tv Hearing on Encryption and Law Enforcement CSPAN April 23, 2016 10:00am-1:18pm EDT
. be will also talk with jeffrey cohen, discussing the modern primary system. we will see you then. ♪ [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> a live picture from gateway high school in pennsylvania, just outside of pittsburgh, as he stands road to the white house coverage continues this morning. a campaign rally is coming up with present a candidate ted cruz speaking to supporters here
in pennsylvania in just a few moments. we will have it for you live on c-span. until it gets underway, a look at potential vice presidential prospects for republican candidates. >> the 2016 primaries and caucuses will not conclude for another eight weeks, but already, republican candidates are looking for potential running mates. "the washington post" has the sayi on thehis morning issue. philip rucker joins us. thank you for being with us. give us a sense of what ted and, and john kasich, donald trump are doing. guest: there is a vetting process underway, which is
unusual. we are headed to a possible convention, which means the candidates have to get ready. ted cruz and john kasich have both begun to vet vice presidential candidates. the more not reached significant stage where they do interviews, and deal with the vice president candidates themselves, but they are preparing to announce the ticket as early as june, and if not, wait until the convention in cleveland. host: there are complex issues involved. if you wait until the last minute, putting someone on the ticket who could potentially cause harm for the candidate. andt: we all remember 2008, mitt romney chose sarah palin. she did not go through the , andterm vetting process there were some surprises there that hurt the campaign.
there are new calculations this year. they don't know who the president shall nominee will be. there are political cut relations the have to be made heading into an open convention. you try to cut a deal with someone who can bring over a certain delegation of delegates segment ton' try and get the ticket nominated. host: your story today, it appears that ted cruz and to a extent, john kasich, are farther ahead of this, at least publicly the donald trump. is that a fair assessment? guest: that's right. i interviewed donald trump, and he said that he is giving his running mate a lot of thought, thinking of names in his head, but that is where it ends. he does not have a system in place at his campaign headquarters to handle this issue.
he is focused on winning the nomination for stand foremost. we sat down with the aid who was just hired and has taken over trump campaign, and he said that they will get to it when they can get to it, but they want to make sure mr. trump will be the nominee before they get ahead of themselves. host: what names are you hearing, and any surprises in this ever-growing list? guest: the names this year are mostly speculative, of course. it is our understanding that marco rubio and scott walker are being looked at by john kasich. certainly, rubio would be an attractive running mate for any of the three candidates in the race, ted cruz and donald trump included. i don't know where trump will go. a lot depends on whether he can wrap up the nomination in june. if you goes to the open
to useion, he may have the vice president shall spot as a means to bring the ca parties together. if that were the case, he may have to go for someone like marco rubio, or convincing john kasich to be his running mate. host: you have been on the ground in hollywood, florida for this two day spring meeting of the republican national committee. a lot of the candidates have sent surrogates or the candidates themselves have met with to use the vice president shall spot as the meeting. what is your take away? sent his new aid down, and they spent a couple of days holding private meetings with rnc members.
the hostility you hear from donald trump about the rnc, that is all an act, kind of a role he is playing now to get willoters excited, but he start acting more presidential, and make them feel more included in the trump process. trump wants to become the nominee of this party, and to do that, he will need to appease a lot of the party leaders who are openly hostile to him now. host: we will see that next wednesday. he is in washington. wednesday speech focusing on form policy. i want to ask you about your story. the last time we saw it? in the convention, 1976, ronald reagan selected his running mate before the election. it did not work out well for him.
guest: it did not. that was a bold move that reagan made. he was competing against -- mbent resident forw president ford to get the nomination. of course, he lost the went on toand ford represent the republican party in 76. ford lost the election and jimmy carter became the president. clevelandntest to co conclave could complicate the presidency. it is a story from philip rucker . thank you for your time. guest: glad to be here. >> several states on tuesday, including pennsylvania -- we are live in pennsylvania where
senator ted cruz, the president holding aidate is campaign rally today. a live picture here from monroeville. we expect to hear from the center shortly -- senator shortly. a quick note that coverage continues later today as well with bernie sanders in wilmington, delaware for a rally there. we will have the of 4:00 eastern time. while we wait here in monroeville, pennsylvania, more from today's "washington journal." is sabrinaw schaeffer, executive director of the in and women's forum, and co-author of the book -- the independent women's forum and co-author of the book "liberty is were on winter coat -- the war on women." start us off by telling us about
your organization. guest: the independent women's forum has been around for more than 20 years, and are -- our goal is to get more women to value limited government. we work on every thing from tax policy to health care, with a big focus on women in the workplace and what we can do to help them. coulter and education, women in politics, all of this is our core focus. host: how does this report factor into your goals and mission? guest: i think there's a sense that over the past few decades, women have achieved so much educationally, professionally, financially. it's easy to overlook that there are still challenges that persist for women, especially those who work outside the home. even in the very best situation for a woman, there are legitimate things that she has to balance in terms of childcare, saving for retirement, making sure that her
work pays. we want to try to address some of those in a way that would give women and their families more opportunity without growing government of the same time. host: what are some of the major policy reform judaism putting forward -- you guys are putting forward? guest: we would get things like pay equity and paid leave, childcare solutions, how can we make the workplace more flexible and reform the tax code to keep more money that you are -- you are an -- you earn. host: you guys had this idea of a personal care spending account , a retirement account of her pregnancy. explain how that might work. -- guest: challenged one challenge on the issue of paid leave is we often talk about it as if no one has access. but 80% of the full-time employees have access to some sort of paid leave at about one
third of part-time employees. the situation is not quite as dire as we sometimes hear. there are some people who don't have traditional work arrangements to do fall through the cracks. we wanted to figure out how can we help them. i don't think we can help them with a one-size-fits-all family act style piece of legislation. we need to think of this more piecemeal. this is one solution that we offer. the idea would be that people could save for that time that they needed to take off, whether to care for a child or an aging parent, and further life reasons. tax-free. we realize that saving is very hard, especially when our budgets are already stretched. we also recommend that businesses could help match those contributions the way they would for a 401(k) plan. we also recommend setting up nonprofits where generous individuals and corporations can donate, and that money can be given to lower income workers. we really want to give people more control over the money they have, so they don't feel quite as dependent on their employer for that time off.
in conjunction with that, we recommend a tax credit for small businesses that truly can't afford to give the kind of generous benefit packages their larger competitors can. host: you can join in the conversation and share your thoughts and your experiences. here's how we are bringing the phone lines for the segment. starting off with original phone lines among those in eastern and central time zones can call us at call (202) 748-8000. mountain pacific, the timeline is call (202) 748-8001.have a special phone line for women working outside of the home, the number is independents, call (202) 748-8002. you can talk to is on twitter, our handle is @cspanwj. we are talking with sabrina schaeffer, executive director of the independent women's forum. you mention everything from tax reform to the minimum wage. why did you guys decide to take
such an extensive -- expansive approach? years, we hadious books that cover everything from food and agriculture policy to energy policy. focus on the workplace issues that people are really concerned about. we were thinking of it in a more tailored sense, but you are correct, part of the issue is that there is a sense sometimes that we can have a simple fix and make anything better. as more ofo see this a collage. we want to make sure we have tax reform, we get rid of certain relations that are making it harder for people to get into the workforce. we want to make sure that we also, people are being paid fairly. his accommodation of efforts. hillary clinton was at an event and fixed burger about the issue of equal pay -- she spoke about the issue of equal pay. [video clip]
hillary clinton: imagine women finally get equal pay for the work we do. [applause] hillary clinton: this is not just a women's issue. this is a family issue. mother ore a wife or sister or a daughter who is working, and they are not being paid fairly and equally, when they go to the store, when they are in the supermarket checkout line, the cashier doesn't say ok , you only have to pay $.78 on the dollar. africanu are an american woman, you only have to pay $.68 on the dollar. are a latino woman, you only have to pay $.58 on the dollar. last time i checked, there was no women's discount for failing
to get equal pay in the first place. that was hillary clinton on the campaign trail. we are talking with sabrina schaeffer of the indiana women's forum. what is your thought about her comments, and should there be legislation to help close the gender wage gap? guest: this is in the know a lot of women are concerned about, as they should be. you want to be sure you are paid fairly. and there are bad employers out there, that actors who may discriminate against women. unfortunately, i think this women that women are only paid $.78 on the dollar is grossly overstated. reflecting, groups on the left in the department of labor, all concur that when you control for any noble variables -- number of variables, there is a small wage gap, it's about four cents to six cents. then we can ask ourselves what causes that it will be can do about it. i think there are smaller things we can do to help ensure that women are being paid fairly. the thing we recommended our
report is strengthening the existing equal pay act, which women are already protected under the law against baseless gender discrimination. but we can tighten some of the language up, which we recommend so that make sure that we are not -- so that the courts can really read this law accurately. and we talk about the things that women can do to make sure they're putting the best foot forward. if salary is the most important thing to you, we want to make sure that you are considering some of your choices. there are trade-offs in everything that we do. host: we turn to the phone lines now, george from los angeles, california will be our first caller. go ahead. turned on your tv and go ahead. caller: yes, good morning. i just want to let you guys know, and all of america, that our women in this country and around the world are getting to be -- succeeding in the industry.
the workforce. they've gotten very bright, they avoided been bright, they are very motivated now, you give a mouse that little piece of cheese, it's when the come for more. his women are hungry. i employ 15 women in los angeles. that is george from los angeles, california. let's get another caller and then hear from our guests, christina from freedonia, kansas. go ahead. caller: i just think that you want to help working women like myself, leave the second amended alone. it's the great equalizer, it helps me protect myself. i also think we need to straighten out the illegal alien situation. i pay taxes. i don't want people stealing social security numbers so they can file fraudulent tax returns. it seems like the irs -- it doesn't bother them any. gap, getender wage
more women working in mines and highline polls, get women to do many jobs in a way that man can do it, they will get paid better. host: christina from fredonia, kansas. sabrina schaeffer. from los angeles made a really good point, which is that women are from is the valuable and that businesses recognize that. that businesses who employ more women tend to have higher bottom lines. we after number that businesses realize their employees are investments. sometimes this narrative that there is a big bad employer who's going to just throw women out and they're going to pay them less because they're a woman -- the reality is that people recognize how valuable women are, that they are outperforming men educationally, they are earning more bachelors degrees and masters degrees and phd's. this makes intravenously valuable to employers. we have to keep that in mind. to your second collars point, she points to the issue of taxes and our tax code.
that is an area where we can really simple if i things and make it easier for women and their families. we can also make sure were not penalizing women who are going into the workforce trade if we sit back and look, a couple that is not married are paying less in taxes than the married couple, and very often that places an added burden on the married family. we want to make sure there's not this second earner tax problem and try to reform that. host: you mentioned earlier that your organization supports the role of limited government in the private sector, limited government and other areas of the country as well. is parthink that leave of an issue, should it be a partisan issue? i think it's an economic issue in the human issue. i'm a working mom and i have three young children, i also have parents who live on the other coast. i recognize the need for leave. thato think about the fact
a few years ago we hired a woman who was six months pregnant. the reason we were able to do that is because we were able to freely talk with her and negotiate what would make sense in terms of a leave package. she was coming on with just a few months before she's going to have a baby. how are we going to work together? we want to make sure that more businesses have that freedom to freely negotiate and figure out plans that work for them. what worries me is when we have a one-size-fits-all, top-down mandate that eliminates that kind of flexibility that benefits all of us. host: what have you seen from a public and presidential candidates, or have you seen from them on this issue, will you like to see them address? have: full disclosure, we two campaigns that have come to us and asked for ideas on this. a 501(c)(3), all of our information is public. issue has gotten muffled a little bit in recent months. it was a little bit more out
there front and center with carly fiorina still in the race, she was talking about it more and she had the capability to do that in a way that some of the male candidates have not been able to. is going to come up again in the general election if hillary clinton is the nominee. i think it is something the republican should be paying a lot of attention to. host: the next caller is matthew from la plata, maryland. guest mentioned about the personal savings or personal accounts for planned pregnancies. with laws such as the affordable care act, what you will end up birth, justntrolled like china. other countries like russia, they have a health problem, because a lot of people are dying. so with a of done is they've created incentives for families
to have more children. and you know, i really don't think that these more socialist programs that have more government control over the planned birth of the family, i really don't think that's good for the people and society in the long run. host: matthew, we hear you. guest: matthew, thank you for your concern. for half that articulate this clearly enough. the personal care accounts would enable people to save in advance of having to take time off, whether it's to have a family or for other reasons in their life. it wouldn't be dictating in any way what kind of family planning they have or what kind of family would like. large or small. it would really help facilitate savings and allow employers and nonprofits to also contribute to that. comments from twitter, lighted my wife have to take sick leave from a federal job to have a child?
