tv Hearing on the Iran Nuclear Agreement CSPAN February 12, 2016 1:08am-3:21am EST
understand why intelligence was important. to the government and presidents and why presidents valued it. >> sunday night at 8:00 p.m. eastern on q&a. >> next, and oversight hearing on the implementation of the iran nuclear agreement. they heard from stephen mull, the lead coordinator at the state department. the hearing is two hours and ten minutes. heard from stephen mull, the lead coordinator at the state department. the hearing is two hours and ten minutes. >> this hearing will come to order. this morning the committee extensiveour oversight of the obama administration's nuclear itsement with iran and nationalces for the security of the united states, the consequences for the allies, as many know here, i feel those
consequences are quite dire. implementations day. an historicked turning point in the middle east. iran's recordnap praia statusits re-connected to the international trade system. now with access to $100 billion assets and sanctions instantly, iran has become the dominant country in the region. the regime has achieved this all itsout having to end aggression against its neighbors and it still calls for the inrthrow of the governments and saudi arabia and other states. it mass done with without
its support for terrorism. and the iranian economy was prior to this hemorrhaging. hemorrhaging because the sanctions we had pushed had worked. sanctions we pushed in 2010 the2012 had led by 2013 to implosion of the economy there. now -- now iran's leader are predicting swift growth. they are probably right. these european countries that have observed sanctions dam is broken. they are sprinting in to the billionsarket to cut in deals and to invest there. they are making a mockery of the administration's claim that sanctions could snap back if iran cheats. you tell me if these companies going to turn back when iran inspectors.national
the revolutionary guards already iran's most powerful economic actor. those are the words of our treasury department. economic actorul -- why would that be the iranian guards? because they are the ones that nationalize the construction firms and the companies. they are only going to grow more powerful with this additional international investment. just hours after the agreement's implementation the regime 2,967 of roughly candidates from running in the parliamentary elections later this month. after the administration finally missile testiran's with very minor sanctions and sanctions,shed
iran's president as he's called ordered the military to its intercontinental ballistics program. aimed here at the united states. it is designed to carry a the icbmayload, program. they say it is every military's man mission to help mass produce icbms. now worse the administration its ways to go out of to apiece the iranian regime. they even thanked iran after it recently seized ten u.s. sailors a highly provocative act, if you ask me. last time we've seen u.s. sailors taken off of their ship with their hands behind their head, guns trained their ship is stripped,
photographs of one of the sailors crying in the iranian medals given to those iranian agents who took them in to custody. appears the administration is determined to protect this deal at all costs. look at how the obama administration backed away from an new bipartisan, u.s. law forng visa waiver travel those who travel to iran, iraq, an outcry -- after an outcry -- from the iranian regime. administration is now decided to basically ignore the iran's ongoing sponsorship of terrorism by stretching a narrow national security waiver far beyond reason. president obama signed this bill in to law. allowedas essentially
the supreme leader to veto it. move, the state department settled a decade's dayfinancial settlement the after implementation day, anding the iranian regime check for $1.7 billion. ambassador, the committee eagerly awaits answers the the state department to many questions surrounding that surprised payment. countlessstration had opportunities to seek committee matter in advance, so.purposely did not do that's the conclusion that i have to reach. complied with any its past nuclear agreements. we're watching this to see if be different.ill but even if iran meeting all of
the administration's , in a few years they will leave the dominant power in the middle east and away from the capability to produce nuclear on an industrial scale. all the way -- this is the most theng part to me -- all while iran's leaders continue on today to chant death america. and many of us are struggling to how this tilt toward iran makes us safer. i now recognize the ranking member for comments. thank you, mr. chairman. welcome to the foreign affairs committee. ambassador, welcome. your currentknow role is an american diplomat.
you, fortunate to have we're grateful for your service, ambassador. mr. smith, you've helped crack down on offenses. treasury could be doing even more if we have an undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence. but the nomination of adam bogged down, despite the need to cut off iran, isis, others from the resources. deal wastand what the and in. today's hearing is different beforey we've had because the iran deal was implemented. beenar related sanks have lifted. iran no longer has enough fuel to make a nuclear weapon.
again no matter what anyone's position was on the iran deal. iran deal.oppose the option is to continue to bring up legislation designed to the deal. they passed two deals already, largely along party lines. symbolic votes. they will never become law. in my view, they are not a committee orof the congress' time. tohave voted again and again repeal it. i didn't like it. i voted against it. ie over option, the one support, is to hold iran's feet
sure there and make are serious consequences. i'm confident we can work across the aisle to find common ground on.uild iran remains the world's most active state sponsor of terror rightshronic human abuser. iran continues to break in with impunity.aw we don't trust iran. our policies must affect that. that's why i'm glad we slapped forsanctions on iran testing two missiles, that was a violation of the nuclear deal. there are other problems we need to address. iran can spread more resources to bad actors throughout the strengthening the murderous hasan regime, and supporting shiite militias in iraq. out, ithairman pointed is golden after we sign an
agreement with iran, their leaders continue to yell death to america. it is really is gulling. we need to work together on new legislation that will crack down on the other dangerous behavior of iran and sure up our allies and partners in the region. ambassador mull and mr. smith i about therd to you verify indications and what else doing with respect to iran outside of the scope of the nuclear deal to help make our safer and enhanced ability in the region. sanctioned lifted. there are a lot of things that iran has not yet done. iran isad things that doing that i think will warrant additional sanctions, for iran's continued support for terrorism. it is not something we can turn a blind eye to. we shouldn't.
so we need to figure out why we effective, what we can do with respect to iran and outside of the nuclear deal. the nuclear deal we were told we can't talk about anything else. we can only talk about the nuclear deal. again it is gulling. the frustration you heard from is the frustration that we have with the iranians and with their bad behavior and with their not changing at all after they signed the agreement showing no good faith whatsoever. poking us in the eye. to walk on the line and walk over on the wrong way. hold their feet to the fire. i look forward to your testimony, gentleman. thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you. are joined by a distinguished
panel. we have mr. mull. appointment, ambassador mull served as the poland andto executive secretary of the state department. the treasuryat department. mr. smith was an expert at the nations, al qaeda and taliban sanctions committee, and an attorney with the department justice. without objection, the made part ofll be the record. members here will have five calendar days to submit any statements or questions for the record. if you would, please summarize go toemarks, and we'll .ou first
ambassador mull: i appreciate to meet with you today to testify on the progress that we've had on implementing joint comprehensive plan of action or the jcpoa. really important deal for america security and the friends and allies around the world. i welcome congress' oversight and partnership in making sure exactly right. on january 16th, the international atomic energy issued a report verifying that iran had completed its key nuclear steps under the jcpoa, thus reaching implementation day. commitments signified that two-thirdssmantled of the centrifuge, including all of the most advanced machines rolled back its enrichment program which had been growing over the past decade. it shipped out almost all about its00 pounds worth of uranium material.
iran can possess no more than 3.67% forams of up to the next 15 years. further iran removed the core of its iraq reactor and rendered it inoperable, cutting off the path by which iran could have ofduced significant amounts weapon's grade plutonium. programced the nuclear under the unprecedented and continuous verification and regime. using modern technologies like seals and enrichment monitors that can detect and report cheating. have oversight of the entire nuclear fuel cycle from enrichment to facilities and production plants ensuring that iran cannot divert nuclear materials to a potential program, covert program. any goods and technology usable must now gopurposes
through a procurement channel administered by the united council,curity creating yet another layer of transparency, oversight, and to iran's nuclear program. iran is now visually inclined. visual protocol to the agreement with the iaea. jcpoalong with the special provisions to address disputes regarding the access to an undeclared location ensures have all ofa will the access it needs to ongoing and verify iran's commitments. a result of these actions and keeping with the deal on january states,e united european union, and the united liftedsecurity council nuclear related sanctions against iran allowing the resumption of some andrnational, commercial, investment activity with iran.
