tv Atlantic Council Discussion on U.S. Russia Policy Toward Russia Ukraine CSPAN February 15, 2021 12:37am-1:43am EST
22. until then, committees will continue work on covid relief legislation based on president biden's $1.9 trillion plan. they face a february 16 deadline to submit their bills, and the health plans to take up the relief filled by the end of the month. the next boats are expected on monday the 22nd. the senate is scheduled to take up the nomination of linda thomas-greenfield to be u.s. ambassador to the united nations, a procedural vote in the afternoon to advance her nomination with a confirmation vote expected the following day, for the agriculture secretary. until then, both chambers are holding brief pro forma sessions . march the house live on c-span, the senate live on c-span2. >> next, former u.s. ambassadors to ukraine and russia along with the former defense minister from you rain join a panel of foreign policy experts to discuss the
current state of relations between the u.s. and russia and you rain. this is just over an hour. i run the eurasian center. we have a wonderful convert -- conversation with you today with our panelists. can president biden get mr. putin out of ukraine? it is seven years since moscow seized its aggression with ukraine. mr. biden's phone call with mr. putin said he is not going to put american interests first without pushback. the question is what does this mean for moscow? our panelists include david kramer, senior fellow for human rights and democracy.
director of the security studies program of the foreign policy council. ambassador alexander the former u.s. ambassador to moscow. former defense minister of ukraine as well. ambassador al, the former u.s. ambassador to moscow. and andry zahorodniuk, former defense minister of ukraine as well. andry, i would like to begin with a question. it is getting me second half of the last year. we already have four soldiers who were killed and two who have died recently on landmines.
every day we record several violations of the main treaty. generally speaking we clearly see things are getting more tense. the question is where it gets to. we can have different scenarios on that. as you know there has been a huge operation in russia regarding the closing of the channels, three channels, which belong to the opposition members of parliament. the thing is security service has been following this case for half a year. the fact he was financing these generals from the so-called dnr companies
registered to those territories, there's a big operation in russia. we believe they will be responded with something. we do not know what they are responding, but to draw parallels from previous, there should be some innovative way of showing how upset they are about that. it will be reflected in the situation specifically in eastern ukraine. it could be something else, but we are expecting the kind of attention would go out. generally speaking the whole situation is being drawn from the stance that the process and agreement has stopped. it is not going anywhere for some time. i am personally in touch with a few members of this counter group and they clearly say that
russia is basically doing whatever they can in order to sabotage the process. there is not much happening there because generally there is a lack of intent of actually fixing or finding a solution. obviously they can reach some agreement if this agreement is purely on russian terms. agreement if this agreement is purely on russian terms. but if that is the case, then i guess the situation got stopped. russians know very well that the government of ukraine is showing the cease-fire as one of its achievements and indeed last year in 2020 we had a relatively small number of lost to battle. we have lost 58 service people. that is less thab in in 20.
-- then in 2019. we do have progress on this. but as we know general russian intent did not change. they can change the situation in order to show if you guys are not agreeing with what we are suggesting, then you would obviously lose that sponsorship and lose more people. that is quite possible. very quickly, the situation is tense. we are recording 4, 5, violations already. now the second half of your question is what russia is going to do with the administration. there are scenarios. i believe they would be trying
to show that the sanctions are not affecting them, that they still can do -- can continue their policy regardless of the administrations or change of policy. i guess the level of some kind of facility of aggression will go up especially in the beginning. but it all depends how steady the u.s. policy and ukraine policy toward russia is developing. we should build out the policy regardless of that -- and in a typical russian manner they will try to bully in the beginning. they have always been doing this and they will do this again.
exactly expecting people will back off and that is what they should not do. thank you. >> how important is president zelensky -- they believe in moscow's direction. some observe the claim the ukrainian public is anxious for peace. are the people still ready to fight on the return of crimea? show less text -- >> thank you for your question. i will divide that into two parts. the first is the change of mind the president of ukraine is demonstrating. the pro-russian tv channels have been talking about very harsh statements about what is happening and even more about crimean platforms. they are demonstrating now zelensky is much more measured, probably.
the problem is we still don't know if it is tactical, strategical, or a change of mind. that means the time for the big compromise is over. he is not ready for any compromise. his statements were very worrying in april. nobody could understand where the lines and representatives of his inner circle can demonstrate. if you remember a year ago there were capitulation movements in ukraine that people were afraid zelensky can go for compromises with putin. but may be jeopardizing the national interest of ukraine.