that approach totally disrespect meant. another common says when can i expect the segment discussing programs to help working men? guest: sometimes the federal government does not have laws that are as generous as one might think in terms of women having to take sick leave. it's good to start under your own nose before you start mandating other places. the second question -- working men. i'm so glad that the follower mentioned that. we very often emphasize that women do not live in a vacuum. i have a father, have a brother, i have a husband, i have a son. we want to make sure the policies we advance in the name of protecting women don't make men take a step back. it's really i think sometimes an unintended consequence perhaps of the larger progressive legislation aimed at helping women. host: the personal care spending accounts that you guys are proposing, would those be usable by anyone? guest: by anybody. we realize that we enjoy that
men are taking a larger role in caretaking, especially as women are taking more of a role in the workplace. sure we areake allowing everybody to contribute to their family's needs. host: the next color is don from florida. caller: i just wanted to say that she is not correct in all areas of the country. i work in a situation where there are three women and one male, and twice in the last two years, the male has gone raises and the women actually do all the work, the other two women i work with won't speak up for it a fortune 500 company. link inearly the weak the system. and still am experiencing pay inequality. thank you. guest: i'm really sorry to hear that. i would never say that discriminate and doesn't exist, or that there aren't bad employers out there who don't
fairly remunerate either men or women for the work they are doing. i would remind the caller and others that there are laws in the books already are the equal pay act of 1963, the civil rights act of 1964 that you protect women under the law. if you feel as though you really truly are being discriminated against, there are options for recourse. the one thing that we really want is to eliminate the kind of laws -- and it was an effort to push things like the paycheck fairness act. we want to make sure the best thing for women and men is that we have a robust economy with playful job creation, so if you are unhappy in your current situation, there are other options for you. that's the best way to ensure competition of wages and benefits. host: next up is steve from phoenix, arizona. go ahead. caller: good morning, thank you for c-span. , i appreciate your advancement of human causes, but i do have a question for you on the flip side.
the corporations and all companies hire people for three reasons. one, productivity. my real question is, if a company sees one person at $7.80 an hour, and another person at $10 an hour, and you know they products, $20 an hour wouldn't it be most productive to hire the seven ellery seven cents an hour person who is just as productive as the $10 an hour , while banking the other 22% profit for the corporation. and that's kind of what i'm asking. isn't the real reason that companies hire women is because for productivity, they can pay less and up their profit? guest: if that were the case with a reason, i think you would see you there were no men in any jobs out there. we are finding it an overstated issue. i think we have to remember that businesses are not quite so
shortsighted, they need the best talents, they want to make sure they have some longevity with their employee tenure. they don't have to be hiring all the time. i think many more factors go into hiring. by also really encouraged number of different things that are taking place in corporate america right now to ensure that hiring is being done without bias. there are different kinds of interviews that are happening, voice recognition software that allows people to interview without even knowing if it's a man or a woman. i really encouraged by that, and i like to think that the glass is still half-full on this one. host: you guys appointed to the minimum wage as one issue that might prove a barrier to women in the workplace. explain that. guest: one concern is that we don't want to eliminate opportunities to enter the workforce. so often, some of these laws like raising the minimum wage are presented in terms of helping low income workers.
but the reality is that they create barriers to entry. we want people to be able to get into the workplace, get the experience and that first foot on the latter. we recommend lowering the minimum wage for workers under 25 years old, or people who have been unemployed for more tha >> we leave this to go live to monroe, pennsylvania, and campaign rally with senator ted cruz. [applause]
sen. cruz: god bless the commonwealth of pennsylvania. [applause] let me say something that is profoundly painful for someone who grew up as a fan of the houston oilers, god bless the pittsburgh steeler's. [applause] sen. cruz: thank you for the terrific job you are doing leading the team here in summing up. i want to thank each and every one of you, patriots, who are standing up today to fight for our country. [applause] sen. cruz: you know, you can
byl a lot about the word looking at its roots. by looking at the root of the word politics, there are two parts. and, meaning many, tics, bloodsucking parasites. that is a fairly accurate discussion of washington, d.c. we are here this morning for something a lot more important than politics. we are here this morning because our country is in crisis. we are bankrupting our kids and grandkids. our constitutional rights are under assault. america has receded from leadership in the world. i hear this morning with a word encouragement all across pennsylvania and all across this country, people are
waking up, and help is on the way. [applause] sen. cruz: this next election is going to come down to three issues. jobs, freedom, and security. but start with jobs. start with jobs. i want to take a minute to talk to all the single moms here, jobs,g to-three part-time who have seen their hours forcibly reduced because obamacare kicks in at 30 hours per week. i want to talk to all of the truck drivers, on the plumbers and mechanics, all the steelworkers and union workers, all the men and women with calluses on your hands, who see
year after year. the cost of living keeps going up, but the cost of -- but your paycheck does not keep pace. i want to talk to all the young people coming out of school with student loans up to their eyeballs, scared, can i get a job? ?hat does my future hold the mainstream media, they tried to tell us this is the new normal, as good as it gets. as people of pennsylvania know, that is an utter lie. [applause] sen. cruz: it is easy to talk about making america great again . you can even print that on the .aseball cap
the real question is to understand the principles and values that made america great in the first place? [applause] the heart of our economy is not washington, d.c.. the economy is a businesses across the united states of america. [applause] sen. cruz: if you want to liftsh the economy, you the boot off of the next of -- necks of small businesses. -- know, ronald reagan [applause] before himand jfk both understood, when you cut
taxes and lift regulations on small businesses, the result is millions and millions of new high-paying jobs. [applause] sen. cruz: i intend to follow the very same path as jfk and reagan. if i am elected president, we will repeal every word of obamacare. [applause] [cheering] sen. cruz: we are going to pass commonsense health care reform that makes health insurance personal, portable, affordable,
irs isuz: apparently the .ot to popular i have to say, that is a that of a problem because both hillary and donald trump have come out taxes.her you know what, that is how we got this mess to begin with. we will reign in the epa. [applause] sen. cruz: and, the federal regulators who have dissented like locust -- onended like locusts
ranchers and farmers across this country. state.vania is an energy texan, i knowg a little bit about that. you look back to eight years ago when barack obama promised if he were president, he would plant.t every coal-fired that may be the only campaign promise that he comes close to meeting. the war on coal by the obama mr. should is wrong -- by the obama administration is wrong. america is the saudi arabia of al, natural gas, and the
federal government should not be working to destroy the livelihood of science of americans who depend on the -- millions of americans who depend on the energy sector. [applause] sen. cruz: energy is key to bring manufacturing back to america, bring the steel industry back to america. low cost energy means jobs. [applause] stop amnesty and and sanctuary cities and and welfare for those here illegally . [applause] sen. cruz: let me tell you what
all of that is going to produce. we are going to see millions and millions of new high-paying jobs. we will see jobs coming back from mexico, from china. we will see manufacturing jobs coming back to pennsylvania. we will see wages rising once again. we will see young people coming 2-5 jobchool with offers. [applause] sen. cruz: we will see morning in america again. electiond thing this is about is freedom. just a few weeks ago, with the
and bear arms. [cheering] [applause] >> usa! usa! usa! we are just one justice away from having those fundamental rights stripped from every american. hewittates ago, hugh asked all of us about religious liberty and the supreme court. donald trump turned to me and said, ted, i have known a lot more politicians and you have. in that, he is correct. donald trump is a washington insider who has been supporting liberal democratic politicians for 40 years.
i have no experience with that. [applause] sen. cruz: when donald trump was writing checks to jimmy carter over ronald reagan, i was still in grade school. donald continues. he said, ted, when it comes to religious liberty, the supreme court, you have to learn to compromise. you have to learn to cut deals with the democrats to get along. let me be very clear with the men and women of pennsylvania. i will not compromise away your religious liberty. [applause]
sen. cruz: i will not compromise away your second amendment right to keep and bear arms. let me ask you. is anyone here frustrated with politicians who keep lying? promisesns who make and the naked in office, and the it.ay-- th hillary is a great example. we have seen the pattern. usually they talk good on the
campaign trail, then they get in betray it. th i have to get donald credit. beforebetrayed us winning the office. andas on the today show agreed with hillary clinton and barack obama that grown men should use the little girls restroom. that is not's -- nuts. a matter of republican, democrat, conservative, liberal. it is a matter of basic common sense. [applause] as the father of two young girls , i can tell you, it does not make any sense at all to allow
adult grown men, strangers, to be a loan in the bathroom with -- alone in the bathroom with little girls. that is just political correctness on steroids. a couple of months ago, donald told us he could be the most politically correct person on earth. haven't we had enough of this nonsense. how about telling the truth. [applause] the third critical issue in this election is security.
for seven years, we have seen an administration that abandons our friends and allies and shows a appeasement to our enemies. donald trump explained to all of us that if he were president, he would neutral between israel and .he palestinians let me be very clear. as president, i will not be neutral. [applause] sen. cruz: america will stand unapologetically with the nation of israel. [applause] [cheering]
sen. cruz: you know, anyone who cannot tell the difference between our friends and enemies, anyone who cannot tell the difference between israel and islamic terrorists who want to kill us, that raises real questions about the judgment and fitness to be commander in chief. [applause] sen. cruz: over the last seven years, we have seen our military aken, readiness undermined, the morale of the troops plummet. as a nation, we have seen this before. we have seen another left-wing democratic president, jimmy carter, we can and -- weaken and undermine the military.
then, ronald reagan came into office. what did reagan do? the economy took off. millions and millions of new ins generated trillions revenue. we bankrupted the soviet union won the cold war. i intend to do these exact same thing with radical islamic terrorism. we are going to repeal obama , rain ins a flat tax the regulators, stop amnesty. manufacturingg jobs back to america.
raise wages. we will use the revenue to rebuild the military so it remains the mightiest fighting force on the face of the planet. [applause] >> usa! usa! usa! qaeda,uz: to isis and al to every jihadist on the face of the earth who intends to murder innocent americans, a day of reckoning is coming. [applause] we are coming to get you, and we are not coming to
negotiate. we are not coming to compromise. we are not coming to cut a deal to arrest you or read you your rights. we are coming to kill you. [cheering] [applause] sen. cruz: one of the saddest things we have seen over the last seven years is this president sending our fighting men and women into combat with rules of engagement that are so strict that they cannot fight, they cannot win, they cannot defeat the enemy. that is wrong, it is immoral. mark my words. in january 2017, it will end. [applause]
sen. cruz: let's talk a little politics. know, this past year has been an interesting year. it has not been boring. we started last year with 17 republican candidates, and amazingly talented, diverse, dynamic field. what a contrast to the democrats . you know, the democratic field consists of a wild eyed socialists with ideas that are dangerous for america and the world, and bernie sanders.