with the commitments, we will not try to block the commercial activity that the jcpoa permits. we will be closely monitoring it to be ready to act with the existing authorities that we have as a government if that areort goals hostile to the interest with terrorism or the missile program. u.s. sanctions on iran that are not nuclear related remain in effect. as evidenced just a few weeks ago when we designated for sanctions, a number of individuals and entities for supporting the ballistic missile no way, the jcpoa in limits our ability or will to to respond tos iran's other destabilizing activities. alliesprecisely why the and nations around the world support this deal. the threat of a nuclear-armed iran. it gives the international tomunity unprecedented tools ensure the nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful
forward, and it doesn't limit or ability to respond to the destabilizing policies and actions. makes the world safer for all of us. israeliew weeks ago, defense force chief of staff jcpoaledged that the reduces the immediate threat to israel because it quote rolls iran's nuclear capability and deepens the monitoring capability of the international community in to tehran's activities. remarks, he said he believes that iran will make great efforts to fulfill their the bargain. it was not built on a prediction of the future. it is built on the solid regime. working everyue day to confirm that iran is jcpoa up to its commitments or face the consequences. they look forward to continuing engage and with the congress in general on the important
topic. i look forward to answers your today.ns thank you. >> thank you, ambassador. mr. smith. mr. smith: good morning distinguished members of the committee. thank you for the invitation to appear today before you to oncuss our actions implementation day of the joint comprehensive plan of action or efforts tond our enhance and enforce our iran-related sanctions going forward. i'll be addressing the key steps that my office, the treasury department's office of foreign ofac, took to or control the commitments on implementation day. i'll address the many iran-related sanctions authorities that remain in place ourhow we approach responsibilities to enforce those authorities. is a strong deal. it protects the national security of the united states partners and allies overseas.
was aplementation day significant milestone of the for iranexchange completing the key nuclear equipments. we lifted nuclear related sanctions on iran. our steps on implementation day only after atomic energynal agency verified that iran had completed its key nuclear the jcpoa. under the deal gives us the necessary flexibility to respond to iran it fails to comply with the commitments, including the ability to fully snapback international and domestic sanctions. as the agency tasked with enforcing thend u.s. economic sanctions, we are that eyed about the fact iran remains a state sponsor of terrorism and continues to in other destabilizing activities. we believe it is crucial to
andinue to implement enforce the sanctions that remain in place. the unitedtation day states took action with respect to sanctions in two key areas. first and most significant to affect wait the are directedh towards non-u.s. persons for activity outside of the u.s. jurisdiction. second area ya concerns the relative exceptions to the embargo on iran, place.emains in ofac issues ae, statement with respect to related parts and services to be used exclusively for commercial passenger aviation. we also issued a general license authorizing the importation and
irani and activities that jcpoansistent with the and applicable with the u.s. laws and regulations to assist the public in understanding all sanctions modification effective on implementation day. published a summary of the took as well as hyperlinks that explain in detail the sanctions lifting document that describes the lifting of the nuclear related sanctions and setsanctions that remain a of more than 85 frequently asked questions and information on the theges that we made to various sanctions list. while we have fulfilled our implementation day commitments lift the sanctions specified jcpoa, ofac continues to administer the robust sanctions and the range of iran's
troubling activities. proudly the u.s. embargo remains in place. that u.s. persons general le remain prohibited from engaging in transactions or with iran or iranian entities unless they are exempt authorized by ofac. in addition secondary sanctions attach to the more than 200 iran-related individuals and entities on ofac's designated nationals and list as well as any such persons we add to the the future. treasury remains fully committed tousing the authorities target iran's support for terrorism, human rights abuse, ballistic missile program, and destabilizing activities in the region. thank you. i welcome your questions. chairman: thank you, mr. smith. let me start with the fact that
testimonyn your there's still hefty secondary sanctions available for anyone connected to the iran terrorism. able to haven't we been ismore on majong air, but the iranian passenger airline and also happens to be the revolution andhe guard corps. they use this particular company itserry its weapons and syria aid the regime and the commander in moscow to enlist the support for offensive to salvage the syrian regime. syria actuallyo
increased. your colleague at treasury testified that regardless of the deal, a that conducts or facilitating a significant withcial transaction iran's majong air will risk access to u.s. financial systems. so instead of more action to planes as part of the prisoner deal, the white interpoleed to lift an notice and the senior manager u.s. treasury said was responsible for the airline operations.vasions take're serious, we could immediate action against those financial institutions that transact on this iranian airlines behalf in asia and europe and the gulf. fine ond slap heavy european and asian ground
service companies working with airlines. are we going to do that? sir, we've been very engaged around the world on the majong air. we've reminded our ally and s with the sanctions that remain. we've continued to designate the entities that try to support majong air around the world. we continue to look at the targets. we continue to engage with governments around the world on the need to stop working with majong air. going after the finances where we've continued to designate we. have to point i out. unless the heavy fine. job bone andng to say this. in the meantime, they are expanding their operations. in the meantime, they are flying syria on a regular bases. you see what's happening in terms of the encirclement. as that support comes in, it has
consequences in syria. what i don't see is the pushback. let me give you another example. what is the specific national that justifiesst this claimed waiver. we know it happened. passed legislation here that get an automatic visa waiver. you have to go through the so we can check if you go to syria or you go to iran or to sudan, because those are state sponsors of terrorism. what logic does the administration then do a carve out? is the national security interest that justifies the waiver? a nationals. have security interest in supporting business ingitimate iran? this is the argument the
administration makes. business in iran. -- reality is your revolutionary guard corps is the actor.werful economic how does this justify because iranians protested this? say with: i can respect to the guard corps, we continue to enforce those. visa waiver to the program, i'd have to defer to my colleagues at the state department. mr. chairman: let me expand. administration should have told iran is stop terrorism and this won't be a problem. it ise the way we wrote state sponsors of terrorism. but the problem we're having is has not changed its
course. iran is still supporting hezbollah to the hill. still saying they are going to 100,000gps00,000 -- guidance systems to help and rockets provided by bettery the way, to target cities inside of israel. instead of taking that stance, created an exception. again the president signed the law. it sounds harsh. sure works as if the supreme leader effectively the bill. signed.assed and ambassador mull: mr. chairman, we supported it as a means of tightening the security to the
borders, which is important to administration. that law -- the congress included in the law a waiver provision to allow waivers for those cases that affected the the unitedcurity of states. as a government in implementing have to gone what the criteria are for exercising what those waivers will be. i can tell you that none of the criteria that we considered was promote greater business engagement with iran. makingreally aimed at sure that those people who carry missions to our national security in iran whether it is the iaea inspectors who need to get in to iran to verify that iran is to allowts commitments journalists to go in and report. mr. chairman: that was not our objection. our objection is that the administration turned concept of a case-by-case waiver on its
head. under the law the proper is why is it in the national security interest of thisnited states that particular person be allowed to enter the united states without a visa? that down toiled is this person involved in so-called legitimate business in iran? at a time when the irgc controls all of the major businesses in iran. a broad category that was expressly discussed and then rejected during the legislative process. we have this debate. we had this debate with the administration. our consensus. this bill was signed in to law the iranians objected. wantobjected because they ed more business with the other entitieshe controlled by the mullah's and controlled by the iranian revolutionary guard corps.
i should go. my time has expired. very much. ambassador mull: thank you, mr. chairman. i think the frustration is while we seem to be talking tough iran, in reality, we're -- our actions are far away from our rhetoric. a worry something. make sure that iran's feet are held to the fire. we don't want iran to wiggle out obligations. ambassador mull,
the administration said on implementation day iran would receive around $50 billion in government and spokesman in iran. do we know how much was released money is going. our estimatell: throughout the process hads been that iran had slightly upwards billion in frozen assets and international institutions around the world. amount, a significant portion of it -- our understanding is more than $50 billion is already tied up and to other debts to trade deals that solved because assets.rozen in fact those assets freely available of that slightly $100 billion. about $50 billion would be available. regimed our assessment
throughout. thank you. recently rouhani toured. he announced tens of billions of venturein new economic ventures. expecting that europe should hold the hard line? do we expect europe to enforce the sanctions if iran cheats when now it is becoming economically beneficial to have some of the european countries with iran andls how much can we count on them if and when iran cheats, and i suspect they will that europe venturesgo some of its and slap economic sanctions on iran. mr. smith: i fully expect that
europe is going to continue to committed partner with us and our sanctions programs. we have to remember that europe had many of the trade deals 2012, and0, before gone along with us. they have sacrificed the deals the first time around and cut the deals off in compliance with the coordination that we've done and the secondary sanctions that we've implemented in cooperation with this congress. i fully expect that europe will continue to comply with the we've struck. engel: the listing of the iran's program could further region when the expires, iran will be able to legally ship weapons to assad and hamas.