however, now we see this new transformation and tough statements from the president on what is important. finally we have at least five main people who are involved that they are speaking with one single voice. the question about population is interesting. it is very provocative. population should be in this condition to be ready. organic people are not ready to hide. the ukrainians would like to keep normal life and the less fighting happening the less people are ready to fight probably. ukrainians are ready to fight. the fight is happening and it is not pretty. the expert community is becoming
more active and at the same time we see the human rights founders activating their work on the different tracks. members of parliament, their work at the parliamentary assemblies are becoming more and more active. crimean platforms, let's say the political track, that is between the government, parliamentary and expert community. but the question should be is the army ready to fight? as we do not have a full-fledged war we probably do not need the same support as we used to have in 2014 when all volunteers were just sponsoring us in always.
it seems to me after seven years the question should be if diplomats are ready to fight, if the army is ready to fight, and are they prepared for the challenges we have? it is easy to generalize the army. is parliament ready? that is probably the weakest point of ukrainian chain of defense because not only are the pro-russian political party in the parliament, let's say, really undermining the efforts happening, but sometimes the efforts of the dueling party -- because they are very diverse in their opinions about russia -- have ways of doing this on many other issues.
it seems to me the next few legislations in parliament can be that indicator of the readiness of parliament to be fully involved in these political fights against the russian situation. >> thank you. how would you characterize the negotiations over the past six years since the first agreement? as you expect kremlin policy to change. >> thank you, john. i think you characterize the talks over the last 6, 7 years you have to say they have been a failure. ukraine and its allies in the normandy format, with help from the u.s. at different stages, have made multiple attempts to jumpstart talks and write new roadmaps. russia has pocketed every concession offered while basically pretending to negotiate. president zelensky is fighting to do better.
he came into offer as the peace candidate and thought his charm would succeed. he got a few minor agreements on confidence building measures, on cease-fires, prisoner exchanges, but basically he learned putin was not interested in reaching a negotiated settlement. at least not on terms the ukraine could accept. i think the problem is moscow has continued to insist on interpreting zelensky in a way that would legitimize the pocket regimes and preserve russian control over the two people's republics even after the formal reintegration into ukraine. they would do this by insisting the local elections take place under russian occupation. you would end up with a sham election and integration of a trojan horse still under russian control. unless ukraine agrees to this putin seems ready to prolong the conflict indefinitely. the next question is moscow ever serious about negotiations?
this is a slightly more hopeful point to make. we saw a window of opportunity opening up at the end of 2017 early 2018. this is when putin floated the idea of a an international peacekeeping force that could be deployed alongside the monitors as a mechanism for implementing peace. it was too narrowly defined and a potential starting point. but raised hope russia was looking for a way out and it spawned a flurry of think tank spawned a flurry of think tank reports and track discussions, and even articles in the russian state newspaper endorsing the idea of a peacekeeping force as a way to end the conflict in dumb. they tried to explore these ideas and again this was a couple of years ago, but there
were ideas taking shape provide a way out. in the end putin of the russian leadership never followed through. it is hard to know whether he was ever serious in the first place. the talks remain deadlocked. putin got more estranged and moscow decided to wait to see if a more malleable leader would come out of the ukrainian elections. that is where we are now. will kremlin policy change under the biden administration? the short answer is maybe. up until now the long deadlock has not cost russia very much, but i think has to take biden's warnings seriously that he tends
to raise the cost, mobilize the partners to raise the cost of the deadlock. if putin sees the threat of harsher sanctions and greater political pressure, he may, as at the beginning of the trumpet administration, begin to look for a way out. that is when peacekeeping proposals could become irrelevant again. i am not predicting this is likely in the near term with russia increasingly defiant, he will not want to show weakness or flexibility. if the pressure really is going to mount on him, he may be looking for a way out and i hope the biden administration, working with ukraine of course, will put him to the test and see whether we can avoid a protracted stalemate. >> thank you. david, who was going to be in
charge of u.s. policy toward ukraine and the biden administration and what you think the main policy will be? >> thank you for including me. president zelensky in his recent interview with axios said i would like the united states, and personally president biden who is very familiar with ukraine, to help us exit this tragic situation. he may be right to some extent. president biden has an an enormous amount of challenges on his plate, but he has spoken to president putin where he raised the issue of ukraine. secretary of state blinken raised this with ukrainian counterparts. i expect there will be more high-level attention including presidential attention focused on this in contrast to the previous administration where there were efforts on the lower levels, but at the presidential level it was an unmitigated metadata disaster where president trump decided to use ukraine as a political tool to try and deal with his political opponent joe. credit to the trump
administration for providing assistance militarily to ukraine which president obama refused to do. but largely under congressional pressure, the administration tried to live sanctions two weeks into office. i think we will see tougher sanctions from the biden administration. we will see the provision of lethal assistance and i think we will see much more personal engagement from the president himself. i think tony blinken is well-positioned to play a serious role on this. i actually do not support appointment of a special envoy for dealing with russia more broadly. but even on this particular conflict, in part because negotiating with the kremlin i find is pointless.