[laughter] [applause] >> [indiscernible] [applause] sen. cruz: over the course of the last year, the primary did its job. it narrowed the field. as we stand here today, there are two, and only two people who to on the plausible path winning the republican nomination. me and donald trump. let me tell you what we are seeing happening across the country. republicans are coming together and uniting behind this campaign. [applause]
nationwide, 65-70% of republicans recognize that donald trump is not the best candidate to go head-to-head with hillary clinton. [applause] donald trump loses to hillary clinton, and loses by double digits. if i am the nominee, we beat hillary clinton. [cheering] [applause] sen. cruz: you know, just a few weeks ago, there was a general election poll in utah that clinton beatsry donald trump in utah. red may be the brightest state in the union. if the republican candidate cannot hold utah, we are headed
to a walter mondale blood back. in contrast, head-to-head between me and hillary clinton, clintoneat hillary in key swing states. [applause] sen. cruz: in the state of ohio, donald trump loses to hillary clinton, we beat hillary clinton. in the state of iowa, donald loses to hillary clinton, we beat hillary clinton. in the state of wisconsin, which has not gone republican in the present shall race since 1984, donald loses to hillary clinton by 10 points. at 44-44.d i are tied [applause]
here, in pennsylvania, another classic battleground, donald loses to hillary clinton, and hillary and i are tied. [applause] let me tell you now, we are coming back in october and november, and if we are standing together, we beat hillary clinton in pennsylvania. [applause] sen. cruz: you may have heard couple of days ago, the state of new york voted. the media reported with
breathless excitement that won his home state. donald and the media immediately said, new york city has spoken, the race is decided. thinkinteresting, i donald and the media believe oft pennsylvania is a suburb manhattan. i have a whole lot more faith in the people of pennsylvania. [applause] sen. cruz: the eyes of the entire country are on pennsylvania right now. we face a choice. do we want to nominate a phony, who isis a
telling us that he is lying to us? behind awanting get forward-looking campaign? [applause] with real solutions to the economic problems in the country. if you have a car that is broken down in the driveway, do you want your neighbor to come over and start yelling at the car, or do you want someone to lift the hood and check the engine? [applause] sen. cruz: do not want to nominate a candidate who hands the general election to hillary .linton as a christmas gift
donald trump may be the only candidate on the planet who hillary clinton can beat. tuesday will be a pivotal day. i want each of you to come out and vote for me 10 times. look, we are not democrats. fraud. suggesting voter if anyone here picks up the phone and calls nine other vote ono come out and tuesday, you will have voted 10 times. [applause] win.is how we grassroots, from the people. if we stand together and unite -- it is amazing thing the unity with 17-- we started
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live onrnor kasich monday at 2:00 eastern on c-span. >> tonight at 10:00, we will take a look at some of the speeches from president obama during his two terms at the washington correspondent's dinner. appearancee his last . >> it turns out jeb bush identified himself as hispanic. i understand. it is an honest mistake. it reminds me of when i 1961.fied as american in >> the white house correspondents dinner on c-span. >> c-span's "washington journal" live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up sunday morning, and
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"hamilton."musical, >> i was reading the book on vacation in mexico, as i was doing it, the word started coming off of the page. "hamilton" is a hip-hop classic erie he said to beon the spot, can hip-hop the vehicle for telling this kind of very large and complex story. he said, i will educate you .bout hip-hop he did on the spot. you can pack more information into the lyrics because it is .ery dense
>> good morning, and welcome to the oversight investigation subcommittee here on deciphering the debate over encryption history and law enforcement. i want to let everyone know weft multiple hearings, so you will see people coming and going, so for our witnesses, that you don't think it's chaos, we have members trying to juggle a lot of things. it is chaos, ok. i stand corrected. we're meeting today to consider the deceptively complex question -- should the government have the ability to lawfully access encrypted technology and communications? this is the question at the center of a heated public debate catalyzed whensh apple to insist using by one of the san burn dino terrorists, but this isn't a new question. strong encryption has existed for decades. for years, motivated individuals have had access to the tools necessary to conceal their activity from law enforcement, and for years the government has repeatedly tried to limit the use of or obtain access to
encrypted data. the most notable occurred in the 1990s, when it sparked fears that the government would lose its ability to conduct lawful surveillance. in response the nsa developed what was called the clipper chip. it would also provide the government with key to access those communications if necessary. this so-called back door sparked intense debate between the government and the technology community about the benefits and risks of government access to encrypted technology. one of the principal arguments of the technology community was such a back door would create a vulnerability that could be exploited by actors outside the government. this concern was validated when a critical flaw was discovered in the dhip's design. i should note that one of our witnesses today identified that vulnerability which made the back door more akin to a front door. as a partial solution congress passed the act called calia. calia addressed concern that rapidly developing technology -- by.
however, the law noted caveats including the government's response encrypted technology. of crypto war entered a time quiet. what has changed in recent years to renew the debate? part of the concern is the expansion of tech knowledge he. at its core however, this debate is about the widespread availability of encryption by default. well, encryption has el, it took effort and first conveys to employ its benefits, but because of this, law enforcement was still able to gain action to the majority of the digit at evidence they discovered in their investigations, but now the enkrimgs is the norm, it's the default. this is a natural response to skating concerns both from government and consumers about the security of digital
information. the decision by companies like apple and the messaging application whatsapp mean more than a billion people, including people who live in repressive governments, have the ability of encryption. at the same time they have a , secure means of communication and they will know it and use it as their own mission control center. that is the crux of the recent debate. alleges to secure technologies beyond the reach of law enforcement no longer requires sophistication, is available to anyone and everyone. at the same time, however, as more of our lives become dependent on the enter in the, the availability of widespread encryption is femme critical to our personal economic and -- and may echo those of decades paths, the circumstances of change and
so too must the discussion we no lorener have a choice of black and white. if we take that approach, the only outfor come is we all lose. this requires a very thoughtful approach. that is why we're here today to begin moving the conversation from appear the versus the fbi or right versus wrong, to constructive dialogue that recognizes this is a complex issue that affects everyone and therefore were all in this together. we have two very strong panels. i expect each will make strong arguments about the benefits of strong encryption and the challenges it presents for law enforcement. i encourage my college to embrace this opportunity to learn from the experts to understand the complexities of the issues. it is time to begin a chapter in this battle, one which i hope can bring some resolution to the war. this process will not be easy, but if it does not happen now, it may reach a time when it's too late and success becomes impossible. so for everyone on calling on congress to address this issue, here we are. i can only hope you will be willing to join us at the table.
i now recognize the ranking member from colorado for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you for holding this. issues surrounding earn crips and particularly the disagreements between law enforcement and the tech community gain significant public attention in the san bernardino case, but i'm not particularly interested in relitigates that dispute today. as you said, mr. chairman, the conversation needs to be broader than just that one case. let me stay unequivocally that i, like you, and the rest of us here today, recognize and appreciate the benefits of strong encryptions in today's digit at world. i also see the flip side of the coin. while encringe did probably they invaluable protections, it can also be used to obscure the
communications of criminals and terrorists and increasingly great risk. it's our task to help find the proper balance between those competing interests. we need to ask both industry and law enforcement some hard questions into. last month the president said, for example -- we want strong encryption, because part of us preventing terrorism or preventing people from disrupts the financial system is hackers can't can't get in there and mess around, but if we make systems that are warrantproof, how do we to have terrorists. if we can't cram the system, then the president said everybody is walking around with a swiss bank account in their pocket. i've heard some of the policies proposed that they will undermine the encryption that,
and a back door for good guys ultimately becomes a front door for criminals. the tech community has particularly vocal about the negative consequences of the proposals to address the encryption challenge. i think many of the arguments are valid, but i've only heard what we should not do, not what we should do collectively to address this challenge. i think the discussion needs to include a dialogue about how to move forward. i can't believe this problem is intractable. i don't promote forces industry -- the same seems to be true about law enforcement. i don't promote forcing industry to build back doors or other circumventions that experts will tell you will undermine security or privacy for all of us. at the same time i'm not comfortable with impenetrable warrantproof spaces where
criminals or terrorists can operate without any fear that law enforcement could discover their plots. what i want to hear is from both law enforcement and industry about possibility solutions going forward. what are the policy options? is encryption is the reason that law enforcement cannot solve a crime? what are suitable options? last week "the washington post" reported that the government relied on gray hat hackers to circumvent the san bernardino phone. thank goodness? i don't think so. yolk relying on a third party is -- i don't think relying on a third party is a good option. i intend to ask both panels what additional resources and
capabilities the government needs to keep pace with technology. while providing government with more tools or capability require additional discussions regarding due process, and the protection of civil liberties. enhancing the government's technical capability is one potential solution that does not mandate back doors. finally the public, the tech community, and the government are all in this together. in that spirit, i really do want to thank our witnesses for coming today. i'm happy that we have people from law enforcement, academia and industry and i'm happy that apple came to testify today. your voice is particularly important, because other players like facebook and whatsapp decline our invitation to be a part of this panel.
now, the tech community has told congress we need to solve this problem. we agree, but i've got to tell you, it's hard to solve a problem when the key players won't show up for the discussion. i'm here to also tell you as a longtime member of the subcommittee relying on congress to on its own pass legislation in a very complex situation like this is a blunt instrument at best. i think it would be in everybody's best interests to come to the table and help us work on a solution. thanks again for holding this hearing. i know we won't trivialize these concerns. i look forward to work with everybody. i yield back. upton fornize mr. five minutes. >> i welcome the opportunity to hear today from both law enforcement and the tech
community as we seek to understand and develop solutions to this debate. it is important we move beyond the us versus them mentality that encompasses this discussion. this debate is not about picking sides, it is about evaluating options. from the technology perspective, there is no doubt that strong encryption is a benefit to our
society. as more of our lives become integrated, encryption is critical. as evidenced by breaches over the past, breaches can have a devastating effect. in addition, encryption does not just encourage wrongdoing, it .lso creates a safe haven as we look to the future and see that more more aspects of our lives will become connected to the internet, including such things as our cars, medical devices, and the electric grid, kirschenbaum play an important role. from the law enforcement perspective, while encryption protects lives, it also presents a risk to public safety as
strong encryption becomes the norm, law enforcement loses access to tools to stop bad actors from doing terrible things. as we hear today, this cannot always be offset by other means. there are certain situations, such as identifying the victims ex exploitation where the access to content is critical. this leads us to the question, what is the answer? i do not have the answer nor do i think we will find it during this hearing. this is a complex issue and will require a lot of difficult conversation. but, that is not an excuse to put our head in the sand. we need to confront these issues head on because they will not go away, and they will only get more difficult as time takes. ticks.
ultimately, it comes down to what society except as the appropriate balance between security and access to encrypted technology. many have called on us to confront the issues here. that is why we are holding this hearing. that is why we establish a bipartisan joint committee working group to examine this issue. require it will patience, creativity, courage, and cooperation. it is easy to call on congress to take on an issue, but you'd better be prepared to answer the call. this issue is too important to have key players sitting on the sideline. i hope you take to heart what we hear today. i yield back.
co now recognize mr. pallone. >> i welcome the opportunity to hear today from both law enforcement and the tech community as we seek to understand and develop solutions to this debate. encryption creates challenges for those seeking to protect us. law enforcement has a different job of keeping our nation safe and finding that some programs are oeven when they obtain a warrant, they find themselves unable to access information. this raises questions how comfortable we are with these dark areas that cannot be reached by law enforcement. at the same time, the tech community helps protect some of our most valuable information and the most secure way to do that is by yoon end-to-end -- by using end-to-end encryption mean the manufacturer does not hold the key to that information. when the tech community tells us that providing back doors will make their job of protecting our
information that much more difficult, we should heed that warning and work towards a solution that will not solve one problem by creating many others. it's clear that both sides in this discussion have compelling arguments, but simply repeating those arguments is not a sufficient response. i hope today's hear is just the -- hearing is just the beginning of that conversation. in the last several months and years we have seen major players look to congress for solutions. in 2014, fbi director comey said, and i quote -- i'm happy to work with congress, with our partners in the private sector and with my law infersment and -- enforcement and national security counterparts and the people we serve to find the right answer, to find the balance we need. in an e-mail to apple employees earlier this year, ceo tick cook wrote about his support for congress to bring together and i quote -- experts on intelligence technologies and civil liberties to discuss the implications for law enforcement, national security, privacy and personal freedoms and he wrote that apple would gladly participate in such an effort.
if we have any hope of moving forward, we need all the parties coming together, and the witnesses today should serve as models to those who have been reluctant to participate. both sides need to recognize this is an effort to strike a balance between the security and privacy of personal data and public safety. the public needs to feel confident that their information is secure, but at the same time we need to assure them that law enforcement has all the tools it needs to do their jobs effectively. mr. chairman i would like to , yield the remaining time to the gentlewoman from new york. > first, let me welcome the chief of intelligence from my hometown, new york city. many refer to the new york city police department as the
country's finest, but i like to think of them as the world ace -- the world's finest. welcome, mr. galati. it's about balancing power, and the rights of individuals. through the years, getting that balance just right has been challenging, and at times tension-filled, but we have done it. we have prevailed. the encryption versus privacy rights issue is simply another opportunity for us to, again, recalibrate and finetune, and as the old cliche states, democracy is not a spectator sport, so it's time for all of us to participate. it's time to roll up our sleeves and work together to resolved this issue as an imperative, because it's not going away. so i'm glad that we are having this hearing today, because i do believe that working together, we can find a way to balance our concerns and to address this issue issuele if physical security with our rides to -- -- with our right to private
security. i look forward to hearing the perspective of our witnesses today. i yield back the remainder of my time. >> thank you. i would ask unanimous consent that the written statements be entered into the report. now, i would like to introduce the witnesses of the first panel. panelrst witness on the is ms. amy hess she's the director of the technology at the federal bureau of investigation, responsible for the executive oversight of the criminal justice information services laboratory and operational technology divisions. ms. hess has logged time in the field as an fbi special agent as well as the bureau's headquarters here in washington, d.c., and we thank her for preparing her testimony and look forward for your insights. we also want to welcome chief thomas galati, a 32-year veteran
of the new york city police department, and currently serves as the chief of intelligence. as chief of intelligence, he is responsible for the activities of the intelligence bureau, the western hemisphere's largest municipal largest intelligence operation. thank you, chief galati, for your testimony today. finally for the first panel captain charles cohen, indiana state police, currently the commander of the intelligence office and, where he is -- and investigative technologies, where he is responsible for the cybercrime, electronics and internet crimes against children. we appreciate his time today. also, sheriff ron hickman unfortunately will not be joining us today due to the tragic flooding yesterday in houston.