efforts willonal suffer greatly. after years they will be able to sell the components for the ballistic missiles program. because during the entire negotiations we were told the only thing negotiated was ballisticwas not missile programs. the nuclear question. suddenly we find this call stuck and frees iran from being banned from purchasing ballistic missiles years and others in five years. so how will the u.s. sanctions this issue after five years and after eight years? i think part of the reason that you saw the way we had the sanctions. i think the u.n. had looked at sanctions. we got the u.n. consensus
were viewed at u.n. level as part of the nuclear related file. i'll tell you that the u.s. sanctions are secondary sanctions continue with respect ballistic missile program. we have all of the major iranian theonents related to program. missile the secondary functions remain. european or other actor that deals with iran and with then'tties with respect to the ballistic missile program, even after eight years, will still the to contend with secondary sanctions. ask you ourlet me final question: what has the allies ineen from our the middle east since implementation? include israel and the sunni-arab countries. to reach out going to israel and the gulf allies
more closelyre affected by the iran deal to level?heir comfort you.sador mull: thank in my current responsibility times to hearal their concerns. secretary kerry maintains a israeli with the leadership on the regular basis to address their concerns. israel washat opposed to the deal. my impression since the deal force is that they want to work with us to make implemented is fully. that's a partnership and i welcome.p that i intend to go to israel in the next few weeks to continue that dialogue. secretary kerry was in riyadh to their counterparts. they've been supportive of the
deal. focusedt us to remain on iran's destabilizing activity in the region. we will be. mr. engel: thank you, gentleman. engel.k you, mr. the cia directors confirmed in congressional testimony that missilesea was selling and technology to iran. in 2013 former state department david asher, testified before our committee that a agreement signed in 2002 between north korea and was the key stone, his phrase for the north korea reactor builtlear by iran proxy which was in 2007. throughout the years, they had been a litany of reports confirming iran, north korea nuclear andn on
ballistic missile technology as the as the presence of north korea scientists and technicians at the test of these weapons in their respective countries. the united states has repeatedly korean andnorth iranian entities for their issues.ation on these reports now indicate that iranian scientists were again korea'sfor north nuclear test in january. so i have several questions that.d to ambassador mull, what u.s.n't it -- u.s. entities are asked with monitoring the nuclear and ballistic missile issues? acquires nuclear knowledge, not the materials, would iran be in or anyon of the jcpoa
sanctions against itself or north korea? if the you confirm iranian firms or technicians latestesent for the nuclear detonation on january 6th? another topic, the civil nuclear cooperation, u.s., and other p5 plus 1 remembers cooperate in to helping iran develop the program. or any other p5 plus 1 country began any transfers to iran as part of this annex and how has been transferred, do we reconcile some of these prohibitionsh under existing u.s. law? longertly the u.s. no seems to care as much as iran's
atrocities and its support for terrorism worldwide the administration is iron afixed on giving good report card on complying. if you could comment on that as well. thank you, gentleman. verysador mull: thank you much for those questions. be happy to address the questions. beengh the years that have connections with iran in nuclear program that we have found to be a grave threat against our interest, interest of israel, and our other friends in the region. so that's the reason that we this deal to limit the capacity for that program to a threat. ros-lehtinen:
can you tell me. ambassador mull: i can tell you there are several that get the from iran ands north korea and elsewhere. we will bemain engaged. engaged now that we have specific criteria by which to judge the compliance. >> can you confirm if iranian officials were president in north korea? >> i cannot. and if they acquire -- if korea notfrom north lotactivity materials but a of the expertise, would that be jcpoa?tion of the outhe jcpoa spells measurable commitments, the number of centrifuges and material -- gets know how
advice, et cetera, results from not material itself, is that a violation? >> north korea is not theifically mentioned in agreement, however in the agreement iran committed to aimedn from all research at developing a nuclear weapon. believe theyson to were not complying with that -- have we beginy any transfers to iran on the and the civil nuclear cooperation? does not require civil nuclear cooperation. it allows as appropriate the providedates has not any material, however we will be group ofng a working the p5 plus 1 that will review of a newvelopment iraqi reactor to make sure it does not -- >> mr. smith, one note. you are no longer -- you are not overlooking the human rights record? are not overlooking their
terrorism throughout the region and world? ma'am.th: no, we continue to be very engaged in the iran's human right and support for terrorism. designated many of the principle actors and entities that engaged in the human rights abuses. we continue to follow the evidence. >> thank you, sir. of florida. mr. deutch: thank you. i want to touch on three different things. being here. i want to talk about the $100 assets thatrozen are now available to iran. i want to talk about the -- the u.s.nctions secondary sanctions on ballistic sanctions under the deal. non-nuclearo talk sanctions in the 300 individuals and entities that were relisted implementation day. first on the issue of the funds 00t you explained that $ billion. $50 billion is tied up
billione, meaning $50 is available. whatever the numbers are, what money doing to track that as it is released since any of the money that flows in to the those who are supporting terrorists would then trigger terrorists sanctions or human right sanctions? tell you we can monitor very closely where the go as they are released. as general klapper testified earlier, a few days ago, so far most of those funds are going in to infrastructure, domestic infrastructure projects to the extent they are able to monitor that. not seen a substantial forge in levels of support terrorists activity. however we remain very closely focused on that. the sanctions that we
have remaining a strong tool kit of sanctions. we remain ready to take and exact appropriate penalties. >> i appreciate that response. i hope we have an opportunity to to have and engage in the discussion and setting and in the classify setting. secondly on the issue of you talkedissiles, about the sanctions applying. what'ss concerned happened now and what's happening right now. right now iran has violated the security council resolution by testing the ballistic missiles. we've been post sanctioned. i commend the administration for doing so. but the jcpoa and the international component of the jcpoa is funded upon its security council resolution. can we expecting, this security council to do in violations the clear of existing security council thatutions and the jcpoa iran has engaged in by testing
missiles? mr. smith: what i can tell you most ofwe still have the major economic actors in iran that have engaged in testing. missile we still have them on the secondary sanctions. >> i understand. the security council. in terms of the security council, i'd defer more to my state colleague. mull: will the security council remain focused? the tests to the security council as i understand it. the security council looked at it. sanctionses to the committee. where does it stand now? to likely is it we're going see sanctions on the clear violation of the resolution and if they don't sanction if a clear violation, what confidence can we have in their out the termsry of the jcpoa? mull: the security council has a feature which perm gnat veto.s have a we have raised in the days after
our strong believe and agreed.tions committee the security council has not yet won the full agreement of all appropriate to take actions. i'll tell you we don't counter the iranian missile program by on the security council. we have a broad range -- >> no. no. i understand that. i appreciate that. to get back to my main point. terms of the jcpoa, we wrapped all of the resolutions in to a new security council resolution that specifically includes the ballistic missile violated.been ultimately we've been told throughout including this allies remainur committed which does -- i guess question is: is that simply the closest ally? longer the p5 plus 1.
i only have a little bit of time left. to turn to the last issue. the 300 individuals and entities delisted on implementation day, we've been told the list is being scrubbed. any one of the individuals or entities should be sanctioned for violating either of the either because they support terrorism or because they violate human rights, that they would be sanctioned. where are we on the review? have you identified any who those be and when will sanctions be applied? we -- evenman, before we reached implementation day. although we had agreed to remove entities from the so-called sd end list because of their being put their on -- for onlear reasons implementation day. we added 200 of those back on to our sdn list because of terrorism and other concerns. smith to get in to the details.