they do not acknowledge they are in ukraine, they have invaded the country. if you cannot start with the basic facts, i do not see what the point of sitting down is. i would argue tightening sanctions and ramping them up periodically, even if the european union will not go along -- i hope they will -- but it does not bode well for a tougher eu policy toward moscow. so i think the assistant secretary for eurasia will play a critical role. i think the deputy assistant secretary held by george kent, who i think has done a terrific job and really salute the work he has done, victoria, assuming she is confirmed as she should be as the undersecretary for policy, i think will also play a role in have been in a position of negotiating with them. getting an ambassador in key have will be important -- kiev as we will be important as we
have been without one. i do hope the administration will take a more active approach at the highest levels. >> thank you. what would you like to see from the united states diplomatic supporters? >> let me start with military because this is when i was engaged, for some substantial time when i was part of the multinational joint commission on u.s. assistance. the biggest -- there are discussions about the creating of the military assistance within you and administration and we would support that. it is a matter of discussion and
negotiation concerning what amounts it should be, but more importantly the symbolic meaning. that would be a huge signal all around the world. the importance of that signal cannot be overestimated really. secondly, the fact the weapons should continue being supplied for the same reason. they do have some capabilities that the ukrainian army is missing at the moment, but it is usually important in this case. it shows to everybody, especially russia and ukrainian defenders, that the u.s. is ready to help and if things go really wrong -- without legal hurdles because it is already being supplied. i would strongly suggest there is some update of the policy regarding how assistance is provided. we have to have done the
analysis on what went right and what went wrong and how to increase the efficiency of these. we have to connect assistance to capabilities. specifically to designing capabilities and building capabilities. that is with the u.s. military would like to see, the ukrainian military would like to see and we could trace the cooperation to the capabilities to the creating or sustaining or increasing -- but not just weapons or trading -- but to the conflict capability. starting with doctrine and then personnel, leadership
preparation, infrastructure, with the weapons, so when it all works together and then we can say, this is how it used to be, and after a couple years of and after a couple years of military cooperation, that is where we are. that gives a huge reinforcement starting with politicians, starting with politicians, diplomats, military, our military, u.s. military, allies, and so on. i think the best thing can do is focus. the best thing we can do is focus. the corporation was focused on all components of capability, not one specific one. at the same time we have seen equipment coming to the ukraine and not being used to the full extent in full force. we clearly can see where the
assistance is mostly effective. regarding the other one, the diplomatic proliferation and so on, we have a major gap in the defense system, specifically the maritime domain, that we still consider the most vulnerable area. there has been some progress but we need to see, again, ukraine and its allies, the u.s. first of all, working very closely on all fronts including diplomatic ones.
including for example working with strategy, working with other countries, working with creating the native fleet in the black sea, creating some situational centers and situational awareness center for the black sea. most of the activities in the black sea for example they were reactive. something happened and then there was a reaction coming. not immediately but usually a lag of several months. russians are very innovative in the black sea. they are inventing new ways of doing hybrid war and we need to be very much proactive. when i say "we," i mean all countries in the black sea area. we need some coherent approaches for the black sea and i think
the u.s. and u.k. could be leaders in that for sure. we still are going to nato. many things could be done obviously in a collaboration between the u.s. and ukraine. i would like to highlight a couple most important ones. as support for the nato integration for ukraine, that would be absolutely huge if that can be accelerated with the new administration. we received the opportunity of partner status. it is a quite ambiguous term and it could be filled with many different instruments depending on how country's -- how many friends they have in nato. that had true meaning and better ways to integrate into nato is
something that is a clear priority. generally the further integration until the membership plan and so on. that support would be really recommended. thank you very much. >> thank you. what is zelensky expecting from biden's team? >> that is an interesting question. [indiscernible] the problem was the question to president biden was why is ukraine not in nato? that demonstrates a low level of
understanding which has both been done by ukraine to joinedjoin nato and what the u.s. can do for the ukraine. that was not a very correct sentence but in general, the president is going with the classical issues. the first is the military support and many of those issues that andrew just named. more javelins or other type ofmf weapons but something physical. the second, it not only has the opportunity to partnership it has to be full support within
nato. hungary is blocking the ukraine natoship, but that is also support against the russian federation as diplomatic. mission federation. what is interesting is that it was sanctioned. continuing the policy and the previous administration of sanctions against north korea. the issue is that it is financial. [indiscernible]
while the signals confirm the new ambassador to the ukraine of the united states, we are waiting a few days that that will be officially announced. the minister of finance will be the new ambassador. the idea is definitely that the main talks she is given is to get as much support, financial support, as possible. we do not see a coherent vision of the administration in ukraine about the relationships with the united states. we get a picture of some central ideas. the new adae feel it is very vague. president zelensky cannot formulate exactly what he is asking from the united states.