prayers and thoughts are with the people of houston. we know there's been several tran did is there. -- several tragedies there today. we wish sheriff hickman could be with them, but we understand that travel logistics sometimes make things impossible.in doingy under of terri do any of you have objection to taking testimony under oath? they all say "no." you are entitled to be advised by counsel. need to be advised by counsel? they all say "no." raise your right hand. i will swear unp reduce where the testimony you're about to give is the truth, the whole but thend nothing truth. all of the witnesses answered in the affirmative. you may know give a five-minute summary of your opening
statement. you are recognized for your five minutes. ms. hess: good morning. yourst make sure that microphone is as close to you as possible. ms. hess: thank you for the opportunity to engage in this important discussion. in recent years we have seen new technologies transform our society, notably by enabling digital communications and facilitating e-commerce. we protect these communications to promote expression, secure commerce and trade, and safeguard information. we support strong encryption here and we have seen how criminals, including terrorists, are using advances in technology to their advantage. encryption is not the only challenge that we face, however. we face challenges in tracking suspects because they can communicate well changing from a known wi-fi service to a wi-fi hotspot. they could move from one communication application to another and carry the same
conversation, or multiple conversations, simultaneously. medication companies do not have guidelines. without data it is a to put pieces of the investigative puzzle together. some communication providers have millions of users in the u.s. but no presence here. we encounter platforms that renders aspects of anonymous on the internet here it if we cannot attribute communications and actions to a specific individual, critical leads and evidence may you lost. the problem is increased when we face one or more these challenges on top of each other. since our nation's inception we have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. this means only with probable cause and a court order law enforcement cannot enter private spaces. ourtechnology prohibits ability to use all the rest tools and follow critical leads, we may not be able to read out calibrators in the shadows or
violent criminals targeting our neighborhoods. we not be able to identify and stop terrorist using to mitigation platforms to plan and execute attacks in our country. we are in this quandary. trying to maximize security as you move into a world where information is beyond the reach of judicial authority and trying to maximize privacy in and year of advancement. trying to find the right balance is a complex endeavor, and should not be left solely to corporations or the fbi to solve . it must be publicly debated and the liberated. the american people should decide how we want to govern ourselves in today's world. it is law enforcement about his responsibility to inform the american people that the investigative tools we have used in the past are becoming less effective. highlycussion has been charged because people are passionate about privacy and security. this is an essential discussion which must include a productive, meaningful, and rational dialogue on how encryption is
implemented, posing significant berries to law enforcement's ability to do its job. as this discussion continues we working with industries, academia, and other parties to develop the right solution. we have an obligation to ensure everyone understands the public safety and national security risks that result from the use of new technologies and platforms by malicious actors. we're not asking to expand the government's surveillance authority, but rather to continue to obtain electronic information and evidence pursuant to the legal authority that congress has provided as to keep america safe. there is not, and will not, be a one-size-fits-all solution to fix the -- to fit the challenges that we face pure it we are pursuing multiple avenues, but we realize we cannot overcome them on our own. issues are great and complex. we must, therefore, continue public discourse on how to ensure the public and privacy can reinforce each other.
this is a vital part of that process. thank you for your time and attention to this important matter. >> thank you. i now recognize chief galati for five minutes. pulled microphone is close to you as you can. chief galati: things to the committee for the opportunity to speak with you this morning. years ago, criminals and their accomplices stored information in closets, drawers, saves, and glove boxes. there was, and continues to be, and expectation of privacy in these areas, but the high burden imposed by the fourth amendment which requires lawful search be warranted and authorized by neutral judge has been deemed mythic and protection against unreasonable government search and seizure for the past 224 years. it seems that legal authority is struggling to catch up with the times. today, nearly everyone lives their life on a smart phone, including terminals. evidence that would once be stored in a file were notebook is archived in an e-mail or text message. the same information that would
solve a murder, stop a rapist, or stop a mass shooting is on that device. law enforcement has legal access to the file cabinet it a shot out of the phone p. because of constraints in the law but limits imposed by technology. when law enforcement is unable to access evidence necessary to the investigation, prosecution and prevention of a crime, way to the level do this, we call this going dark. first, it is what we know as data. this is when the actual device, the computer, the tablet, or the phone is in the law-enforcement possession, but the information stored within it is inaccessible. in a six-month time october 2015 to march of this year, we have in locked out of 67 apple devices awfully seized pursuant to the investigation of 44 violent crimes. there are 35 non-apple devices.
of these apple devices, they include 23 felonies, 10, size comment 2 rapes, and 2 police officers shot in the line of duty or they include robberies, criminal weapons possessions, criminal sex ask, and felony assaults. in every case we have the while, so to speak, in the legal authority to open it, but we lack the technical ability to do it because of encryption that protects its contents. in every case, these crimes deserve our protection, too p the second type of going dark is data in motion. enforcementes, law is legally permitted through a warrant or judicial process to intercept and access the suspect's communication, but the encryption built into the ,pplications like what's app permits this kind of surveillance purina criminal group is communicating, but we are unable to understand why. in the past, a wiretap legally obtained from a judge would alert the police officer to drop
off a location, targets, now we are verrilli in the dark. criminals know it, too. we heard a defendant in a felony case make a call from rikers island where he called the apple ios eight and its encryption software as a gift from god. the prosecutors and the people we are sworn to protect rna precarious decision. what is more alarming is that the position is not dictated by elected officials or a judiciary system or the laws. it is created and controlled by corporations like apple or google who have taken it upon themselves to find who can access critical information in investigations. as the bureau chief in our nation's largest police department, an agency charged with protecting a 25 million residents and tourists every day, and corporate ceos do not hold themselves to the same public safety standards as our elected officials and law
enforcement standards. how do we keep people safe? the answer cannot be warranted-proof encryption, which creates a landscape of criminal action. or outside legal authority established over centuries of jurisprudence. this is not always been apple's answer. until 19 months ago they held the key that could help phones. apple used this master key to comply with court orders in kidnappings, murders, and terrorism cases. there was no documented incidences were killed getting out to hackers or the government. they were able to comply constitutionally legal court orders, why not now? ramifications of this fight extends beyond san bernardino, california and the 14 people murdered there. ofe than 90% of criminals all criminal prosecutions are handled by the state or local level. these involve real people. emily's, your friends, your loved ones. they deserve police department's
that are able to do everything within the law to bring them to justice. they deserve corporations to appreciate their ethical responsibility. i applaud you for holding this hearing. it is critical we work together and across the silos to fight crime and disorder, because criminals are not bound by industry standards, but they are aware of the safety net that the warned-proof encryption provides them. we must take responsibility for what that means. for the new york city police department it means investing more in people's lives and quarterly earnings reports. putting public safety back into the hands of the brave men and women that have sworn to defend it. thank you, i will take any questions. >> thank you. capt. cohen: think you verlag me to testify. i would not be here if it were not for serious problems associated with encryption that do not have easy technological axes.
we need your help and it must be legislative. azhar's i know the fbi is not exaggerate or trying to sleep anyone when they say there is no way to recover data from newer iphones. apple has designed an operating system that functions as a locked container without a key. the sensitivity of personal information people store in their phone should be compared to the sensitivity of information people keep in bank deposit boxes and bedrooms. with proper authorization they have the technical means to access deposit boxes and bedrooms, but we lack the technical means to access phones or encryption. howre often asked for encryption hinders law-enforcement ability to conduct investigations. there are numerous encrypted phones in the indiana state evidence rooms waiting for legal or technical. some of them along to murder victims and child sex crime victims. earlier a mother and son were shot to death and a home in indiana. they had newer iphones. i'm confident if they were able,
both would give consent for us to frantically examine their their to help find killers. unfortunately, they were not able to give consent. unfortunately for investigators they decided to buy phones that had encrypted operating systems by default. we are not only talking about suspect's phones, but victim's phones, and not only commit eating evidence, but evidence that cannot be recovered. it is difficult to know what evidence and combivent has not been recovered. the child victims that have not been rescued, the sex offenders that have not been arrested. the investigation and prosecution of randall r fletcher sheds light on the evidence. fletcher lived in northern indiana. during the course of an investigation to my computer hard drives with encrypted partitions and encrypted drives were seized. the encryption was such that it was not possible to forensically examine the data. despite numerous attempt by law
enforcement agencies. a federal judge compelled him to this goes the key. he provided on for some with a basket that opened the partitions, but not the thumb drive. in the opened data they found data and images depicting minors being caused to engage in sexually explicit conduct. they believe the thumb drive contains child pornography produced by fletcher but has no way of confirming the believe. fletcher has previous convictions including conspiracy to commit murder and child sex offenses that are detailed in my written testimony. there is reason to believe because of encryption on the usb storage device additional crimes cannot be investigated and prosecuted. that means that child victims cannot be provided written services or access to justice. i hope congress takes the time to understand the phenomenon and what problems are being created. there is a cost associated that
allows lawful access with theoretically chances of lost data. there is a greater and human cost that we are seeing because of investigations that fail due to default encryption. in my daily work, i feel the impact of law enforcement going dark. a feeling of frustration because it makes to sectors and whom i'm for responsible less effective. for the families, it is different. it is infuriating, unfair, and income principle why critical information for solving crimes should be allowed to be completely out of reach. i've heard some say that law enforcement can solve crimes using metadata alone. that is not true. that is like asking a detective to process a crime scene i only looking at the street address on the outside of a house where a crime was committed. i urge committee leaders to contact your local police department and ask about the challenge.
i appreciate your invitation to share my perspective. i'm happy to answer questions today. >> five minutes for question. ishink sometimes the fbi concerned about encryption and it is characterized as being against encryption. considering the work on the sony data breach or the recent attacks on hospitals, i have a tough time believing the organization is against the technology for attaching digital information. does the fbi believes that encryption is important and strengthening national security? ms. hess: yes, sir. >> and benefits on enforcement. can you elaborate? ms. hess: you are correct. as i stated in my opening statement, we support strong encryption because it does all of the things you just said. have a continuing and increasing struggle to access
readable information, to access content of communications caused by that encryption that is in place by default. >> are you witnessing an increase in individuals intentionally or unintentionally of aiding the law, through availability of default encryption? ms. hess: it is difficult to discern whether or not they are intentionally doing it, however, we are significantly seeing increases in the use and deployment of encryption because it is a default setting on most devices. >> chief galati, would you say that the phone can create significant hurdles for law enforcement? is that the issue, the default one? chief galati: yes. a lot of the apps being used today, even with legal process or coverage on the phone, you cannot intercept those conversations. , and ine hear criminals
terrorism cases that we do, people encouraging participants to go to apps like telegram, what's app, and so on. >> her testimony was moving about the case that you described involved with murder and victimizing children. aboutebate has often been taking sides, the most notable being apple versus the fbi. either you support law enforcement or the tech community. that feels like a loser's proposition. i understand people want encrypted technology, but based upon the responses that you ess and thems. h chief, do you think this is an them debate question mark what you think question like you on the frontline dealing with these -- dealing with these
cases. we are dealing with default encryption that cannot be turned off. example that i gave you was that after 2 prior convictions, he learned that he needed to do something to protect himself better from investigation and went out in search of, we assume, encryption and ways to do that stop the difference is what we are seeing increasingly common to talk to your question ss, we are seeing discussion among criminals, about online, sexually extorting children, trading child photography, discussing the best possible systems to buy, the combination of cell phone and operating system to buy the stock make no mistake that their learning quick messaging apps to use to protect themselves against encryption. they are learning which messaging app is out of the united states and has no bricks
and mortar location in the united states. which ones are in countries with which we have a treaty and which ones we don't. this as anre using education to make themselves more effective at the criminal tradecraft. have? hess, what do we if the terrorists are planning a plot or have killed people, we are trying to find out what the next move is? or if there is a child predator, will there be an answer for this? ms. hess: yes. statement,my earlier we do see individuals encouraging others to move to encrypted platforms. we have seen that for some time. the solution to that for us is no investigator or agent will take that as an answer to sate stop investigating. they will try to find whatever work around they can. time solutions may need intensive. they may not eventually be effective.
