbia. >> i just have not seen anything specific from them to suggest the way that it is now. >> obviously there needs to be a reimagining of the security posture. but i'm not exactly sure the answer to that in the
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environment we currently see. >> the sergeant and arms, you have no reason, you have no information to suggest we have an imminent threat to have the national guard here? >> i have not. >> i have not. >> i have no information. >> so who makes the decision the national guard needs to be here and where does that come from? >> does anybody know? >> look at the current leadership at capital police with the current sergeant of arms.
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>> the head of capital police and the city and acting sergeant of arms? >> that's correct i can give you current information. >> with a coordinate with metropolitan police? >> if there was intelligence to indicate the need for such activity come it would be shared with local law enforcement around our borders. >> if this was a threat would there be public information? >> again that has to deal with the nature of the threat and the classification level, but again i share with law enforcement and the district of columbia as well as the executive board through the jt tf? >> i am flabbergasted not that you don't know now but there is no public information why we have all the national guard here. does that surprise you? >> it is a significant security deployment i believe it is based on what they have seen hindsight being what it
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is, that attack is unprecedented insurrection. >> thank you mr. chairman senator your recognized for your questions. >> thank you mr. chair and thanks to all the witnesses for being here today. i especially want to take a moment to acknowledge the heroism of the officers of capital police and law enforcement and other employees who bravely worked on january 6 and of done so much work to restore our capital also thank you to the families of law enforcement and capitol hill staff what they went through watching this unfold in real time. i want to start with a question if i could
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, chief, washington dc is obviously no stranger to assemblies and protest. so what is the standard process for protest in washington dc with integration he agency coordination the following the event of january h what recommendations do you have for information sharing? >> thank you for the question. there are several discussions and meetings that take place between the police department as well as our federal partners. often times we have coordination with the federal land. there is coordination that has to happen there with the police department and capital police with respect to the intelligence come our partners from the fbi they are a part
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of those discussions. going forward what needs to be looked at with respect to specific intelligence that has been outlined through the testimony today when there is specific information that warns us to posture differently our notification system needs to be different that distribution list we have is not something that is monitored 24 hours a day seven days a week to generate a response to that. and those communications are sent out those are members that will get that information but that has been laid out talking about something of this magnitude that could happen and ultimately did happen in our city we should
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posture the move differently. to move immediately and not counting on an e-mail to the level that it needs to make those decisions. >> thank you for that answer one of the things i would observe is ahead of events like these are the ongoing check ins with leadership for those that need to coordinate to share in real time. i want to move to a question the secretary of homeland security can designate events as national security events but that did not happen january 6 even given the threat information readily available ahead of time that means they are expended security eligibility for the
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event the prior to january 6 did anyone from department of homeland security contact you about a potential national security event designation? >> no. i'm not aware from anyone dhs reaching out and requesting if we want to follow up to be a national special security event or for us to request that or to identify or designate a special rating i am not aware. >> no. no one contacted me. >> no contact was made here in my office. >> thank you for those authors one - - answers i will follow up during the next hearing on this topic. my last question, the officers of capital police try to keep us capital safe and secure every day.
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we are all grateful for the work of the police officers on january 6 tragically the law enforcement community has now lost two officers to suicide since january 6 as a result of the insurrection and the events our thoughts are with the families with jeffrey smith in us capital police officer. what mental health resources are currently available to the united states capital police officers and are they sufficient? >> the department broaden significant mental health resources and i appreciate your recognition i talked to a number of officers who have gone through the battle and have seen a lot of trauma but those are broaden significant resources with employee
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assistance programs to bring in outside contractors that have gotten a very good response there is a lot of mental health resources available and officers have taken advantage of it which i am happy to see. >> some of my i would encourage all officers that feel they could benefit from counseling to reach out and i would encourage them and i'm sure my colleagues would also that all leadership reach out to us if they feel the resources are strained. thank you for your service thank you for your testimony today to the chair and ranking member of respective committees thank you for organizing this hearing. >> thank you senator the chair recognizes the senator for his questions. >> i want to begin by saying a special thank you and acknowledgment to catherine
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who shared her testimony earlier today, this morning a native of missouri and alumni of park university and i want to say to her thank you for being here today before her incredible bravery and courage on january 6th and on behalf of the entire state of missouri, thank you for you have done and what you represent and to take the opportunity to say to all law enforcement from all various branches that responded in this emergency to face these violent criminals to repost them from the capital and secure the space so the work of congress could continue and a special thank you to catherine mendoza.