mr. smith: what i can say is 400 off, we did the comprehensive review of all of them to make sure we were removing them.h we didn't see any support for missiles, ballistic and those entities on. any kinds evidence of of activity that would violate our sanctions, that fall within sanctions that remain, we will act against those. to clarify.nt are you -- this is -- i didn't know this. 400are saying that of the individuals and entities who 200sted in the agreement, of them are being sanctioned for terrorism and human rights violations? no.smith: we removed 400 from the list related toy were not terrorism, human rights, others.c missiles, or 200 were marked by the treasury department as government of iran. we still in the united states --
our u.s. persons are still to block and do no transactions with anyone that has identified as the government iranian financial institution. those 200 that we put on a a list forst just u.s. persons to say these are and iranianf iran financial institutions. >> which i understand. know have you -- where are you in scrubbing the list of other names? take all you determination if any of the individuals or entities should be subject to sanctions? the plan that we continue to we review all of the intel. sdnave 500 names on the list. we don't look at every name. we look at all of the intel that comes in. that affect any name? should we add a name? andork with our ic partners the rest of the u.s. government to make sure we collect all of the
>> has any action been taken? mr. smith: we have the taken action. we took action after the missiles. we investigated into al qaeda yesterday. >> the time has expired. the chair recognizes himself. my understanding on the ballistic missile steel, they were relatively low level people. in regards, and a simple yes or no would be helpful, it expires the 31st of this year, will the administration simply extend the , andan sanctions act kennedy snapped back if he ran -- iran cheats? we need to set this into a straight reauthorization. secondly, in terms of the can 5000eal, what
machines actually produce to constitute any threat whatsoever, and if they build more machines, how can we be sure that that has or has not happened? you have testified that iran shipped a most all of its nonium stockpile leaving more than 300 kilograms. thisou tell us where enriched uranium has been shipped, who watches it and who guards it? is there any concern that it could be returned to iran, and i have raised us with the secretary in the past, are there concerns that north korea could be providing such material to iran in a clandestine way. on the human rights issue, and i will be cheering this subcommittee -- chairing this
subcommittee, they are despicable. execution,torture, there are very few parallels, north korea comes to mind and a few other countries. how many individuals have been inignated as the top justice iran? of mull: we designated all the top actors in iran from the beginning. if you go down the list, we have the iranian list of intelligence and security. we have the law enforcement forces, iranian cyber police to investigate organized crime. all the major actors in iran that would have any touch on the
human rights abuses, we have designated. the numbers are 37 individual immunities that have been designated because we went after the big actors. >> how many in the past year? mr. smith: none because we have already done the big actors. the assets are frozen in the united states. it also carries a secondary sanction, so we can tell third country entities who deal with europendividuals -- if tries to deal with any of those that are designated for human rights abuses, i would say europe has many of those actors remaining on their sanctions list, but we would go to anyone and say, you will be cut off from the united states if you continue to deal with those actors. >> you are ready to do that? mr. smith: yes, we have not seen that activity from those organizations, but those individuals are ones that no one
is trying to do without this time. centrifuges that are permitted to operate, the operational part of the agreement, this is what they produce. iran may not have more than 300 kilograms at any time in the next 15 years of no more than 3.67 low enriched uranium. if they exceed that amount, it will face a responsibly joint commission, which could feature being declared in violation of .he agreement that would be one of the consequences. if iran builds or employs more also be0 they will subject to being declared in violation of the agreement. these enrichment facilities are under 24/7 monitoring with cameras, regular business. we have a good handle on whether or not they will be keeping
those commitments. in terms of other covert support, because there is full-time iaea monitoring of the entire few cycle within iran, it is impossible to introduce elements into that system without being detected by the system, by the iaea. that applies to whether north korea supplies material or anyone. the material that iran shipped out, 25,000 pounds of nuclear enriched material, russia took that under its control. we obviously have many differences with russia, but one of the features of our relationship is pretty close cooperation on protection of nuclear material. we do not have a concern about material -- >> do we have any on-site accountability? can we go and verify ourselves? mr. mull: we cannot. >> who does? mr. mull: russia has tons of
nuclear material and has for many years. russia is responsible for maintaining access. >> where is the repository for it? where has it been put? mr. mull: it has not been fully decided where exactly russia will place this. >> it has to go somewhere. mr. mull: it is still in the process of being delivered in its entirety. >> it is not all shipped out yet? mr. mull: it is all shipped out. >> it has to be somewhere. mr. mull: it is on a russian ship in russia under russian control. >> it is on a ship right now? mr. mull: if it has not arrived yet, it will very soon and it will be under the control of russian facilities. >> we are trusting the russians question mark they are so close to iran -- russians? they are so close to iran with double deals, i do not know why
we would trust them. can you tell us where it is going? that is important. mr. mull: it is the russians responsibility to decide where it goes. what is important in this deal is will it go back to iran? i can guarantee there are , ificient rules in place one piece of dust of the material goes back -- >> can we verify it is there and follow it until its final testing -- destination place? confidence, ite is not even in a city then. it is not somewhere in russia where we can say, there it is. mr. mull: the iaea verified the loading up. >> loading and where it ends up is very important. mr. mull: that is russia's
responsibility. >> that is wrong according to my opinion . mr. mull: we remain ready to work with the committee to decide on its proper placement. >> if you want snapback sanctions and you want the accountability measures, you need to have the iran sanctions act. i do not know why it is not a simple yes. the entire country has been captivated by isis, the beheadings on youtube, but the shiite extremist is more dangerous and more evil. killed far more americans, hundreds in the 1980's in lebanon, hundreds in iraq and afghanistan from iranian provided ied's.
is racking up victories in the middle east now. they are not just more evil because they have killed more americans, they are responsible for the deaths of more than 200,000 syrian civilians. the difference is a sod ssad and the --ha through finances. he has the good taste to deny killings. this nuclear deal was not supposed to be a get out of jail free card for everything iran does. 302 of section 301 and the iran threat reduction act
our formered with and present chairman on. you have only designated 70 entities under 301, but just as important, under 302, you have not sanctioned a single business that i can identify for doing business with the iran with newnary guard blood on its hands every day in syria. mr. smith, what is the most well-known company that has been sanctioned for doing business under section 302, for doing business with the revolutionary guard? mr. smith: i'm sorry. i would have to get you that information. >> i have the information, 0.0. what about sanctions? mr. smith: designations are sanctions, sir. >> i am talking about secondary
sanctions. mr. smith: if you have the label on our website, -- is not trying to do business in the united states, it is getting it supplies from european companies. which companies have you sanctioned or doing business with the revolutionary guard? in irgch: when we put tag, that carries secondary sanctions. >> have you designated, proposed a secondary sanction on any business? mr. smith: the european actors have moved away from that business. >> none of them are doing business with the irgc? mr. smith: i have not seen evidence that europe is dealing with the irgc. asiant about southeastern actors?
they are a huge economic monolith. there are a lot more funds for you to designate. companyot find a single that is doing business with them. to another on designated entity, the airline of choice for the iran revolutionary guard corps. aircrafts into friendly countries in middle eastern europe. those aircraft's have u.s. technology on them. what have we done to vent those aircrafts from being received in this friendly cities? mr. smith: a number of agencies in the u.s. government has been actively engaged to try to prevent them from being able to fly. >> have we stopped anything or
are we just sending letters? mr. smith: we have stops. >> can you get that information to me confidentially? they are flying into an awful lot of european and asian cities. why have we not nailed a single bank for dealing bit -- doing business? mr. smith: we continue to try. >> we cannot find a single bank? mr. smith: if we find the evidence, we will go after them. >> but you have found zero evidence of any bank? we are relying on the executive branch to enforce this deal because you are able to monitor what iran does, and here is an example where you have a major airline doing business in dozens of cities, and you cannot find them doing business with a single bank. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much.
first of all, i would like to associate myself with the concerns about human rights that congressman smith outlined, and i would like to say that there are a number of ways of approaching the human rights issue that will have an impact for today. there are other ways of approaching it that will have a major impact in the future as well. let me just say that we have with us today, folks in their yellow jackets who remind us they are here as testimony to the fact that we have a brutal human rights abusing regime in tehran. they remind us that they have families and there are still people, whether it is in camp
liberty or iran itself, who are being held and tortured and being repressed by this , that they think they had the destiny, blessings of god for these horrible crimes they are committing against their own people and have been doing so for decades now. have a nuclear free iran, and what we are really trying to do is to stop this. we recognize that shiites fled, and the last thing we want to see is a nuclear exchange between sunni muslims and shiite muslims. this is not just for our own national security, but a humanitarian effort on our part to prevent that weapons system to become part of that historic fight between these two factions
of islam. that just thete sanctions for human rights abuses is not enough, and i do not believe we are doing it with the gusto or determination that we need to, although you knew more about -- no more about that that is one part of the human rights approach. the other approach is that we need to be supporting those , not just punishing those people who are oppressing the population, but supporting those people in the population who want to bring about a more them a craddick iran -- democratic iran and want to separate their country from the iron grip that they have on iranian society. have we done anything based on the fact that now we have this
reproach on the nuclear issue with the iranian regime, have we stepped up support, direct support for any group within iran that is trying to make a more democratic country? mr. mull: thank you for the caution -- question. my job is focused exclusively on making sure iran it meets all of its commitments, that it does not get to have a nuclear weapons capability. we remain gravely concerned about the human rights situation in iran. i think there is not another country in the world who speaks up more often about our concern and takes action through the international community, international organizations as well as through our own laws. you folks would not know if we had operations going on this part of the human rights issue.
challenging those people who are violating human rights versus helping those people who are trying to overthrow this , which would create a better situation for achieving all of our goals if we had a more democratic government there. say, that is, if we do not do that, if we do not help those people who are struggling to build a more democratic iran, we are just postponing the time when i ran -- iran will have a nuclear weapon. the treaty we are talking about, how many years is it before it no longer applies? is it 15 years, i think question mark instead of -- i think? instead of postponing, we need to eliminate that eventuality by making sure that we are supporting the democratic and the as iras and
kurds in iran who want to live in a more free society. >> thank you very much. mr. connolly of virginia. >> thank you. onis fascinating, especially the implementation of the iran deal, because some of the critics are focused on airlines and revolutionary activities and sanctions and rather thanbanks, the elements of the nuclear deal, which they were the first to say it would never work. they witchy, the metrics were not good enough. ambassador mull, i am going to ask questions about the nuclear agreement and compliance. any evidence of cheating? mr. mull: so far, no.