and may require an additional amount of resources or skill to get to those solutions. i merrily, we are usually in a race against -- primarily we are usually in a race against the clock. this is a frightening aspect for americans, we understand privacy, but if there's some child predator hiding in the bushes by the playground waiting to snatch a victim you can find them, but this is giving them a cloak of invisibility. it is frightening, we should find an answer. thanks, mr. chairman. to follow up on the chairman's question, the problem is default encryption. if you are limited to default encryption, criminals could still get encryption, and they do. isn't that correct, ms. hess -- isn't that correct,
mrs. hess? encryption ist great for people like me love bank accounts and do not want , but it is be hacked a talent for all of us in society when you have a child sex predator who is trying to encrypt or, just as bad, a terrorist. what i want to know is, what are we going to do about it, and the industry says if congress forces them to develop tools so that law enforcement, with probable cause and a warrant can get access to the data, that will open the door. do you believe that is true, mrs. hess? ms. hess: i believe there will always be no such thing as 100% security. industry leaders have built
systems that enable us to be able to get over receive readable content. chief galati, what is your view? i believe in order to provide, and i do not want to call it a back door, but a front door -- i think companies can provide law enforcement and it would not be abused. >> why not? chief galati: the laws in 1994 were not abused will stop i do not see how making a law -- >> what they are saying is the theyknowledge he, once developed the technology anyone could get access to it and break the encryption. chief galati: i believe that if we look at apple, they had the technology going back to 19-months ago where they were doing it for law enforcement. cases ofunaware of any
abuse that came out when apple actually did have the key. if they still have the key today -- >> captain cohen? capt. cohen: it would be helpful to look for analogies. if you think of an apple or ios own as a safety deposit box, the private key is that private encryption, the key the customer holds is the public encryption. they build firewalls. there is a difference between encryption and firewalls. >> you believe the technology exists? capt. cohen: it does. >> i don't have a lot of time. there is something else that can be done. forcing the industry to comply, or, like in the san bernardino case, the fbi hired a third-party to help them break the code in the phone. that is what we call a gray hack , people who are in a murky market.
what you think about that suggestion ms. hess? ms. hess: that is one potential solution, but that takes me back to my prior answer that solutions are very case-by-case specific. there are dependent upon the fragility of the systems, the vulnerabilities we might find. there are also time and resource intensive which may not be scalable to allow us to be successful. >> you think there is an ethical situation with using these third-party hackers? ms. hess: there are vulnerabilities we should review to make sure that we identify the risks and benefits of being able to exploit those vulnerabilities in a greater setting. >> i understand you are doing it because you have to and certain cases. you think it is a good policy to follow? ms. hess: i do not think that should be the solution. >> one more question, if
third-party individuals can develop these techniques to get into these encrypted devices or we bring why can't more capabilities to the government to do that? ms. hess: certainly, these types of solutions, and as i said, this cannot be the only solution -- but these types of solution we can and do employee require a lot of highly skilled specialized resources that we may not have immediately available to us. >> can we develop those with the right resources? ms. hess: no, ma'am. i don't think that is possible. i think we need the cooperation of industry, academia, and the private sectors to come up with solutions. >> recognizing the gentlelady from indiana, mrs. brooks, for five minutes. thefter i was appointed
attorney for the state of indiana i worked with the crimes task force led by steve to broder. working hand-in-hand with you, captain cohen. prior to the time i would say that i was not aware about what and whatnt into horrific crimes really were being perpetrated against children at that time in 2001 and 2002. when we talk about child exploitation, we need to realize that this involves babies of two teenagers. this is not all about willing teenagers being involved in these acts. these are people praying on children of all ages. i want to walk you through, captain:, what some of the impediments are, how this works, hawrted are being t
in your investigation, and your thoughts on the firewall. if you could please walk through with us offenders, and i am talking about older children, older kids with access to social media. offenders and perpetrators are making connections through social media platforms? are they typically unencrypted or encrypted? capt. cohen: typically encrypted. rep. brooks: things i think have changed dramatically. in the second step, the conversation moved to encrypted discussions, is that correct? they encourage particularly young people to go to apps like what's app? capt. cohen: they will typically app, in an unencrypted then they will move to an encrypted app. rep. brooks: is it fair to say
that through the relationships developed, they encourage them to send an image? want cohen: corrected they that the victim to do one compromising act they can exploit. rep. brooks: that is typically sent from one smart phone to another or from one smartphone to a computer? capt. cohen: generally from one smartphone to another, in the united states involving an android phone or a iphone. rep. brooks: this is not only happen in our country? capt. cohen: it is possible for someone in another country to victimize a child in the u.s. rep. brooks: cap out of country perpetrators as well as in country perpetrators focusing on out of country victims as well? encrypted,ypically the transmission of those photos? capt. cohen: that is a challenge. the transmission is encrypted as well is when the data is addressed on the phone, it is encrypted as well. rep. brooks: you resenting that
if that a jury individual is caught and persecuted, it is imperative for you to present the actual image to a jury? capt. cohen: the metadata alone, who was talking to him does not matter. it is the content of the communication, the images sent and received. rep. brooks: if you cannot get these encrypted images and encrypted discussions, what do you have in court? capt. cohen: we have nothing in court. we cannot complete the investigation. rep. brooks: how do you find the victim? capt. cohen: often, we cannot identify the victims and they go unserved. rep. brooks: can you talk more about what it is that you actually do to find the victims? capt. cohen: we do everything we can. we try to look for legal solutions, trying to get records of providers from the technology companies, trying to identify them through that. the challenges we have
encountered there many times is because of retention periods, the data, the metadata, no longer exists. we try to get the committee kaisha and to show who was talking to who, often we cannot do that because of encryption. > is in that comment that when you find one of the phones, there are usually thousands of images? capt. cohen: hundreds of thousands and in dropbox and one drive and google drive. >> expand on what you previously started to answer potential solution with respect to fire walls. capt. cohen: to provide a better fire wall. think of it a vault door, the doors to a bank. so while you think of the actual locks on the bank deposit boxes as encryption, build fire walls around that. those can, with legal process be
, opened up, and you can go inside it. like a safety deposit box if we go to a bank with a search warrant the bank uses their key and we drill the lock. i've done that dozens of times. the difference is with encryption, my drill doesn't break the lock. >> thank you, i yield back. >> now, recognize ms. clark for five minutes. >> i thank you mr. chairman and i thank our ranking member. in october of 2014 fbi director comey gave these,s abot -- these remarks about encryption before the brookings institute. we, in the fbi will continue to , throw every lawful tool we have at this problem. it's costly. it's inefficient and it takes time. we need to fix this problem. it is long past time. we need assistance and cooperation from companies to comply with court orders so criminals around the world cannot seek safe haven. we need to find common are -- common ground. we care about the same things.
so, ms. hess, i'd like to ask this question of you, other than tech companies creating back doors for law enforcement, what do you believe are some possible solutions to address the impasse between the law enforcement and the cyber security benefits of strong encryption? ms. hess: yes, ma'am. and as previously stated, i really believe that certain industry leaders have created secure systems that they are still yet able to comply are lawful orders. they're able to access the contents of those communications to either provide some protection for their customers, against malicious software or some other types of articles. in addition to that they're able to do it for business purposes or for banking regulations for example. in addition to those solutions, we certainly don't stop there l. we look at any possible tools we might have in our tool box. that might include the things we
previously discussed here today. whether that be individual solutions, mata data , whether could the an increase of physical surveillance, but all of those things are not as responsive as being able to get the information directly from the provider. >> do you believe there is some common ground? ms. hess: i do. >> to the other panelists are there other solutions you can see that might solve this impasse? capt. cohen: the solution we had in place previously in which apple did hold a key. the chief mentioned that was never compromised. they could comply with the proper service. essentially apple solved a , problem that does not exist. i would say by apple or other industries holding the key, it reduces at least the law enforcement having to go outside of those companies to find people that can get a solution.
as mentioned earlier, about the gray hat hackers, you know, they're going to be out there. if the companies are doing it, it reduces the risk i believe. >> very well. in the san bernardino case, press accounts indicate the fbi has used the services of private sector third parties to work around the encryption of the iphone in question. this case raises important if the companies are doing it, questions about whether we want law enforcement using non-governmental third party entities to entities. -- to circumvent features created by private companies. i have questions about whether this is a good model or a better model exists. assuming press accounts are true and you procured the help of a third party, why were you not able to solve this problem on your own? ms. hess: for one thing, as previously discussed, technology is changing very rapidly. we live in such an advanced law enforcement using anyone of technologyage. -- such an advanced age of
technology development. we require the services of specized skills we can only get through private industry. that partnership is critical to our success. >> this is to the entire panel. do you believe that the u.s. government needs enhanced technological capabilities? chief galati: i think it does. private industry provides a lot of opportunities. so i think the best people that are out there are working for private companies and not working for the government. >> ok. capt. cohen: i agree with the chief. essentially we need the help of private industry both the industry that makes the technology and others. we need industry to act as good corporate citizens and help us. because we can't do it alone. there are over 18,000 police agencies in the united states. and while the fbi may have some technical ability internalally those other agencies do not. over 90% of investigations are handled at the state and local level. we need industry's help.
>> very well. i will yield back. >> now, recognize mr. griffith for five minutes. >> thank you all for being here for this important discussion we're having today. i will tell you, we have to figure out what the balance is both from a security standpoint but also to make sure that we are fulfilling our obligations under our constitution. which was written with real-life circumstances in mind. where they said we don't want the government being able to come in and get everything. they were aware of the situation with general warrants, both in london, used against john wilkes and the rebellion and the founding fathers were aware of james otis and his fight in
massachusetts which john adams said sewed the seeds of the revolution when the british government wanted to go from warehouse to warehouse looking for smuggled goods. it's not an easy situation. i do have this question, though -- apparently some researchers recently published the results of a survey of incrypted products that are available online. they found 2/3 of them are foreign products. so the question would be, given that so many of the incrypted products could be from companies not located or headquartered within the united states of america, if we force the companies that we do have jurisdiction over to weaken the security of their products, are we doing little more than hurting american industry and sending the really bad actors like mr. fletcher who is the child pornographer to a different format we don't have control over? that's a question i would ask all three of you. capt. cohen: right now, google and apple act as the gatekeepers
for most of those incrypted apps. the app is not available on the app store. if the app was not available in google play. a customer in the united states cannot install it. some of the encrypted apps like telegram are based outside the united states. u.s. companies act as gatekeepers as to whether those apps are accessible to be used. chief galati: i would agree. certain apps are not available on all devices. if the companies outside the united states can't comply with the rules and regulations of the ones that are in the united states and they shouldn't be available on the app stores. for example, you can't get every app on a blackberry you can on an android or google. ms. hess: yes, sir what you stated is correct. and i think that certainly we need to examine how other countries are viewing the same problem. they have the same challenges as
we speak and are having similar deliberations as to how their law enforcement might gain access to these communications as well. as we move toward that the question is what makes consumers want to buy american products. is it because they're more secure or because they actually cover the types of services that the consumers desire? is it just because of personal preference? at the same time, we need to make sure that we balance that security as well as the privacy that the consumers have come to expect. >> i appreciate that. captain cohen, you talked about the fletcher case and indicated that the judge orders he give the password to the computer. but then you didn't get access to the thumb drive. was the judge asked to force him to do that as well?