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so return to the question about the national guard activation. i am confused about the timeline and i want to ask you questions so i can get this clear. looking at your written testimony you testified you spoke with mr. irving those that one oh 9:00 p.m. i understand there is a little bit of dispute about the timeline but you do say that he advised you he needed to run it up the chain of command. >> that is correct. >> mr. irving, when he said you need to run it up the chain of command, to whom were you referring? >> senator i do not recall the phone call at one oh 9:00 p.m. was on the floor. my phone records do not reflect a call at that time. had i received a call at that
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time i had everyone with me , the leadership we would approve that immediately. so i have no recollection of that call or i don't have a record of it. >> you said you spoke with him later approximately 1:30 p.m.? >> that is correct after i left the floor and on that call he indicated to me that conditions were deteriorating and he might put in a request at a later time. >> and then you said you had to run it up the chain of command? >> no. not to my recollection. and then to receive updates of those conditions to determine whether he needed to make a request or not and when the request was made shortly after 2:00 o'clock. >> who is we?
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>> mr. stanger's office. >> so you are waiting at any point for input from congressional? is that your testimony? >> yes. i advise them as we do with many security protocols. >> but you were not waiting for them at any point there was no delay to get that request you are not waiting for the input of the speaker or majority leader or anybody else. >> no. absolutely not. >> is that your recollection? >> my recollection was at one oh 9:00 p.m. in the command center watching things rapidly deteriorate i made a phone call in the presence of both my assistant chiefs possibly
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my general counsel which i may be the initial request we need to activate the national guard the situation is bad on the west front. i followed up at 1:22 p.m. to check on the status of the request. >> so who constitutes the chain of command mr. irving said he never made that statement but my understanding from the statutes that in the emergency situation i would think this would qualify that the capital police board does not have to consult with members of senate or house leadership to make a request for deployment of other executive department or agencies. it would seem strange there is any talk about command involving anybody other than the capital police board other
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than the statute so there seems to be confusion of the basic facts and who asks for what and when. monday january 4th you testified you approach house and senate sergeant-at-arms to request assistance of national guard mr. irving stated he was concerned about the optics of having regard to play. >> correct it wasn't a phone call biden in person visit i went in and requested the national guard. >> mr. irving can you clarify when you use the term optics, did you talk about being concerned of the optics and what you meant by that? >> monday january 4th , safety was always the deciding factor in the security plan. the issue on the table whether the and told on - - intelligence warranted that at the capital. the conversation was not.
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he said he received an offer and then we said the three of us discussed specific issues whether the intelligence warranted the troops and then it said no and then he put the recommendation to put them on standby and that he was satisfied with that and i heard no concern at any time thereafter. >> were you concerned the optics the appearance of the guard that there was a reluctance to request assistance because of the appearance? what is the appearance you were concerned about? we concerned having regard president would look like it was to militarized or the criticism to be deployed from earlier this summer? give us insight into your
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thinking. >> senator i was not concerned whatsoever it was all about safety and security. any reference would be related to appropriate use of force or display of force and ultimately the question on the table with any security asset is does the intelligence warranted it? and again the collective answer was yes. >> one final question. madame chair thank you, speaker pelosi has asked retired lieutenant journal to lead a review in light of the attack. the general has said the leadership at the capital police and both of you gentlemen he has criticized you for the appearance of
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complicity during the attack and also said you took complicit actions those are his words during the attack. you complicit in this attack ja? >> i have her those comments as well i think is disrespectful to myself in the capital police department. >> we complicit those attacks january 6th? >> mr. irving we you complicit on those attacks on january 6th? >> absolutely not. there is no evidence to that effect i think your comments are appropriately taken to allege any of you were complicit in this violent mob
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attack on this building i think is not only extremely disrespectful but it is quite shocking in this person has no business relating a security review. >> now a new member of both committees. >> thank you madame chair. there has been a lot of questions from multiple committees about intelligence and what was known and with those differing opinions i will try not to be too repetitive. but first a quick question about the sergeant and arms. i imagine that most people that saw most if not all the house impeachment managers
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presentations before the united states senate as they laid out the case with the impeachment question aside we know how that was resolved but in terms of how january 6th happened leading up to january h , is there anything from that presentation that you would disagree with? >> just to make sure i understand the video i watched all the information that was portrayed is all accurate video. as far as the other commentary associated i cannot tell you i watched every single bit but a lot of that video was from the united states capital police and was all accurate. >> yes. from what i can see from my window on january 6th.