then we see most of these issues, it doesn't matter, we don't see that much about the development of sustainability, about going further with that support the united states can provide for ukraine. we are hearing things like it is time for negotiation and understanding with ukraine and presidential administration. when you look up with the expert community is asking it is much wider. when you look at the energy experts, they are thinking about the necessity of energy security. when you speak with the security experts at the top of the military support, they are
speaking about the issues of creating of the lessons learned for ukraine or about the sustainability of that support we have now. you can have the price in two years still be sustainable? experts are talking about the investment, the joint ventures. we have some examples and that people would like to see more in this sphere and more assistance with the presentation of ukraine in public life of the united states. meaning that the ukrainian picture in the u.s. is predominantly war or something through russia. now it is time to demonstrate other parts of ukraine.
something they see not just as a threat or problem for the united states policy, but also as the possibility for joint projects and the joint enterprises in the future. john: thank you. alex, what do you think the biden administration is going to do regarding negotiations in general? alexander: first of all, i agree with what david kramer said. the president is a true believer in defending the sovereignty of countries like ukraine and he knows the stakes go beyond ukraine in terms of defending the rules based order and bringing back russia into compliance with international law. i think he is going to assign
this issue to one of -- either secretary blinken himself or one of blinken's top deputies -- definitely seek to play an active leadership role of the united states in diplomatic efforts. the ukrainians have suggested the u.s. should join the normandy format. the administration may be prepared to do that, although the russians have used that as a way of playing the parts against each other than seriously negotiating. but the russians would have to agree and it may be sufficient just for the u.s. to play an active role using bilateral connections rather than getting into the group activity with the normandy format. i think the big challenge for
the administration is to come up with the leverage needed to get the russians to stop marking time in these talks and actually seeking a deal. that starts with working with the europeans on a strategic approach to sanctions. it also includes working with the congress and getting some kind of understanding about their readiness to support the lifting of the sanctions if russian negotiate. right now the russians think sanctions are going to be there forever no matter what they do. i also think the administration will definitely look for ways both to support ukraine in the defense field in terms of nato integration, but also use the support in another way of putting pressure on moscow. indeed, nato needs to flush out
what it is going to provide ukraine under this opportunity status. the administration might want to consider major non-nato allies for the ukraine to show the russians we are not just going to abandon ukraine. we are going to boost their relationship with nato. i think the time may come for a membership action plan. i think the administration can get nato to take that important step which has been promised for over a decade. building leverage is just as important as playing an active part in negotiations, but i think given the commitments of some of the individuals, including the president himself, i think you will see a very proactive u.s. approach to diplomacy. john: thank you. david, bipartisan support to ukraine has been a hot topic over the years. will this continue and what do you think the u.s. should do to support ukraine? david: i think it will continue and it is likely to be stronger. i do not think we will see the exceptions to that as we saw in the past four years were some members, particularly in the
senate, for either waiting or unwitting agents of -- witting or unwitting agents of ukraine. i think under the change in control in the senate we will not see such episodes repeated under new chairmanship. i also think the congress will continue to push for more sanctions on putin and his circle. i think they will push for continued u.s. military support for ukraine and i think they will also call for more of a black c strategy at large rather than -- black sea strategy at large. i think the biden administration will win supporting congress for what will be a tougher line toward moscow. i think it is good president biden renewed the new treaty off the bat. that is off the table.