capt. cohen: the judge -- in that instance the judge compelled him to provide it. he said it was not incrypted. the thumb drive was not incrypted, his defense expert disagreed and said it was encrypted. he provided a password and failed a stipulated polygraph. every indication is he intentionally chose to not give the second password for that device. >> and was he held in contempt for that? capt. cohen: not that -- i do not believe he was. >> all right. i mean, look, obviously, if you can get the images you have better chance of finding the victim. it's true before encryption there was great difficulty in finding victims even if you found a store of photographs in a filing cabinet. it was sometimes hard to find the victims? capt. cohen: it's hard to find child victims. >> it is. it's a shame. i like the concept, the visual of you're able to drill into the safety deposit box but you can't get into the encrypted telephone or computer. is there a product out there
that would be that limited? one of the things i know apple has had they don't want a back door to every single phone that other folks can get ahold of, or the government. do you know of any such a product that would give you that specificity? capt. cohen: it would be similar to what we had. the legal process served on apple as an example and apple is the one to use the drill, not law enforcement. that helps provide another layer of protection against abuses by governments other than ours. while they have that capability because they're inside the fire wall. those outside the fire wall, outside the vault would have no ability to get access. >> i appreciate it. i yield back. >> i recognize mr. walsh for five minutes. >> thank you very much. i want to thank each of you for the work you and your departments do. it's astonishing times when the kind of crimes that all america is exposed to are happening and the expectation on the part of the public is somehow someway
you're going to make it right and make us safe. so i think all of us really appreciate your work. this issue as you've acknowledged is very difficult. if any of us were in your position what we would want is access to any information that the fourth amendment allowed us to get in order for us to do our job. but there's three issues that are really difficult. one is law enforcement issue that you've very clearly enunciated. you have probable cause, you go through the process of getting a warrant. you're entitled to information that's on the phone or in the house. because of the technology we have impediments. i think we want you to be able to get the information you rightfully can obtain. the second issue that makes it unique almost is that in order for you to get the information, you have to get the active participation of an innocent third party who had nothing to do with the events.
but who potentially can get the information for you. that's the whole apple case. but it's not -- very complicated situation. because it's not as though if you came with a warrant to my house for me to turn over information i had it's one thing , if i go in my drawer and give it to you. it's another thing if it's buried deep in the back yard and the order is i've got to buy a backhoe and go out there and start digging around until i find it. normally that would be the burden on the law enforcement agency. so that's the second issue. how much can the government require a third party, a company or an individual to actually use their own resources to assist in getting access to the information. and then the third issue that's that mr. griffith was just acknowledging, we get a back door key, we trust you, but we have other governments our businesses are doing business
with and they get pressured to provide the back door key. the key is lost and then things happen with respect to privacy and security. that you don't want to happen and that we don't want to happen. this is a genuinely tough situation. frankly i'm not sure there's a quote, easy balance on this. so just a couple of questions. ms. hess, what do you see as the answer here if -- i know you want the information. but if the getting of the information requires me to hire a few people to work in the yard with a backhoe or apple to really deploy high cost engineers to come up with a entry key. are you saying that's what should be required now? ms. hess: yes, sir i think the best solution is for us to work cooperatecoop cooperatively and
with amdemia to come up with the -- academia to come up with the best possible solution. no investigative agency shouldfore go that for all other solutions they should continue to drive forward with all solutions available. >> chief, you are on the front line in new york all the time. and is it your view that the right policy now would be for you when you have probable cause to protect us and, you know, we're all on the same page there, to force a technology company at significant effort and expense to assist in getting access to the information? >> so, i would say up until a couple years ago, most of the technology companies, and they still do, have law enforcement liaisons we work closely with. for example, facebook or google or apple where, you know, we
have the ability to go to them with legal process and they're providing us with the search warrant. >> right. my understanding from talking to those folks is that if it's information like that's stored in the cloud -- this is a situation in san bernardino. there was a lot of stuff that was relatively easy to retrieve. and they do provide that. they do cooperate as long as you have the warrant, they do everything they can to accommodate those lawful requests from law enforcement. has that been your experience? chief galati: yes. the cloud does have some issues because things can be deleted from the cloud and never recovered. if the phone is not uploaded to the cloud, things are lost. there's a very -- >> would you just acknowledge there's a significant distinction between a company turning over information that's easily retrievable in the cloud comparable to me going to my house and opening a drawer and giving you the information you requested. versus a company that has to have engineers try to somehow
crack the code so that they're very energetically involved in the process of decription? that's the difference, you would agree? chief galati: yes, it's a difference. i believe when they create the operating system, that's where they have to make that key available. so that they don't have to spend the resources to crack a code. rather have a new operating system -- >> thanks. by the way, thank you. i'm over? all right. i just want to say i thought what representative clark said about resources for you to let you do some of this work on your own makes an awful lot of sense. some of these conflicts are going to be frankly as much as we want to say they're resolvable. they're hard to resolve. >> recognize mr. mullen for five minutes. >> as you can see, i think both sides on this -- up here on this -- in this committee you can see we want to get to the real
problem. we want to be helpful not a hindrance. all of us want to be safe but we want to make sure we operate within a constitution. and the technology is changing at such a pace. i know law enforcement has to do their job and staying with it because criminals are doing their job, too. like it or not. and if it changes, crimes change, we have to change the way we operate. the concern is privacy, obviously and getting into that. some have argued that the expansion of connected devices to the internet of things provides law enforcement with new surveillance tools and capabilities. recently, the center at harvard university argues the internet of things could offset the government's inability to access incrypted technology for providing new paths for surveillance and monitoring.
my question is, what's your reaction to the idea that internet of things presents an alternative to access of incrypted devices? ms. hess: certainly, i do think the internet of things and associated mata data presents us with an additional opportunity to collect information and evidence that will be helpful to us in investigations. however, those merely provide us with leads or clues whereas the real contents of the communications is what we really seek in order to prove beyond all reasonable doubt in court in order to get a conviction. >> could you expand a little bit on the content to what's in the device? ms. hess: the actual -- >> or communication between the device. ms. hess: what people are saying to each other? as opposed who is communicating or what location they were communicating. it's important to law enforcement to know what they said in order to prove intent. >> is there something that we on this panel need -- i say this panel, this committee should be looking at to help you be able to gain access to that?
or since it's connected, does it even take any extra steps for you to be able to access that information? ms. hess: yes, and exactly to the point of discussion here today, is that we need to work with industry and with academia in order to come up with solutions so they can access that content and provide it to us. >> the fbi is exploring options? ms. hess: we are, yes, sir. >> are there challenges or concerns using the growth of connected devices you can see coming down the road, obviously, with the technology changing rapidly today? what are some of the challenges you're facing? ms. hess: certainly as more and more things in today's world become connected. there's an increasing demand for incrypting those particular services and devices and capabilities. and that's well-warranted and well-merited.
again, it presents a challenge for us as mata data is incrypted that presents as challenge as well. we need to be able to access the information and the content. in other words, if a suspect's toaster is connected to their car so that they know it's going to come on at a certain time, that's helpful. but it doesn't help us to know the content of the communication when it comes to developing plots. >> so is there a difference between say, the fbi the way you have to operate captain cohen and the way you operate? capt. cohen: not much of a difference. because we work very well together. initial challenges, in february appleannounces it plans to tie the same encryption key to the icloud accounts. apple has announced they plan to make that incrypted and unaccessible to legal process. we'll lose that area of content as well. >> i just assume that everything
i do online for some purpose is out there. and people's going to be able to retrieve it. i don't assume any privacy when it's on the internet. is that analogy true, or should we be expecting a sense of privacy when it's on the internet? we put it out there. >> sir, i believe we should all expect a sense of privacy on the internet, when we talk in a restaurant, talk on the telephone. that privacy cannot be absolute. we need to have a search warrant, and have the ability, the constitution protects us from unreasonable searches and seizures, not all search and seizures. >> do you have an opinion on this? chief galati: i agree also. on the internet, you have a right to privacy. most of these apps and programs give you privacy settings so nobody can get at it. when you get into the criminal
world, that's when law enforcement has to have the ability to go in and see what you have on there. >> thank you. i yield back. >> mr. pelon is recognizes for five minutes. >> i never seem to be amazed at how complex an issue this is. it requires balancing competing values and societal goals. much of the debate is focused on simplified versions. there seems to be some misunderstanding. we've heard the encryption puts us in danger in going dark. we heard that the law enforcement now has access to more information than ever. so-called golden age of surveillance. at harvard at the burkeman center, there was a report
titled don't panic making progress on the going dark debate that concludes, the communications of the future will neither be eclipsed into darkness or illuminated without shadow. i think that's the useful framework to view the issue, not as a binary choice between darkness and/or illumination but rather a spectrum. it's fair to say there have been and always will be areas of darkness where criminals are able to conceal information and no matter what law enforcement has a tough job. but the question is how much darkness is too much. i wanted to ask you all -- this is for any of you -- key questions on the spectrum. if you will. where should we be on the spectrum if we're not in the right place how do we get there. let me start with ms. hess. ms. hess: yes, sir. as far as the amount of information we can receive today, yes, it is true we do receive more information today than we received in the past. but i would draw the analogy to
the fact that the haystack has gotten bigger but we're still looking for the same needle. the challenge for us is to figure out what's important and relevant to the investigation. now we're present would volumes of information. and the problem additionally with that is that what we are collecting, what we are able to see is, for example, who is communicating with who. or potentially what ip addresses are communicating with each other, the location, the time, perhaps the duration. but not the content of what they were actually saying. >> chief, did you want to add to that? chief galati: i do agree that, you know, the internet has provided a lot more information to police. we can go out and find public records and find records within police departments throughout the country. so to police, the internet has made things a little bit easier. however, the encryption is taking all of those gains away. i think the more and more we go towards encryption the harder it's going to be to really investigate and conduct long term cases.
we do a lot of cases in new york. about gangs. we called them cruise. crews. it's vital all the information we get on the internet that are sometimes public out there. now they're switching to incrypted and making long term cases or i guess call them similar to rico cases very very difficult to put together. we are in the blind. >> all right. did you want to -- capt. cohen: i see we have a lack of information that i've not seen before in my 20 years of investigations. not solely by encryption. but also it relates retention of information and the lack of -- similar to what the rest of the banking industry as well as our inability to service legal process on companies who are located in the united states and stored data outside the united states. i see it as interrelated issues which together conspire to make
it more difficult than ever before for me to gather the information i need to conduct a criminal investigation. on the spectrum you asked about. i see it far to the extent we're losing the ability to access information we need to rescue victims and solve crimes. >> thank you. i think my second question, i think to some extent you already answered. if anybody wants to add to it. the second question is where do you see the trend moving? are you comfortable where we're heading or the technology trends leaving us with too much darkness? you kind of answered that unless anyone wants to add to what they said. guest? thatess: i do see increasingly, technology continue to change and present challenges for us that i
provided in my opening statement. in addition to that, we try to figure out how we might be able to use what is available to us and we are constantly challenged by that as well. for example, some companies may not know what exactly or how to provide the information we're seeking. and it's not just a matter of needing that information to enable us to see the content or enable us to see what people are saying to each other. it's a matter of being able to figure out who we should be focusing on more quickly. if we can get that information, we can exonerate the innocent and identify the guilty. >> i'm going to end with that. i wanted to ask, obviously, that you can continue to engage with us to help us answer these questions. i mean, not just, you know, with what you're saying today. you know, a constant dialogue is what we need. >> thank you. i now recognize dr. burgess for five minutes. >> thank you. and thank you all for being
here. i acknowledge there's another hearing going on upstairs. if we seem to be toggling back and forth that's what happening. there is another committee called the commerce manufacturing and trade subcommittee. we're working very closely with federal trade commission which is under our jurisdiction on the issue of data breach notification and data security. a component of that effort has been to push companies to strengthen security. one of those ways could be perhaps through encryption. the ftc will look at security protocols for handling data when it reviews a company. so has the fbi had any discussions with federal trade commission over whether the back doors are access points might compromise the security data? >> yes, sir we have engaged in a number of conversations among the interagency with other agencies with industry. with academia.
i can get back to you as far as whether we met with the trade commission. >> that would be helpful. we are trying to work through the concept of more on the retail spautce of data security. data security is data security regardless of who is harmed in the process. data security is national security at large. so that would be enormously helpful. let me ask you a question,ist probably off topic but i can't help myself. one of the dark sides of encryption is someone comes in and incrypts you stuff you didn't want it incrypted and they won't get it back to you unless you fork over bit coins them in a dark market. what is it the committee needs to understand about that ransom ware concept that's going on currently? data security is data security ms. hess: yes, sir. it's an increasing problem we're seeing and investigating on a regular basis. certainly to exercise hygiene is important.
to be able to access the information is important to be able to talk to each other about what solutions might be available to be able to fall back to another type of backup solutions so you aren't beholden to any particular ransom demands. >> that's critically important. i'm a physician by background, some of the ronsomeansom ware has occurred in medical facilities. i just cannot imagine going into an icu and asking to see the data on my patient and being told it's been incrypted by an outside source and you can't have it, doctor. when you catch those people, i think the appropriate punishment is shot at sunrise and i wouldn't put a lot of appeals between the action and reaction. i'll yield back.