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>> from our perspective i did not diagnosed at the time with that information to the intelligence agency we had at the time and i would say now to those determinations. >> so now specifically there is an intelligence division within the department? >> yes sir. >> having read your letter to speaker pelosi and you make reference to november 14 as well as december 12th with intelligence with threat assessment and risk assessment for november 14th and december h nothing near what happened
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january 6. is that my correct interpretation? >> yes. both the assessments indicated we would have various militia groups and extremist in attendance and in addition the chief testified earlier weapons were recovered during both of those events. >> so to the best of your recollection in the lead up to january 6 that was comparable assessment and intelligence so you proceeded with comparable posture. >> yes that with those instances of islands to be focused on the capital and we knew members are proud boy and then huawei participating and capital police metropolitan police are federal agencies no
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one had information we would be facing armed insurrection of thousands of people. >> if we take our experience with terrorism globally and look at case studies that both incidents that were prevented and successful against the united states, is it possible i know hindsight is 2020 but is it possible the november 14 and december 12th incident may well have been trial runs? the extremist organizations that you referenced involve the organizing participation of november 14 and december 12th 2 gain counterintelligence how you and your partner agencies would be planning and preparing for such incidents? >> as you point out looking at some of the attacks that
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occurred with preplanning and pre- surveillance and pre- collection of intelligence on security features i don't know if the november and december were that but i would suspect we will find this is a coordinated attack. >> and that threat would be at a subsequent hearing but in your letter and testimony you always said the intelligence community mr. this. >> that is correct. >> who is commander-in-chief on december 6th? >> when you say commander-in-chief. >> donald trump. >> over the intelligence community that miss this. >> for the entire agency that represents the 80 agency is the commander-in-chief president donald trump.
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>> i think it's obvious too many across the country those in chambers on january 6th with the benefit of watching the events occur real-time inside and outside the capital on television. many people that i have talked to say that difference in both police presence and response on january 6 compared to events from last summer when the protesters were demonstrating in the nation's capital in the wake of the george floyd murder. last summer they were met with significant force with some data points today 250 individuals involved in the capital insurrection and arrested and more will be
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arrested in the lake the coming weeks and months only 52 of these individuals were arrested on january 6th. by contrast during the peaceful protest last summer 427 people were arrested excuse me june 1st alone, 200 people were arrested similarly 300 protesters were arrested during the kavanaugh hearings in 2018. so question, tell us exactly how that capital police preparations january 6th differed from preparations for the protests from last summer and if you can specifically address if they were the same or different with those guidelines in place compared
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to the protest of last summer or any criteria making an arrest on january 6 versus the protest. >> if you could do that in about one minute. >> looking at it for planning and preparation we plan for every demonstration the exact same way it doesn't matter the message or the person or the demographics or the grievance we do at the exact same way that we develop intel and base a response plan on that. transition to preparation i will tell you 15 major demonstrations were handled with black lives matter's the following week the death over george floyd's we had six arrests, no use of less lethal capabilities or lethal force. everything put into place generally six far exceeded any planning we did for any event
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in 2020 with full activation of the department the size we expanded and the protective equipment deployed to be less lethal and the application of less lethal far exceeded any other event i can recollect on the nation's capital. i will leave it at that. >> thank you. now to senator hagerty and senator king who has been very patient with us. >> thank you chairman klobuchar. thank you very much for having us here today i went to begin by thanking all the law enforcement officers that are here today thank you for your sacrifice in my heart goes out to those who have lost their lives. in the spring and summer of 2020 many people criticize the use of the national guard to help order in washington after the worst fighting in decades the mayor said the guard presence was necessary and maybe counterproductive and
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then to tell the troops that some of the public does not agree with a mission and could have nefarious attempts and according to the "washington post" report top pentagon officials emphasized on january 6 it would have a far more muted presence than in june saying we learned our lessons and we will be absolutely nowhere near the capital building. and then stated despite asking for support he was unable to get approval for such support several people today have reported concerns over optics of january 6 so my first question do you think the backlash of the use of the national guard troops back in the summer led to the advance of january 6 to protect the capital?