i can tell you in the six months, and the run-up to welementation day, whenever detected a potential for moving away from the commitments, we engage with iranian counterparts and they have entrusted in us every single time. >> i want to try to understand. let me see. one of the requirements was to reactor soresearch it could no longer produce weapons involving plutonium. did they do that? what did they do? mr. mull: they removed the core of the reactor and replaced it with concrete. >> is in observable? mr. mull: yes, it is observable. >> they complied. pretty big deal. centrifuges and it was part of the agreement to
get down to 56 -- 5060. did they do that? mr. mull: yes, they did. they had full enrichment, what is the status there? mr. mull: the enrichment is proceeding, and all of the operations have been ceased. >> what was the enrichment level before? mr. mull: the highest amounts was 19.75% >> is that weapons grade? mr. mull: no. >> they are required to get onto 3.67, correct? did they do that? was it observable? mr. mull: yes it was. >> could they go back to 20 or 19? mr. mull: only by breaking elements of the agreement and it would have to do so under places with full-time surveillance. >> that i understand you say
there is a stockpile of enriched 25,000 was in excess of kilograms -- 25,000 pounds question mark now they can have only 300 kilograms? did they do that? mr. mull: yes. >> you are kidding. they complied again? mr. mull: yes. >> was that observable? mr. mull: it was observed and documented by the iaea. >> they also had to agree that centrifuge production would be subject to iaea inspection at any time. had they complied? mr. mull: yes, sir. ofall of those predictions the end of the world, armageddon, the fact is we were just enabling a nuclear development, it sounds to me, andssador mull, that so far
we are not dealing with a perfect state or perfect behavior, there are a lot of things we object to, but with respect to this agreement so far, they have in fact abided by it, not cheated, that we know, we have a vigorous inspection, metrics that have been met and it sounds to me like, despite reductions to the contrary, they are further away from a nuclear weapon today than they were before the agreement. would that be a fair assessment from your view? mr. mull: that is undeniably true. >> my lord. we can decide if we want to pillar the administration in one of the most important nuclear agreements in our lifetime. i happen to draw the opposite conclusion of the prime minister
of israel. the x essential threat -- existential threat to israel would be denying the agreement. it is hard work to implement this. it is hard work to validate it. it is hard work to stick with it and oversee it. so far, it is working. thank god it is. >> it is hard work to say, that is enough. now we turn to mr. wilson. >> thank you. i really appreciate the extraordinary efforts on his leadership to expose the increasing threats of the iran deal. i am grateful this is a bipartisan concern. we have heard it from ranking emgle. i believe your testimony
confirms american families are at more risk than ever and that the terrorists are better financed than ever to achieve their goals of death to america and israel. in fact, mr. smith, you admitted that iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. how could you not recognize that to aleasing $100 billion state sponsor of terrorism, that a significant amount of that money would be used to kill american families? saw aith: sir i think we state sponsor with a nuclear dangerwas a far bigger to the united states. we put through the efforts of our sanctions, iran and a half hole.illion whol american families are at risk. in fact, last month in baghdad,
it was iranian backed terrorist that kidnapped for americans, and so they are not stopping. they may be kidnapping today, i 283 still not forgotten u.s. marines killed in beirut. we should not forget that. i had two sons that served in iraq. they are at risk of ied's. incrediblethis is and putting the american people at risk. indicater mull, you israel supports the agreement. this is in direct contradiction to every bit of information that we have received from the israeli and themselves. they support this or not? mr. mull: the chief of staff of the israeli and arms forces has publicly said that the threat to israel of a nuclear iran has
declined as result of this agreement. is that mean the entire government is happy with it, no. a have had concerns with this. , you will havecy good people who agree and disagree. back again, to the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, there was no response as iran continues to do that. there is only one purpose as indicated by the congressman engle, to develop nuclear weapons to strike america. is there any other reason for ?his question mark mr. mull mr. mull: that is one of the reasons we attached payloads to the missiles. aat is why they are still threat to us and our allies. icbm is to use of an
use it for nuclear capability, not to make some type of conventional attack. the american people are truly at risk, and for this to simultaneously occur is extraordinary to me, and there are no repercussions, and so over and over again, see the american people at risk, and when you identify the iaea inspections, are there no americans on this team? mr. mull: there are a number of americans that work in the iaea. iran -- americans do not travel to iran. >> no americans, no canadians. what you are really describing is self verification by the existence. their own i really am saddened by what i hear today, and to meet it just confirms what the lieutenant,
the former direction of the defense intelligence agency said, that the middle east policy is one of willful ignorance and putting the american families at risk. i hope you will change course. there have been over and over again requests to enforce sanctions and reinstate sanctions. i am very grateful to be working on legislation, bipartisan legislation on it zero tolerance for violations. i yield back my time. >> thank you. thank you to our witnesses. englek the ranking member to remind us that the i think when you think about what the consequences would have been in our efforts
to push back on iran in a number of ways because of their aggression, it would be a very different scenario if we were required to push back on iran with nuclear capability and make a difficult situation even more dangerous. i have three very specific questions. when the united states began negotiateing with iran, the breakout time was a few weeks to a few months according to most experts. by that point they would have enough enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon. how far are they out from this implementation? ambassador mull: about two months to at least one year. >> ok. the international atomic energy to do someeing asked significant work in compliance with this agreement. i actually wrote to the president about this urging that we be certain that we provide additional resources to the iaea to do this work. i know that the administration's proposal provides a modest increase, but i think the iaea has already indicated that it is
not sufficient. could you speak to the importance of making sure that we in a bipartisan way allocate significant resources, that we don't fund the entire operation the financial requests of iaea so they can do the work that we're asking them and requiring them to do? ambassador mull: yes, sir. 'm in regular contact. it is fully funded and has everything it needs if for rest of this year. we will continue and welcome the congress' bipartisan support for making sure that the yay jay fully funded. >> i think the request they made for fiscal year 2017 was $10.6 million. i don't think that is reflected in the administration but i hink many of us are very
concerned and want to be certain that they have the resources that they heed the. finally, i know there has been a lot of discussion about the snap-back provisions and noncompliance for iran for obviously the behavior of this country and our leaders give us lots of reason to expect there will be some noncompliance. what i'm interested to know is what work the administration in has done to deal with violation s of this agreement. while some people have argued if there is even the slightest unintentional violation, the deal is off. that would obviously result in the deal which will prevents iran from being a nuclear power, from being abandon sbeanded which doesn't give us the work we want. so there has been conversation on what the administration's provision thinking about minor we tions of the agreement communicated those to our european allies. i know there is some discussion of zero tolerance. if there is anything the is
completely abandoned. i would like to know your the ts on that, what administration is considering and how we should think about sending a very clear message to the iranians that any violation comes with a punishment and a consequence. ambassador mull: yes, sir. oa hink tell you that the jcp has consequences to the agreement from partial imposition of the sanctions to partial. i'm not sure that it would be helpful for me to speculate here in terms of what each individual slylation of contradiction to the agreement would provoke. diplomatic access to us
as we go forward. the breakout time we talked about a few moments ago, if the breakout time diminishes below a year, we would consider that to be a very serious violation and work with our allies to have the appropriate response. >> of course communicating to the iranians that it is a the position of the united states that any violation will be addressed and punished in an appropriate way. .mbassador mull: yes, sir i can assure you we are in dailey contact with iaea on their evaluation of the situation and iran's compliance. mr. chairman thank you. mr. duncan is recognized. rep. duncan: let me say i hope history is right and sides more with mr. connolly's comments. we'll see. i hope that iran continues to comply. i hope they don't have a nuclear weapon because consequences are dire.
i want to talk about the voosea waiver program law that was passed as part of the omnibus in 2015. as relates to the jcpoa. i want to talk about the relations that went on through november 30 to the passage of the omnibus. these were negotiations between the white house, state department, homeland security and members of the house and senate. on november 30, d.h.s. asked for certain waivers for people to travel to iran and iraq in the post march 2004 time frame. the negotiations went on for quite sometime on november -- december 1, december 1, december and december 3.
that does not allow visa waivers for specific group or categories. ok? that is december 3. december 3 at 10:37 in the morning, notifies them that the state department has no further edits to that text. the president signed it into law which included the visa program language. december 19, secretary kerry sends a letter to the iranian foreign minister stating that the u.s. met the requirements of this law so as not to interfweer the legitimate business interests of iran. we ought to be talking about the nation of the united states of america. ut that is what he said.