>> i recognize mr. yarmouth for five minutes. >> thanks to the witnesses for your testimony. i find it hard to come up with any question that is going to elicit any new answers from you. and i think that the -- your testimony and the discussion we've had today is an indication of how difficult this situation is. it sounds to me like there's a great business opportunity here somewhere. but probably you don't have the budgets to pay a business what they would need to be paid to get the information you're after. so that may be not such a good business opportunity after all. i want to ask one question of you, ms. hess. in your budget request for 2017, you request more than $38 million to deal with the going dark issue.
and your request says it's non-personnel. so it seems to me that personnel has to be a huge part of this effort. could you elaborate on what your request and budget request involves and what you plan to do with that? ms. hess: yes, sir. at a higher level, essentially we're looking for any possible solutions, any possible tools we might be able to throw at the problem. all the different challenges we encounter and whether that's giving us the ability to be better password guessers or whether that's the ability to try to develop solutions for we might be able to perhaps exploit some type of vulnerability. or maybe that's a tool where we may be able to make better use of mata data. all of those things go into the request so we try to come up with solutions to get around the problem we're current laerply discussing. >> i don't know enough to ask anything else. unless someone is interested in my time i yield back.
>> i now recognize mr. mckinley for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i've been here in congress for five years, five and a half years. we've been talking about this for all five and a half years. i don't see much progress being made with it. i hear the frustration in your voices. i was hoping we were going to hear today more specifics. if you could pass a magic wand what would it be. what's the solution. you hinted towards it but we didn't get close enough. so one of the things i'd like to try and understand is how we differentiate between privacy and national security. i don't feel that we've come to grips with that. i don't know how many people are on both sides of that aisle. i don't care. i'm very concerned about national security as it relates to encryption. we've had just this past weekend
there was a very provocative tv show with 60 minutes came out with the hacking into cell phones. we had about a year ago we were briefed, it wasn't classified. it was the -- where russia hacked in and shut down the electric grid in ukraine. the impact that could have that a foreign government could have access to it. it just in this past week at town hall meetings back in the district, twice people raised the issue about hacking into shutting down the electric grid. and it reminded me of testimony that had been given to us about a year ago on the very subject when one of the presenters like yourself said that it would -- within four days a group of engineers in america or kids could shut down the grid from boston down through -- where was it? from boston to new york you could shut down in just four days.
i'm very concerned about that. where we're going with this whole issue of noencryption and protection. if i could ask you the question, how confident are you? that the adequacy of the encryption is protecting our infrastructure in your jurisdiction? chief galati: cyber security and infrastructure is very complicated. we have another whole section in the police department and in the city that monitors works closely with all the agencies such as coned, dep and so on. we work very closely with the fbi and that joint cyber task force to monitor -- >> but my question really is how do you feel? everyone comes in here, and when i've got to the power companies, i don't need to list their names. all of them have said we think
we've got it. yet, during that discussion on 60 minutes, this hacker that was there is a professional hacker, he said i can break into any system. any system. my question back to you s how confident are you that the system is going to work? it's going to be protected? >> i think with all the agencies that are involved in trying to protect critical infrastructure. i think there is a big emphasize in new york, i'll speak about new york. working with multiple agencies we're looking at vulnerabilities to the system. i do think that is an encryption issue. i think what i was speaking about more when it came to encryption is more about communications and investigating crimes or terrorism elted offenses. >> beyond your jurisdiction on that?
>> that's not an area i would comment. >> how about you in indiana? >> what are you talking about? control systems being compromised. again we're talking about fire walls not encryption. we're talking about the ability for someone to get inside the system. to have the password, to have the pass phrase something like that. to get the fire wall. so encryption of data in motion as an example, would not protect us from the types of things you're talking about and being able to shut down a power grid. it's noteworthy i saw that 60 minutes piece. and what that particular hack was able to exploit would not have been fixed by encryption. that's a separate system related to how the cellular -- cell system works separate from the issue of encryption. what i can say is having more robust encryption would not fix those problems. i lack the background to be able to tell you specifically do i feel confident or not confident about how the fire walls are right now in the systems you asked about.
ms. hess: first off i don't think there's any such thing as 100% secure. anything as a purely secure solution. with that said, i think it is incumbent on all of us to build the most secure system possible but at the same time representing the challenge law enforcement has to be able to get or access or be provided with the information we seek pursuant to a lawful order. a warrant that has been signed by a judge to be able to get the information we seek in order to prove or to have evidence that a crime has occurred. >> thank you. i yield back my time. >> recognize mr. tonka for five minutes. >> thank you to our witnesses. i'm encouraged that here today we're developing dialogue, which i think is critical for us to best understand the issue from a policy perspective. there's no denying that we're at risk with more and more threats to our national security.
including cyber threats. but there's also a strong desire to maintain individual rights and opportunity to store information and understand and believe that it's protected. and sometimes those two are very difficult. there's a balance that needs to be struck. and so i i think, you know, first question to any of the three of you is is there a better outcome in terms of training? do you believe that there's better dialogue, better communication, formalized training that would help the law enforcement community? if they network with these companies that develop the technology? i'm concerned that we don't always have all the information we require to do our end of the responsibility thing here. >> i do think that certainly in today's world, we need people who have those specialized skills and have the training. who have the tools and the resources available to them to
be able to better address this challenge. there is still no one sized fits all solution to this. >> anything, chief or captain that you'd like to add? >> i would just say that we do work very closely with a lot of these companies like google and we do, you know, share information. and at times work on training amongst the two -- agency and the company. there is cooperation there. i think that it could always get better. >> what specifically would you suggest the fbi is asking for? asking of the tech community? >> that when we present an order signed by an independent neutral
judge that they're able to comply with that order and provide us with the information we're seeking in readable form. , also to ms. hess, is the fbi asking apple and possibly other companies to create a back door that would then potentially weaken encryption? ms. hess: i don't believe the fbi or law enforcement in general should be in the position of dictating to companies what the solution is. they have built those systems, they know their device and systems better than we do and how they might be able to build some type of the most secure systems available or the most secure devices available and be able to comply with orders. >> do you believe that that type of assistance that you're requesting from tech companies would lead to any unintended consequences such as a weakened order of encryption? ms. hess: i believe it's best for the tech companies to answer that question. because as they build these solutions to be able to answer these orders, they would know what those vulnerabilities are or potentialally could be.
>> thank you. another potential unintended consequence of u.s. law enforcement gaining special access may be the message that is sent to -- they're sending to other nations. other countries that seek to stifle dissent may ask for tools as well. if countries demand a work around, apple and other companies can legitimately argue they do not have it. how would you respond to the argument that helping tech companies help subvert their own encryption establishes presdants cedents from people around the world to protect them from despottic regimes? ms. hess: in the international first, community -- we've had a number of conversations with our internationally that is is a problem throughout the
world. there are international implications to any solutions that might be gepdeveloped. in addition, what we seek, through a lawful order with the system we've set up in this country to be able to go to a magistrate or judge to get a warrant to say that we believe we have probable cause to believe that someone or some entity is committing a crime. i believe that if other countries had such a way of doing business that that would probably be a good thing for all of us. >> chief or captain, do you have anything to add by what was? capt. cohen: i saw stories that said apple provided an ios code to china. i don't know if that's true or not. i tried to find an example of apple answering a under oath and i did not find that. the source code of the operating
system would be the first thing that would be needed hack into an iphone. and i know that they have not provided a source code to u.s. law enforcement. >> thank you. my time is exhausted. >> thank you, mr. hudson you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, chairman. thank you to the panel today. as our lives become more of the digital universe the need for , strong security becomes more important. at the same time i naturally , suggest a massive increase in our digital footprint and the amount of information that's available on the internet. does this present an opportunity to law enforcement to explore new creative ways to conduct investigations? new forms of surveillance, or
other options, maybe we have not discussed yet. ms. hess: i do believe we should make every use of the tools that we've been authorized by congress, the american people to use. and if that pertains to mata data or other types of information we might be able to get from new technologies we should take advantage of that in order to accomplish our mission. at the same time, clearly, these things present challenges to us as well as previously articulated. >> have you and others in law enforcement engaged with the technology community or others to explore these types of opportunities or look at potential ways to do this going forward? ms. hess: yes, sir. we're in daily contact with industry and with academia in order to try to come up with solutions in order to try to come up with ways we might be able to get evidence in our investigations. >> and what have you learned from those conversations? ms. hess: clearly, technology changes on a very very rapid pace. and sometimes the providers or
the people who build those technologies may not have build in or thought to build in a law enforcement solution. a solution so they can readily provide us with that information, even if they want to. in other cases perhaps it's the way they do business that they may not want to provide that information or may not be set up to do that. either because of resources or just because of the proprietary way their systems are created. >> i see. the other members of the panel, do you have any opinionon this? chief galati: i would just say that as technology advances, it does create a lot of new tools for law enforcement to complete investigations. however, as those advances as we start using them, we see them shrinking away. you know, for -- with encryption especially blocking things that we recently were able to obtain. >> got you. you don't -- ok. to all of you, i recently read
about the ceo of msab, a technology company in the detroit news article. said there's a way for government to access data stored on our phones without building a back door to encryption. his solution is to build a two part decription system with both the government and the manufacturer possess a unique key and only with both keys as well as the device in hand could you access the incrypted data on -- encrypted data on the device. i'm not an expert on encryption. i ask, is such a solution achievable. secondly, have there been and the tech community regarding discussions between you and the tech community regarding a proposal like this or something similar that would allow safe access to the data without giving a key so to speak to one entity? capt. cohen: to answer your question, that paradigm would work. that's very similar to the paradigm of the safety deposit box in a bank where you have
two different keys. it would require the cooperation of industry. >> anything to add? ms. hess: what i was going to say. >> ok. we'll get a chance to hear from industry in our next panel. i was trying to explain this to my staffers, i said did you see the new star wars movie. ou know, the map to find luke -- one half, and have, and you have to put it together. anyway, i think it's important that law enforcement and technology work together. continuing to have the discussions. i want to thank the chairman for giving us the opportunity to do that. i thank you for being here. >> i recognize ms. blackburn for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you to the witnesses. i am so appreciative of your time. and i'm appreciative of the work product that our committee has put into this. mr. welch and i with some of the
members that are on the diashave served on data security task force. for the committee looking at how , we construct legislation and looking what we ought to do. when it comes to the issues of privacy and data security and going back to the law and the intent of the law. i mean, congress authorized wire taps in 1934. and then in '67 you come along and there is the language you've got katz versus the u.s. that citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy. and we know that for you in law enforcement you come upon that with this new technology. and that sometimes it seems there is the fight between technology and law enforcement. and the balance that's necessary between that reasonable
expectation and looking at the ability of your ability to do your job. which is to keep citizens safe. so i thank you for the work that you are doing in this realm. and considering all of that, i'd like to hear from each of you -- ms. hess we'll start with you and work down the panel. do you think that at this point there is an adversarial relationship between the private sector and law enforcement? and if you advise us, what should be our framework, and what should be the penalties that are put in place that will help you to get these criminals out of the virtual space? and help our citizens know that their virtual you, their presence online is going to be protected, but that you are going to have the ability to
help keep them safe? kind of a loaded question. we've got two minutes and 36 seconds. it's all yours and we will move down the line. ms. hess: yes, ma'am. as far as whether there's an adversarial relationship, my response is i hope not. certainly from our perspective and the fbi, we want to work with industry. we want to work with academia. we do believe that we have the same values. we share the same values in this country that we want our citizens to be protected. we also very much value our privacy. and we all do. i think as you noted for over 200 years, this country has balanced privacy and security. these are not binary things. it shouldn't be one or the other. it should be both working cooperatively together. how do we do that? i don't think that's for the fbi to decide nor do i think it's for tech companies to decide. >> it will be for congress to decide.
we need your device. -- advice. believelati: i don't it's not an adversarial relationship either. there's so many things we have to work with. all the big tech companies, twitter, google, facebook on threats that are coming in. they are cooperative and we work with them in certain areas. this is a new area we're going into. but right now i will say it's not adversarial. they're cooperative. capt. cohen: as you mentioned, some of the statut that authorize wire tap lawful interception, authorized a collection of evidence, they have not been updated recently. as technology evolves some of the statutes have not evolved to keep up. we lack the technical ability at this point to properly execute the laws that congress has passed because the technology has by-passed the law. >> ok. we would appreciate hearing from you as we look at these updates. the physical space statutes are
there. but we need that application to the virtual space. and this is where it would be helpful to hear from you. what is that framework? what are those penalties? what enables you to best enforce? and so if you could submit to us -- i'm running out of time. submit to us your thoughts on that. it would be helpful and we would appreciate it. mr. chairman i yield back. ,>> i will now recognize esther cramer for five minutes. >> thank you. it's refreshing to participate in a hearing where people asking the questions don't know the answer until you give it to us. that's really cool. i want to hone in on the issue of breaking modern encryption by brute force as we call it. that's the ability to apply multiple pass codes and perhaps an unlimited number of pass codes until you break it. that's sort of trick.