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>> i cannot completely testify on the inner workings or the decisions with the pentagon regarding either over the summer or the memo put out by the secretary on the fourth, however i was very surprised amount of time and push back it was receiving when i was making an urgent request for assistance. >> that is regrettable. >> i would like to follow up the speaker pelosi indicated she intends to establish a commission that's why we are here today to examine those issues she also appointed a retired army lieutenant general who will be the investigation the day after the attack he said i think once all of this is uncovered , it was complicit actions by capital police before he added
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that you mr. t12 were complicit with the sergeant and arms in the house and senate. do any of you believe comments like this suggest he is well suited to have a serious and unbiased review of january 6th? please explain. >> as i mentioned before, i found the comments that he made regarding myself and the capital police officers highly disrespectful to the hard-working women and men of that police department and also myself. i welcome and look forward to an interaction that moves the agency forward in our partnership forward but it has to be done in an unbiased fashion. >> i cannot agree more with you son. any other response? >> i disagree with what the general said. i don't believe that's true
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there are people who put themselves in danger that day and saying something like that is not in good taste. >> i cannot imagine that being said myself that you are all complicit so thank you for your answers and for your service. i yield back. >> thank you very much. >> madame chair thank you to the witnesses first for their patients this is been a long hearing and i really appreciate it and i appreciate the fact other than the chief
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in washington that you come forward to give us the benefit of your observations. it seems to me the clear pieces of information we have learned today is the intelligence failure. is not a failure of intelligence but to communicate the intelligence and i think that something we all need to think about and you can be very helpful to us in suggesting what should be the chain of communication in terms of intelligence. you cannot adequately prepare if you don't have the information and clearly it seems to me there were some failures. chief come i have a specific question for you and is more forward-looking and i appreciate your insight. how do we protect the capital from either an angry mob or more likely, one or two or
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three malignant actors without turning it into a fortress? how do we allow the american people to go into tour the rotunda be on the capital to play with their kids? it seems to me going forward that is the challenge. we want security but i would hate to see the us capital turned into a fortress. your thoughts? >>. >> with the original comment with the intelligence and the communications the processes in place with credible intelligence especially high level to quickly get to where it needs to be. my concern is on collection and how wide we cast that net
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that would have revealed this is coming in we are facing this mass insurrection. the capital police is well versed and well trained on handling what you are talking about a couple of attackers armed and active shooter events those are the events we are ready for it was the thousands of people storming the capital that creates a big issue. talk about physical security and he mentioned in my opening statement with the initial question there are options to maintain an open environment and open campus while putting substantial physical security measures in place for the building as well as farther out. time and distances are best friend and then to provide protection for the routes of the officers have more time to deal with it but that should be discussed in the closed are classified session.