then on january 21, homeland security announced implementation plan for the enhancements with five broad category s of wavers including those rejected during negotiations by congress through december 2. are you familiar, sir, ambassador, with the visa waiver recommendation paper memo white paper issued by the state epartment? ambassador mull: i've seen many papers that were involved in zugs of deciding what the administration's policy would be implicating case by case wavers. - waivers. rep. duncan: during the s, the congress including the state department said that the texts, the negotiated texts through the passage of omnibus. and they issued this white paper which talks about and actually references a second white paper called a legal paper within this document. i have no idea why this is and we don't have our hands on that
yet. but in this paper, it specifically comes up with rationale for circumventing the will of congress as well outlined during the negotiations during the omnibus and the visa waiver program law, before the ink is even dry on that bill they are i think it points to actually negotiating in bad faith in necessary the state department feels like they are going to go around the will of congress and go around these negotiations and actually allow the issue of waivers, visa waivers for people that have traveled to iran from the uropean countries. to the simple point that part of it says this is one of the questions they are going to ask madam chairman for someone traveling on business purposes. simple question. was your travel to iraq, this was the iraq portion but i think
it applies to iran as well after march 1 2011? if yes, was the travel exclusively for business purposes? that is a pretty benign question to be asking. there is not a lot of delving into what the business was related to. who they were talking with. and going back to mr. sherman's comments as the conversation that went on with mr. smith a minute ago about the contact with i.r.g. we're talking about european businesses. not american businesses. european businesses and businessmen and women traveling to iran who may have contact with the iran revolutionary guard, possibly come back to their home country in europe and apply for travel to the united states under the visa waiver program, and according to state department, they are going to be given a waiver. that goes against the will of congress, sir. we're going to delve into this more, madam chairman, mr. chairman, i wanted to say all of
this on the record and i wanted to ask that this document be submitted for the record for my colleagues to delve into this a little further. wi t >> thank you, mr. chair. thank you, gentlemen, for being here. i have two sort of -- i think they are sort of related questions. first has to do with the snapping back the sanctions. e have read about a lot of economic activity now with iran, with other countries, so my first question is realistically let's say two years ahead from ow or three years ahead from
now and we had to do a snap back, what is the prospect of actually getting back to where we were before we lifted the sanctions? hat is the first question. second question i have is that you know, we hear talk of people, and not to get political, but there have been presidential candidates who have said well, if i get elected i'm going to immediately rip up the deal and i would like to know what you think the implications of that would be. . ose are my two questions thank you. ambassador mull: thank you very much congresswoman. in terms of snap back, if we get to a situation which iran is not complying and we decide to snap
back those sanctions, imposing the secondary sanctions as my colleague mr. smith mentioned earlier, we have been down this road before where our european or other partners have an economic relationship with iran, companies from those countries do, but for whatever reason we have decided to penalize and force those countries and companies to make a choice. either you do business with iran r you do business with us. every single time they choose to do business with us because it is a more profitable relationship. i have no doubt if we decide to snap back sanctions we would be effective in achieving that. in terms of various interests that some candidates have said they might rip up the deal on the first day in office of a new presidency, i would only say that i would advise whoever the new president and his or her team in taking office, to think very carefully about destroying a deal if iran has continued to comply which has reduced its breakout time from one or two
months to over a year. to one that that is drastically shrunk the amount of enriched nuclear material that could move a bomb. i'm not sure i see what the benefit to u.s. interests would be in freeing iran from those commitments that have made our nterests much safer. >> mr. smith, did you want to answer? mr. smith: i would just agree to what ambassador mull said. we're all very trained in what the secondary sanction consist accomplish and they know the force of u.s. law in this area. >> but i guess would it be safe, though, -- i don't know if the word safe is correct. i would assume that even if you put the sanctions back in place immediately, you're still not going to -- it is still going to take a while for iran to actually feel the same impact that they felt before they went to the table.
mr. smith: it may take some time before iran feels sanctions if they come back on, but we should remember where we are today. iran is in a half a trillion dollar hole because of the sanctions that we have imposed over the course of time. now they are facing a drop in oil prices just as the sanctions relief is coming into play. what we're talking about is them getting about $50 billion, much of which they need desperately to prop up their currency to be able to do any foreign trade. when you look at the $50 billion it is believed they are getting versus the trillion dollar hole they have, i think it is going to be a very long time before iran gets out from under the sanctions burden that we have imposed. >> thank you. i yield back, mr. chair. mr. chairman we go now to mr. perry of pennsylvania. rep. perry: thank you, mr. chairman. thank you gentlemen for being
here. i appreciate the very direct questioning of mr. connolly and the very direct answers on very specific items. i would also tell you that in my view, iran has played long ball and we have been myopic. i think it is a bit early to talk about cheating on some of the specifics but i do think in time they will will get there and -- but i just see them as consolidating their gains in syria and yemen and iraq and then using their ballistic technology, completing that testing and that program over a series of years to the point where one when they are ready to be nuclear there will be very little that we can do with it and that is the long goal. i see iran as the regional hedge month. let me ask you, ambassador, a
question here. the procurement channel of the nation's security council 2231 allows for nuclear articles and dual use articles through a dedicated procurement channel. however, some of the materials that can be supplied through the carboned channel such as fiber, this is a simple yes or no question. would it be a violation of the agreement and/or the u.n. security council resolution? ambassador mull: i'm sorry i can't give a yes or no answer. because each case would be dependent on what exactly the intended use of any such material through that channel would be. the united states has a veto in the procurement channel. any time we believe that an item is going to improve iran's ballistic missile program or is going to be delivered in a way
that is not subject to appropriate end-use monitoring, i cannot imagine the circumstances in which the united states would agree to a case like that. rep. perry: let me make sure i understand your answer. you said it would be episodic because of the dual use proposition. but then you said i think that the united states understanding in recognizing that wouldn't be amenable to their procurement of that. is that -- did i characterize that correctly or not? ambassador mull: again, we would examine what is the good that they are seeking to procure, what is the stated purpose of its use. will it be monitored in a way that we're satisfied that it won't be used in a way to harm our interests across whatever. rep. perry: you know they can't domestically produce carbon fiber, right? and you know it is critical for their ballistic missile program, i'm sure.
and it is regulated through the procurement channel. how would it not be monitored? how would its use not be monitored? ambassador mull: well, according to the terms of the implication of the procurement channel, any country that wants to sell any material as part of their applying for permission to proceed with the transaction, they must explain how they are planning to monitor the end use. we have a number of other tools outside the procurement channel such as the missile technology control regime. rep. perry: i don't mean to interrupt. i have a limited amount of ime. rouhani will have to gain access to carbon fiber elsewhere and it will not go through the procurement channel. are you familiar with that, that he said that? ambassador mull: i'm familiar in what he said,ith
yes. rep. perry: if they do buy outside the procurement channel, because it is outside, you don't know what they are using it for and there is no inspection paradigm or verification paradigm associated with that. would the administration consider that a violation and an agreement of the security council resolution? ambassador mull: what is subject to the control is a very specific list of nuclear supplier group and other sensitive controlled nuclear-related items. rep. perry: including carbon fiber? ambassador mull: it depends. it depends on what exactly -- rep. perry: what does it depend on? they are going to go outside the procurement channel as stated by rouhani? ambassador mull: i can assure you we will use every technique at our disposal. rep. perry: including considering it a violation.
yes or no? ambassador mull: a violation would be if iran procures something outside of the procurement channel. rep. perry: including carbon fiber. o the answer would be yes? ambassador mull: yes, sir. carbon fibers. rep. perry: i appreciate that. purchase we go to mr. lowenthal of california. rep. lowenthal: i want to follow up on some of the questions that mr. connolly hazardsed and i think this is related to you ambassador mull. you have already described to us about the removal of the core of the plutonium reactor.
you have already described to us about the shutting down of the thousands of centrifuges and shipping out of the country of its highly enriched uranium in exchange for lower level nuclear fuel for its nuclear pour plants. i want to follow up on these questions. i'm curious about the extraction of that stockpile. if you can tell us how that was done, when it was sent out of the country, where it was taken, what steps we are taking to ensure it is a permanent transfer and that the iranian regime will not be able to get its hands on that or any other highly enriched uranium in the uture. ambassador mull: yes, sir, thank you, congressman lowenthal. iran would remove all of its nuclear material in order to keep that obligation. what it decided to do was to negotiate with russia the transfer of that material out of iran on a russian ship into
russian custody without any claim of title to that information. so it has surrendered this material to russia. russia has committed to responsibly safeguard it within the -- within its entire nuclear program that it has there a long history, obviously, of maintaining and safeguarding nuclear materials. rep. lowenthal: are we able to know? is there a way we can follow up on that? will we be monitoring where both the russians and the iranians re so that that enriched plutonium never --ambassador mull: yes, sir. we have worked with the iaea through this agreement to make sure that any possible entry point of nuclear material like that back into iran could only take place under the observation nd monitoring of the iaea. if there were some development by which someone tried to do that, we would be aware of it and we would consider that a
violation. rep. lowenthal: approximately how much was delivered to russia? ambassador mull: about 25,000 pounds of enriched uranium material. rep. lowenthal: what could 25,000 pouns of enriched uranium do? how much would it take of that o develop nuclear weapons? ambassador mull: none of that 19.75%. -- that was at nuclear weapons material. weapons grade uranium really has to be at the 90% level or higher. highly enriched uranium. rep. lowenthal: i want to follow up. i was proud to support the agreement. but we had concerns about the implementation. that's why we're so glad that the two of you are here today and we're concerned as some of these questions have been raised about iran's other nonnuclear trouble making.