the trick. with the iphone specifically there's the issue of the data destruction feature. would removing the data destruction feature sort of be at least a partial solution to the -- your side of the formula? in other words, you know, we're not creating the back door, but we are removing one of the tools. and i'm just open minded to it and looking for your out loud thoughts on that issue. ms. hess: yes, sir. if i may. certainly that is one potential solution that we do use and we should continue to use. to be able to guess the right password is something that we employ in a wide variety and number of investigations. the problem and the challenge is that sometimes those pass code links may get longer and longer. they may involve alphanumeric characters. it could take years to solve that problem regardless of what
resources we apply. we ask our investigators to help us be better guessers in order to come up with information or technology intelligence to help us make a better guess. that's not always possible. >> ten tries and you're out data destruction feature that iphone utilized. that makes your job all the more difficult. would expanding that from 10-20 or unlimited, is there some -- i'm not looking for magic formula. it seems to me there could be some way to at least increase your chances. ms. hess: yes, sir, and that's one of the things that does quite clearly present to us a challenge. usually it takes us more than ten guesses before we get the right answer. if at all.
and in addition to that, many companies have implemented services or types of procedures so that there is a time delay between guesses. so after five guesses for example you have to wait a minute or 15 minutes or a day in order to get between those pass codes. >> others? capt. cohen: i don't think personally that the brute force solution would provide a substantive solution to the problem as ms. hess mentioned. oftentimes the delay is built in, i os went from a four digit pin to a six digit pin. you're increasing the number of guesses to guess it right. if you were to legislate it would not wipe the data after a specific period of time you would have to write in that pass codes could only be a certain complexity and length. and that would degrade security. what's important to understand is we want security, we want hard encryption but we need a way to quickly be able to access that data because the
investigations i work, oftentimes i'm returning against the clock to try to identify a child victim and being able to brute force that in a matter of days or weeks or months is not fast enough. >> thanks for your testimony and all that you do. i yield back. >> our tradition is to allow others outside the committee to comment. >> i thank the witness foryour service to the country. i heard one of you state in your opening testimony that congress is the correct form to make decisions on data security. i agree with that. however, encryption and related issues are technical, complicated. most members of congress aren't experts in these areas. therefore, it's appropriate that congress authorize a panel of experts from relevant fields to review the issues and advise the congress.
the legislation does exactly that. do each of you agree with that approach, the mccall legislation? >> i believe we need to work with industry, academia and all parties to come up with the right solution, yes. >> you agree that's the right approach, convene a panel of experts in cyber security, in privacy, and so on? ms. hess: i believe that construct, there are varying aspects of that construct, but, yes, that premise, i would agree with. >> ok. chief? chief galati: sorry. i really couldn't comment becaue i haven't seen that bill. i agree with what she said, we need to work together, have a panel of experts and advise and work with congress. i do believe the answer is in congress. so i do agree with the principle. capt. cohen: whatever paradigm helps members of congress feel
they are properly balancing civil liberties and security versus ability for law enforcement to conduct investigations, whatever paradigm supports that i fully support. >> you've eliminated some of the information that has been available before in cell phones but no longer is available because of encryption. i thank you for doing that. i was a little in the dark about that. what haven't we heard about information that is now available but wasn't available in the past gaza technology? -- in the past because of technology? having problems, thinking of information that was not available both or. , when yourspective combine the encryption issue along with shorter and shorter ds, keeping the
records of data and metadata -- we can find an example of an avenue that is available that was not before. >> i've been in the police department for 32 years. technology has opened up a lot of avenues or law enforcement. there's a lot of things that we are able to a pain today than we -- we are able to obtain today that we were not able to obtain a few years ago.
many countries are having the same conversation. i think this will continue to be a larger and larger issue. while it may temporarily drive certain people who may decide it is too much of a risk to be able to do business here in this country, i do not think that is the majority. the majority of consumers want good products and those products are made here. >> thank you for calling out the quality of american products. i appreciate that, especially since my neighbor here and i represent the part of california where those products are developed. i think there's always going to be countries where products are available that would supersede whatever requirements we make. also back door access would alert bad actors that there's a weakness in our system and motivate them to try to find those weaknesses.
do you agree with that or not? >> i don't believe there's anything such as 100 pure -- a 100% pure system. there will always be people who are trying to find and exploit those vulnerabilities. >> if we design weaknesses into the system and everybody knows about it, they are going to be looking for those and those are designed with weaknesses. i don't see how that could further security infrastructure and so on. i guess my time has expired, mr. chairman. >> thank you. chair recognizes congressman for five minutes. >> thank you. i appreciate it so much. ms. hess, thank you for participating today this much needed hearing. appreciate the entire panel. we're certainly at a crossroads of technology and the law and having the fbi perspective is imperative in my opinion.
i have a question about timing. the recent debate has been revised as technology companies are using strong encryption. you describe the problem as growing. what will a hearing like this lo ok like a year from now, two years from now? what do you see as the next evolutionary step in the debate so we can attempt to get ahead of it? as processors become faster, will the ability to encrypt keep increasing? hess: yes, sir. my reaction to that is if things don't change, this hearing a year from now, we would be sitting here giving you examples how we would solve cases or find predators or rescue victims in increasing numbers. that would be the challenge for us, how can we keep that from happening and how might we be able to come up with solutions
working cooperatively together. >> thank you. again, the next question is for the entire panel, please. what have been some successful collaboration lessons between law enforcement and software or hardware manufacturers dealing with encryption? are there any building blocks or success stories we can build upon or have recent advancements in strong encryption making any previous success obsolete for ? for the entire panel. who would like to go first, miss ? ms. hess: yes, sir. i apologize. could i ask you -- i'm not 100% clear on that question. >> let me repeat it. for the entire panel, again. what have been some successful collaboration lessons between law enforcement and software or hardware manufacturers dealing with encryption?
that's the first question. there are any building blocks or success stories we can build upon or have the recent advancements in strong encryption made any previous success obsolete? ms. hess: yes, certainly deal with industry on a daily basis. come up with secure ways to provide us with that information and still be responsive to our request and our orders. i think building on our successes from the past, clearly there are certain companies, for example, as has been already stated here today that fell under calea. those covered providers have built ways to respond to appropriate orders and that's provided us with a path so they know when they build those systems what exactly we're looking for and how we need to receive that information. >> sir? >> i'm sorry, sir. i really couldn't comment on that. that's not an area of expertise for me.
>> i agree with what miss hess said. there are companies that worked with law enforcement to provide a legal solution and did that voluntarily, technological solution, provide a legal solution such as we can access data. >> thank you. >> building on those collaborations and having other industry members follow in that path would be a great help. >> thank you. next question for the panel. what percentage of all cases jeopardized due to suspect having encrypted device, cell phone, laptop, desktop or something else? i recognize some cases such as pornography, it may be 100% impossible to charge someone without decrypting their storage device. what about other cases where physical evidence or other
evidence might be available? does metadata fill in the gap? for the entire panel, let's start with miss hess, please. ms. hess: yes, sir. we are increasingly seeing the issue currently and just the first six months of this fiscal year starting from last october. we're seeing in the fbi the number of cell phones we have seized as evidence. we're encountering passwords about 30% of the time. we have no capability around 13% of that time. we've seen those numbers continue to increase. clearly that presents us with a challenge. >> thank you. >> sir, i'll give you some numbers. we have approximately 102 devices we couldn't get in. these are 67 of them being apple devices. if i just look at 67 apple devices, 10 related to homicide, two to rape, one to criminal sex acts and two related to members of the police department who were hot. -- who were shot. we are seeing an increase as we go forward of phones, not getting information on the phones. one thing i will say, it doesn't always prevent us from making an arrest. however, it doesn't present all
the evidence available for the prosecution. >> and to expand on what the chief said. that can be exculpatory evidence as well. that we don't have access to. the sad part is when our forensic examiners get called, we ask a series of questions of the investigator, is there an iphone, which model? we're told a model 5s or newer, 164 operating system, encrypted. we don't even take that into evidence anymore because we know there's no technical solution. the problem is we never know what we don't know. we don't know what evidence we're missing. whether that is, again, on a suspect's phone or victim's phone where the victim is not capable of giving us that pass code. >> thank you very much. i appreciate it, mr. chairman. i yield back the time. >> i think we have one last question for the first panel. that's from the gentlelady from california. >> thank you for extending that
legislative courtesy to me to be here and join in on this hearing because i'm not a member of the subcommittee. the rules of the committee allow us to, and i appreciate your courtesy. i first want to go to captain cohen. i think i heard you say apple disclosed its source code to the chinese government. i believe that you said that. that's a huge allegation for nypd to base on some news stories. can you confirm this? captain cohen: yes, ma'am. i'm with indiana state police, not nypd. >> i'm sorry. captain cohen: what i said in my
testimony, i have found several news stories but i was unable to find anything to either confirm or deny -- >> did you say that? i didn't hear all of your presentation around that allegation. but i think it's very important for the record that we set this straight. that takes my breath away. that's a huge allegation. so thank you. to miss hess. the san bernardino case is really illustrative for many reasons. one of the more spriking aspects -- striking aspects to me is the way in which fbi approached the issue to gaining access to that now infamous iphone. we know the fbi went to court to force a private company to for thehe phone
government. i think that's breathtaking. it takes my breath away to try and digest that. then to use that information whenever and however it wishes. some disagree, some agree, but i think that this is a worthy and very, very important discussion. this came about after the government missed a key opportunity to back up and potentially recover information from the device by resetting the icloud password in the days following the shooting. the congress has appropriated just shy of $9 billion for the fbi. now, out of that $9 billion and how those dollars are spread across the agency, how is it that the fbi didn't know what to do?
ms. hess: yes, ma'am. >> how can that be? ms. hess: in the aftermath of san bernardino, we were looking for any way to identify whether or not -- >> did you ask apple -- did you call apple right away and say, we have this in our possession. this is what we need to get. how do we do it, because we don't know how? ms. hess: we did have discussions with apple. >> when? after it was essentially destroyed because more than 10 attempts were made relative to the passcode? ms. hess: i'm not sure. i'll have to take that as a question for the record. >> i'd like to know, miss hess, your response to this. i served for almost a decade on the house intelligence committee. during my tenure, michael hayden was the cia director. now, he's the former director of cia. he has said america is safer with unbreakable end to end encryption.
tell me what your response is to that. ms. hess: my response -- >> i think cyber crime, excuse me, is embedded in this whole issue, but i'd like to hear your response to the former director of the cia. ms. hess: yes, ma'am. from what i have read and heard from what he has said, he certainly, i believe, emphasizes and captures what was occurring at the time that he was in charge of those agencies. >> has his thinking stopped from the time he was cia director to being former, and he doesn't understand encryption any longer? what are you suggesting? ms. hess: the technology proceeds at such a rapid pace, one must be constantly in that business in order to keep up with the iterations. >> let me ask you about this. once criminals know that
american encryption products are open to government surveillance, what's going to stop them from using encrypted products and applications that fall outside of the jurisdiction of american law enforcement? i've heard you repeat over and over again we're talking to people in europe, we're talking. i don't know. is there a body that you're working through? has this been formalized? because if this stops at our border but doesn't include others, this is a big problem for the united states of america, law enforcement, and american products. >> the gentlelady's time has expired. >> can she respond? ms. hess: we are working with the international committee. >> how? is there some kind of international body you're working through? >> thank you.
>> can she answer that? >> do you want to finish your remark? ms. hess: there's no one specific organization that we work through. there are a number of organizations we work through to that extent. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. chairman, i'd ask unanimous consent all of the members of the committee, as well as the members of the full committee who have been asked to sit in be allowed to supplement their verbal answers with written answers of the witnesses. >> approved. without any members seeking to be recognized for questions i'd like to thank the witnesses for their testimony today. now, i'd like to call the witnesses for our second panel to the table. thank you again.