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>> i understand. we hope that is a discussion that we can have it is very important. because as i say we don't want the united states capital to be so protected it is an accessible to the american people. to amplify on your intelligence answer it seems to me you are saying it is communicated adequately but we didn't have the collection that we needed like the norfork virginia letter how does it get filtered and where? >> than your fault field office letter because even on the fifth holding a joint conference call with members of the board and members of the team those military
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officials from washington dc where we discussed those upcoming events for the inauguration any kind of threats or issues may have the director of the field office of the fbi nothing was mentioned so my big point is there is significant evidence coming out the insurrection that occurred on the sixth was planned and coordinated well in advance almost looking at a number of states and that detection would have been key to put effective security in place for this event. >> finally, talking about providing this level of security, is there a playbook or a contingency plan literally sitting on a shelf
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that is just demonstrations around the capital here is what you do? like deployment of the national guard might have been faster had there been a predetermined set of phone numbers or actions or steps to be taken. does that exist and if not should it? >> what you are including there is a process we handle special events and demonstrations but i tend to agree we need to streamline the process to request the national guard in the future. >> because clearly there was a delay their that was an important part of the response at the time. madame chair thank you to the witnesses they have made a contribution and they did when they were serving in their respective positions. i yield back. >> thank you.
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>> thank you mr. chairman my first question is for the chief what coordinating actions were taken in the weeks leading up to january 62 share intel with local law enforcement and what security planning took place and with which agencies? >> thank you for the question. there were a series of several meetings that took place while leading up to the events of january 6. and that is where the federal partners the first amendment coordinating call took place and those that took place prior to this event and the chief mentioned several calls
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it with those law enforcement entities leading up to the events of january 6 so there are significant amounts of phone calls and virtual meetings that took place leading up to january 6. >> thank you. can you talk about what you see as the mistakes made as a whole that didn't help connect all those dots with those meetings prior to january 6? >> the major issue from my perspective i think in terms of the sharing of information and how it is shared that is where the focus should be so talk about the report that came from the office the day before. so that night after 7:00 o'clock p.m. in the chief
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of police the metropolitan police department i assure you 24 hours a day seven days a week and i am available that have information to something of this magnitude certainly if there was information or a building being overrun like the metropolitan police department i can assure you i would go directly with those officials responsible to give them that information firsthand and then to help it makes it so that is critical there were several phone calls leading up to this but no specific information that we
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saw and we do believe there should be proper attention given to that. >> so you outline the fbi report was sent to collapsed - - capital police and you never received the report is there an understanding within the system how it did not make it to you or other individuals on the night of january 5th? >> i appreciate the question actually earlier in the discussion this is a report i am just learning about they informed me yesterday. i'm not sure what investigation may be going on since january 8 i know the chief has put additional safeguards in place to make sure it doesn't happen again
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but i'm not sure the outcome and why they need to push it further. >> was their expectation prior to january 6 that should've gotten the memo or the night of january 5th? >> there is one that ensures from the joint terrorism task force with the intelligence analyst and based on that information he has my cell phone number and we talk regularly. >> as you mentioned you are just learning about this recently but would it have been the expectation the fbi calls capital police or someone on the joint task force to alert that in the expedited fashion knowing it made it to capital police intel team on the fifth?
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trying to understand how i didn't get to the higher level for preparations the night of the fifth. >> i will echo what the chief mentioned that deserves additional focus if we have information coming in the day before a major event, with that level of specificity it could get more attention than just being handled in the electronic format. >> was there any intelligence that caused you to change any security plan with united states capital police? >> just to reiterate all information we have been receiving during the event of the six outline very similar to the intelligence report published on the third outlined. we are expecting a large number of protesters coming in a potentially violent group.
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we knew there focused on the capital and we knew that some may be armed this is information we knew it was developing a security plan around that and based on our review of november and december evidence determined we would push the fence line out that's an i requested the national guard knowing we would need support for the fence line. >> thank you. chief you stated the intelligence you receive january 6 didn't differ from the two previous marches. was there any conversation or consideration about the fact january 6 was scheduled on a very important day that congress was in session to certify the results of the election was that different in consideration of security the
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other two marshes were on weekends congress is not in session. >> absolutely that is reflected in the response posture the two prior demonstrations that happened the metropolitan police department we did not call up officers from surrounding jurisdictions we did not do that before the mayor in addition to using those resources called up the national guard specifically for the reasons we outlined to them that would allow the metropolitan police department to be more nimble in their response so that enabled us to respond quickly to assist capital police officers. those responses were different
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we were intercepting individuals that are in violation so the metropolitan police department posture. >> thank you mr. chairman i appreciate your indulgence i have extra questions to submit. >> thank you for your business on the report everyone seems to acknowledge to say didn't go the right place to send is not enough for a report like that we have senator cruise and then if there's any other senators who wish to ask questions you should tell us because these are the last to that we have. >> thank you madame chair.