the security of israel and the region. these are all concerns. congress wants to state abreast of the compliance and any violations. in a letter in august to my colleagues from new york, congress member to a new york congress member, the president allayed many of these concerns and detailed his plans which colluded with the boston to monitor them. that is really your position now that has come up. what i'm interested in is in your role, do you have all the proper access and information that you're going to need. are there any things you're going to need to report and how often can we expect those kinds of interactions with you to follow up on this? ambassador mull: yes, sir. i am at your disposal. any member of congress to come and answer any questions
that you have. i feel extraordinarily well supported by the entire administration. i have regular rich, frequent interactions with various representatives of our intelligence community. i have access regularly to secretary kerry, other senior officials in the white house who are very much focused on the implementation of this deal. rep. feel very well support lowenthal: so you understand this is just the first -- we have begun this process. ed and i'm -- and my team and are are we had --you will be very much agreeable to coming back to the committee. i think it is critically important that we stay in touch. ambassador mull: absolutely, sir. i think this is a vitally important part of my job. you may raise questions i haven't thought of. this is about the interest of all of our country. i very much want to be a good partner. rep. lowenthal: well, i will be calling upon you. i thank you and i yield back. mr. chairman we go to mr. mark os.
rep. meadows: thank you. mr. smith, let me come to you with regards, you're talking about this trillion dollar hole that the sanctions have had great effect. let me just maybe narrow our focus a bit as it relates to hezbollah. i know you implemented some new sanctions. in january. but my question, i guess, goes really to the heart of the regards toit is with iran and are they financing hezbollah in your professional opinion? mr. smith: i think we have seen iran support hezbollah over time, yes. rep. med owes clob. re we today? mr. smith: i haven't seen the
latest figures. we have seen iran continue to support hezbollah. rep. med owes:so at what point would you consider putting sanctions on iran whether it is through the executive order that is in place or through the new law that the president just signed into law in december. at what point will you consider putting sanctions on iran or supporting hezbollah? mr. smith: so iran is already under a government blocking from here. meaning that we -- >> i understand it. i am talking about the additional tools that you have. at what point will you implement additional sanctions as it relates to hezbollah and the financing that comes from iran? mr. smith: i'll have to look at the evidence in the future and see where it takes us. that's what we do. we follow the evidence and when we see evidence we continue to develop targets. >> but your testimony is that the last intelligence you had was that they are financing hezbollah. let's be intellectually honest.
i think we both know they are. is it not true that the greatest benefactor of iran's support or the greatest benefactor for hezbollah is iran? mr. smith: that is a statistic i don't know if i have. i think we could get that to you in perhaps another setting, a classified setting. >> under your professional opinion who recollects might be a greater financer of hezbollah other than perhaps their illegal drug activities. what other state sponsor could be greater than iran? mr. smith: i have already acknowledged that i think iran has continued to do so. >> the american people see pictures of sailors and they are offended. i'm offended. if we have tools in place that can address it and we're not sing them, would you not believe that is being irresponsible?
mr. smith: we're continuing to use our tools and continuing to designate every month and every week additional designationsor terrorists. we did so yesterday and i think we'll continue to do so in the future. >> the big black hole, mr. smith is iran. we're going all around it. we have over 100 individuals. i agree with you. we have been following the numbers. we're addressing it but somehow iran is getting a free pass and that is concerning to the american people. mr. smith: i would disagree with you about iran getting a free pass. there are a number of agencies for the government of iran that continue to be designated by the united states for their support to terrorism and a specific number of individuals that continue to be designated for their support mr. meadows: some of your colleague were behind you.
mr. duncan of south carolina mentioned that. under what -- since you're responsible for making sure that this jcpoa stays in place, was there language in there that would allow iran to actually participate in our visa waiver program, either irectly or indirectly? because they're participating indirectly now. was there language in there that would suggest that they should enjoy those benefits? mr. mull: language -- i'm sorry, in the legislation or in the -- mr. meadows: we know there was in our legislation. i'm talking about in the joint agreement. because secretary kerry came out and very quickly said that we're going to expand it to business-related activities, which was not -- mr. mull: yes. thank you very much for the opportunity. i'd like to address this. i think it's a critical misunderstanding that i really welcome the opportunity to clarify. the jcpoa in that agreement, all of the parties agreed that
they would not attempt to block legitimate business activity in iran. when this legislation was passed, iranians immediately complained to me, to secretary kerry, accusing us of violating the jcpoa through this legislation. that's decidedly not the case. we explained to them that this legislation was not aimed at disrupting iran's business activity. it was aimed at protecting america's borders. and it was in that context that secretary kerry in fact defended the legislation in responding to this untrue charge that the iranians had leveled. mr. meadows: i yield back. thank you, mr. chairman. >> we're going to go to mr. william keating of massachusetts. mr. keating: thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank our witnesses for being here today and frankly for your direct answers to questions. there's one area i have left, we've covered so much ground as a committee here this morning. and that's -- those are the issues for violations outside
the jcpoa that we were told during the whole process will be vigorously, you know, pursued. we talked about some of the areas this morning where that would be relevant, including support of terrorism, regional destabilization, human rights abuses and ballistic missile programs and we do know that iran tested precision guided ballistic missile, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead in violation of u.n. agreements. we are aware that the u.s. sanction to individuals and enltities responsible for supporting these activities. now, my question is this, in terms of your oversight, in terms of our ability as a committee to work with you in communicating and monitoring this. i know you can't be very specific on this. because it will hurt your leverage. with sanctions in the future. but in these sanctions outside the jcpoa, could you just shed
little light on how you work administratively with other agencies of our government, can you just shed some light on the process where you determine what to give for sanctions at a certain level, what factors are going to result in your reviewing that and changing those sanctions, maybe escalating them, whether it's continued violations, whether it's -- how do you arrive at that? how do you function administratively in reviewing those, setting those, so that we have a better sense going forward on these very important sanctions that are outside the agreement? mr. smith: thank you, sir. i think that's a very important question. i'm happy to try to shed some light on it. as i sit here today, we have teams of analysts at the treasury department who are pouring through the intelligence and other information that we have from a variety of sources.
the intelligence community, from the defense department, from all of the agencies of the u.s. government. they look at the classified and unclassified information that's available and they focus on the different sanctions programs that we have. so i have a team that's working on terrorism, hezbollah sanctions, isil sanctions, everything in the terrorism realm, whether it's iran-related or noniran-related, we follow the non-iran-related, we follow it. anything dealing with yemen. destabilizing activities in the region and also teams that focus on the ballistic missile program. we gather the evidence to see if we see anything that fits within the sanctions program and then if we do, we start to develop a case on it. we talk to the rest of the inner agencies so everybody's onboard, so they know what we're doing. we don't want to, for example, interrupt a sensitive intelligence operation. we don't want to interfere with a law enforcement operation, so we make sure that what we do, we communicate very well so that when we roll out, we're
able to roll out in the smartest, most effective way. so, basically we start from scratch, developing the intel, building cases, working with the team, so that we can roll out successive sanctions against the greatest threats to our national security and foreign policy. mr. keating: and in that process, what triggers re-evaluating things? without getting into detail. because i don't want to undercut the lesk rang you have. but -- leverage you have. but i mean, what are the things that are important when you say, you know, we're not reacting to these sanctions, we're going to have to leverage these things up, what kind of things are you looking at? mr. smith: i think we continue to look at our experience across all of our sanctions programs. we have a good idea of what's impactful and that's why when we wanted to have an impact on iran and many of these other sanctions programs, for ballistic missile, we hit -- there are major entities that do the programs. all of the big names in iran that are associated with the ballistic missile program, we
hit those. and then we go after anyone outside of iran that we see supporting that program. so that's why last month we went after u.a.e. and a china-based network that we saw supporting that program. so we follow the evidence to see what's going to have an impact. and the evidence sometimes will suggest different impacts for different programs. and so we try to get the networks that are most critical to those bad activities. mr. keating: so it's a dynamic situation. it's not something that's incremental. here we go, going to impose this, no, let's see. it's continually being evaluated, is that correct? mr. smith: those under sanctions know how to try to circumvent them so we have to continue to evolve. mr. keating: that will help us as we move forward. this committee is certainly going to be concerned on these other violations going forward. and how the u.s. reacts. and this will help give us our ability to perform the oversight function more properly. so thank you very much. i yield back. >> thank you very much. we go to ted yoho of florida.