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thank you did to the witnesses thank you for being here and thank you for your testimony and also for your service. and to think each of you and the heroic law enforcement officers that demonstrated extraordinary courage in fighting to repel the terrorist attack that unfolded on the attack january 6. we are grateful for the bravery and the courage in the face of a truly horrific attack. in the aftermath of that attack there is naturally a process to assess what could have been done better to prevent that attack and secure the capital. everyone recognizes that hindsight is different from a decision made in the moment to
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face the threat immediately but the hearing is nonetheless productive for analyzing the security decisions law enforcement decisions made in real time and what can be done differently to ensure an attack like that never occurs. >> just want to walk-through what occurred in the days preceding january 6. in your written testimony you say i approach the two sergeant and arms to have the assistance to have no authority to do so i first spoke with the national guard mr. irving stated he was concerned the optics of national guard presence and didn't feel the intelligence supported it. and then i spoke to mr. stinker and requested the
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national guard. instead of approving the use of national guard he suggested i ask how quickly we can get support if needed and leaned forward in case we had to request assistance on january 6. can you describe that link those conversations with the two sergeant and arms on january 4th? >> the first conversation occurred monday morning i would have to refer to my notes for somewhere around 11:00 o'clock in the morning event with mr. irving in his office making the first request to the national guard to say i don't think the intelligence supports it if we
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needed them on wednesday is there a way to beep report on - - prepare for a request? at that .125 national guardsmen supporting if we needed a response quickly he could repurpose them to get them to the armory and to get them to us as quick as possible the next day i met
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with mr. stinker he came for the video call i posted with those officials and we spoke about it briefly there as well as i passed on to mr. irving later that afternoon. >> i understand you have some disagreement with that characterization about the concern of the optics to relay your best recollection on january 4th. >> my best recollection was a phone call indicating he had received an offer 125 on armed
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guards as we followed up the three of us engaged in a conversation we left at the light of the existing intelligence the intelligence did not warrant the national guard and that intended that discussion rather than the offer should we perform any follow-up and he recommended they were placed on standby. >> to the best of your recollection and what did you mean by that? >> i cannot remember my exact
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verbiage and it was all in reference the first match for the security plan. >> did you have conversations for congressional leadership with the democratic or republican leadership on this question to supplement presents for national guard either on january 4th or real-time january 6th? >> january 4th, no. no follow-up conversation and i alerted leadership we could be making a request and that was the end of the discussion. >> i mention that on january 6.
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>> so there has been some disagreement about what time phone calls occurred. senator portman asked earlier everyone has phone records it would be helpful if each of you could forward the relevant phone records to this committee also reference you sent an e-mail to congressional leadership. if you could for that to the committee as well that would be helpful. thank you. >> smit they give madame chair and take you to our panel went to echo the sentiments for the men and women of the united states capital police who endured a great deal in generally six to show great heroism and also madame chair
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if i might express an interest in working with you to ensure they are well taken care of and their needs are met. the conversation that the three of you had regarding supplementary security support raises the question of who is in charge? is that consensus between the two sergeant and arms and the chief of us capital police required to make such a request? >> the request for the national guard needs to have approval, yes. >> who has ultimate responsibility for the security at the capitol complex? >> apples under capital police. >> so there is no individual that has personal responsibility for the
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security of the us capitol complex? >> that is a way to interpret it. yes. >> have us capital police conducted exercises simulating comparable events such as a violent riot on the complex? >> the civil disobedience units involves dealing with riot groups and we do do that training.
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