mr. yoho: thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, i appreciate you being here. in your opinion, i think we already know the question or answer to this, hezbollah, we could assume they're a terrorist organization that carries out proxy work for iran, agreed? mr. smith: yes. mr. yoho: with iran offering to put g.p.s. technology on 100,000 missiles, would we assume that's for peaceful purposes? or terrorist purposes? mr. smith: i'll say iran's development of its ballistic missile program is something that remains under sanction by the u.s. government and we continue to go after it. mr. yoho: ok, good. so if they're supporting hezbollah and giving this kind of technology to over 100,000 missiles, we can assume that's probably not for good reasons, right? i mean -- mr. smith: i'm going to continue to follow the evidence and -- mr. yoho: the evidence points that it's going there. if it walks like a duck, quaks like a duck, it's a duck. this is not a good thing.
and that brings any to the opening remarks of the chairman. president obama in the rose garden pledged to remain vigilant and respond to iran's continued sponsorship of terrorism, its supports for proxies who destabilize the middle east and threats against american friends and allies. iran's a destabilizing activity has continued in the wake of the nuclear deal. is that not breaching the jcpoa? mr. mull: sir, the jcpoa is exclusively focused on iran's nuclear program. mr. yoho: i want to take to you measure 28 of the jcpoa which clearly states that iran and the others will commit to implementing the jcpoa in good faith. if they're doing terrorist activity, is that in good faith? mr. mull: terrorism is outside the scope of the jcpoa. mr. yoho: what about the development of the ballistic missiles and the firing of those? are they outside of that? mr. mull: yes, sir.
mr. yoho: what about breaching u.n. security resolutions, are they outside of the jcpoa agreement? mr. mull: yes, sir. we deal with those problems in other avenues. mr. yoho: all right. but also, in good faith, that's a part of the jcpoa, in good faith, in constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect and refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of jcpoa that would undermine its successful implementation. i mean, we can argue which side of arming hezbollah with 100,000 j.p.s.-guided missiles or firing medium range ballistic missile as they did on november 22, i think it was, or november 20, and then again on october 10, which was before the agreement went into place. the point i want to bring out here is the pretty clear the intention of iran is not to -- abide by the jcpoament
they're taunting. for the administration to release sanctions, i've got a letter here that we wrote that has over 100 u.s. representatives that asked the president to hold off on sanctions. this was sent december 17 of 2015. by over 100 members of this body, republicans and democrats, that asked the president to look into this before we move further and there was no response from the president. i think this is a traffic esty to our negotiating -- travesty to our negotiating and i think it's weakened us. as we negotiate, i would only hope that our government, as we negotiate, is from a position of strength that makes our country stronger. do you feel that this has made our country stronger, this negotiation? and what we've seen the actions of iran do where the -- with the firing of these missiles, the firing of the missile real close to our navy destroyer, the way they apprehended our military personnel, and they
make fun of them on the world scene, do you think that's made our country stronger? mr. mull: that activity was outrageous. i'm disgusted. mr. yoho: ok, so it's not made our country stronger. do you think the iran nuclear deal has made iran stronger? mr. mull: i believe it has constrained iran's ability to develop a nuclear weapon and has made us safer. mr. yoho: what about freeing up their money? mr. smith, you were talking about the $50 million or the half a trillion dollars they're in debt. if a country's a half a trillion dollars in debt and they're screaming for economic relief, would you think a country that is in that dire straits and suffering that bad would be funding terrorist activities? mr. smith: iran continued to fund terrorist activities during the course of the sanctions program. mr. yoho: how bad were they suffering? i heard that through the jcpoa agreement and i didn't buy it. i didn't buy it then and i don't buy it now. i hope what mr. duncan said does not come to fruition.
it will either be a neville chamberlain moment or we can look back and say, that was a ronald reagan moment. and i hope it goes the right way. i yield back. thank you. >> thank you very much, mr. yoho. we now go to grace meng of new york. ms. meng: thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you to ambassador mull and mr. smith for being here and all your hard work. since the jcpoa went into effect, iran's hard liners have taken pains to consolidate their economic and political power and to sideline would-be reformists who are more amenable to reproachment with the west. it was hoped that the openings created by the jcpoa would engender iran an moderation, but instead -- iranian moderation, but instead the extremists have reaped the benefits while tighten their grip. does the u.s. have a strategy to combat the retrenchment we see on the part of could he mainy, his allies -- khomeini,
his allies and the irgc? i'll go through all of my questions first in the interest of time. how has iran's terrorist activities been affected by the jcpoa? i know that you mentioned that it was outside the scope of the eal, but what do we know about , if their support for terrorism has increased or decreased, does the u.s. have an estimate of the amount of funding that iran provides to groups like hezbollah? how are the funds being transferred? and if we see an iranian bank transfer funds for the benefit of groups like hezbollah, will the u.s. immediately sanction that bank? and if we are to go beyond the sanctions, is the administration pursuing any actions beyond sanctions to confront any of iran's problematic behavior in the region? and if so, what are these
actions? mr. mull: thank you very much, congresswoman. in terms of the impact of the jcpoa in the internal iranian political situation, you are right. many people have expressed various views and hopes and aspirations of the impact it would have. but the principle reason for the administration to pursue this has really been to diminish iran's ability to build a nuclear weapon. and in that so far we've succeeded by increasing iran's breakout time to at least a year. so it wouldn't be appropriate for me to speculate. we're not really implementing this deal to have a political impact on iran. it's all about protecting us from a nuclear iran. and as i said, in that we're succeeding. in terms of penalizing iran's destabilizing activity in the region, we have a rich set of tools that we can use and we've, as mr. smith has been
describing and i'll let him address in more detail, we've shown a readiness to do that. we've penalized most recently on january 17 iran's ballistic missile program. in the past few weeks we've continued to sanction hezbollah activities and people linked to hezbollah. and we will continue to do that. mr. smith? mr. smith: i just add and say, congresswoman, i don't have the exact amount that iran uses to fund terrorism. we can go back and see. i think the intelligence community properly has the best number, working with the treasury department. but that would be more of a classified figure we'd have to provide in a different setting. in terms of sanctioning iranian banks for bad behavior in support of terrorism, we've done it. we've sanctioned banks in the past for its support for terrorism. we'll continue to follow the evidence of support for terrorism, ballistic missile support, destabilizing activities and we will develop packages and targets when we see the evidence show. ms. meng: ok. and finally, but can we tell if the support for terrorist
activities and groups has increased or decreased? mr. mull: i think mr. myth is right. that i think we'd be happy to go into more detail in a different setting. but i do know that general clapper recently testified in the past few days that he has not seen an appreciable change in iranian level of support since the implementation of this deal. the support for terrorism. ms. meng: thank you. i yield back. >> thank you, congresswoman grace meng. ambassador, ranking member engel and i both mentioned iran's horrible behavior in the neighborhood. and that includes iranian-backed forces that threaten those at the camp. the committee raised this with ambassador mcguirk yesterday. and i pass these concerns on to you. mr. royce: these individuals need protection. the u.s. government needs to
guarantee that protection. and we have seen what has happened of late. in terms of the loss of human life there at the camp. so, i would convey to you what i conveyed to him yesterday, to the ambassador yesterday. which is, this needs to be a priority. we appreciate the time of both of you as witnesses here today before the committee. you've heard the deep concerns that many of our members have about iran policy. and how it's being carried out. so i know that you'll want to continue to be in touch with members of this committee as we move forward. at this time we'll adjourn the hearing. thank you again for your appearance. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016]
>> on the next washington journal, analyzing the presidents budget proposal. our guess is maya mcguiness. a member of the steering committee. washington journal is live every morning at 7:00 a.m. on c-span. you can join the conversation on calls and comments on facebook and twitter. tonight, democratic presidential candidate hillary clinton and bernie sanders will be speaking at the humphrey-mondale dinner. posted by the state democratic former labour party. you can watch that starting at 8:30 p.m. eastern on c-span. ♪ >> i am an undecided voter right now.
one of the biggest issues is education. i am also a union president. one of the things that should be shame,about his the accountability that has been pervasive. i hope the candidates start to talk about that. thank you. >> the candidate that i have supporting his bernie sanders. he is the only candidate that is going to make the changes we need to get our country back to being a democracy. the system is not broken. it is fixed and we need to make it right for the average american. he space the truth. >> i believe it is important for young voters to care about the economy. we are the ones who are going to be affected by it. he is the one able to fix the economy. ♪ >> iranian president spoke to a crowd in tehran to commemorate