we do not have to be dragged through prolonged negotiations about extending the start. i think president biden and his team can focus on making life more difficult for mr. putin said that he feels pain across the board. if you look at what he has requested of his intelligence community, more information about russian election interference, the hacking last summer, the poisoning of navalny, russian bounties on u.s. forces in afghanistan, i think that bodes well for us who have argued for a tougher line toward mr. putin. i think that is the only way of trying to get putin to understand the cost for continuing his aggression, his violation of sovereignty, will incur serious cost. thank you. john: thank you. we are going to turn toward audience questions. david, we will give you the
first one. president biden gaze into putin on the treaty. how will he get putin out of ukraine? you just endorsed what biden did. if you could take this question? david: i think it would be in both country's interest. i commend president biden for getting this done. president trump tried but tried to work china into the equation. i think he gummed up the process. i also commend president biden for getting it done quickly within the deadline of february 5 with the treaty would've expired. that means we do not have to focus on any start for a while. i am not saying there should be no more arms control efforts, but having gotten a new start out of the way the administration can focus on these other areas of egregious prudent behavior and focus on pushing back on those behaviors whether it is abysmal crackdown on human rights in russia over the protests, the poisoning and
the rest of navalny, and continued war and aggression against ukraine, occupation in georgia, the human rights in syria, you name it. there are many problems we have with mr. putin and i think getting a new start done and renewed is a way for us to focus on these other areas. john: thank you. please keep these answers under two minutes so we can get through as many as possible. we have a question from ambassador robin frankly. how does the panel assess the risk of russian military action in reopening the canal to crimea? andry, if you could take that? andry: as always with war gaming and building scenarios there is no single answer. we are starting this because last year specifically there has
been a significant attention to these measures because some press materials which raised a huge interest in the subject. honestly speaking with what we see so far they will not be able to make a quick jump to the channel because the channel starts with the river. it is about 70 to 100 kilometers to the crimea line of separation. i cannot call it a border, but the line of separation. technically it might be possible for a quick operation, but in reality when we analyzed it it would involve much more serious operations. we don't see them being capable of implementing such a plan
this is the proclamation that the occupied territories leadership says it is forever part of russia. i will ask you to address that, but i would also appreciate your sense of significance in terms of the war of the closing of the russian forum. hanna: even the ukrainian media covered it briefly. the doctrine as well was mostly laughable. and he linguist will explain exactly when and where this territory was part of ukraine --
any linguist will explain exactly when and where this territory was part of ukraine. that is local manipulation that creates images to support the interests in russian society and we should not forget about that didn't is very important -- putin is very important to the russian federation. both to explain why he is in the area but also to detract from our issue. that is why we did not care about -- [indiscernible] legally, for ukrainian legal entities, is not as great for the foreigners. [indiscernible]
the legislation functions. the national security council -- they definitely built the s against them. it was definitely an overrated decision. it had nothing with media. it is nothing about opposition or not opposition. we still have other tv channels that are opposing the presidential policy or even opposing the national security issues. but these channels, mostly propaganda, there were a lot of references of the russian videos. it was propaganda of the new politicians of mr. putin.
you can imagine the narratives he is trying to promote. to be sure, politically it is a timely decision, even a little late. but legally we still see problems with these decisions. john: thank you. alex, we have a question from the national agency of ukraine. it is a humiliating visit last week. the russian regime has finally crossed the red line. as a possible there is no hope for any constructive cooperation with russia? alexander: the visit by mr. burrell was clearly an embarrassment for the europeans , and i
i am -- that is my -- that is what i am seeing. the fact the expelled european diplomats in the middle of this meeting was a real provocation and i do not think burrell reacted forcefully enough at the time. it does suggest russia does kind of feel beseiged by the west and only has itself to blame in terms of its aggressive behavior whether it is ukraine, threats against belarus, or sending mr. navalny back to jail after failing to assassinate him. it does suggest the prospects for improving relationships with moscow is pretty weak. that does not mean we should not challenge them and that applies
to the relationship at large but also makes clear the price of prolonging the status quo is going to continue to rise for russia. i think of the russian taxpayers heard more about it they might begin to wonder whether this adventure is in the long-term interests. i think sanctions are going to get more stringent if russia continues to dig into the ukrainian relationship. that occupying territory does not equal a veto over ukraine's atlantic aspirations. doing other things to make clear to the russian people that putin
is leading them down the wrong path. it could in time convince putin to cut his losses and end the war. that leaves crimea. i think the bind demonstration -- biden administration is going to make clear we are not going to forget about crimea. it takes russia to change course and i think we are in a better place to convince them to do that then when we had the incoherent policies of the trump administration. john: thank you. we have a question from oksana. i will post it to david. incremental punishment of russia has not worked. putin moved ahead with the no military expansion propaganda. we are hearing more about incrementalism. what would be a more forceful response and why is the u.s. and nato afraid to do it? david? david: i think sanctions have not really been ramped up in a
serious way. we need to test that theory more seriously and by major sanctions against russian individuals. it is going to reach a point at some point this year with the elections, which will be pretty extreme in russia, to sanction putin himself. sanctioning people around him has not been enough, but i think if we started discussions about sanctioning mr. putin, that might be a u.s. only sanction. it is hard for me to envision league member states supporting a decision. negotiations from the past of not worked, visits to moscow have not worked, and it needs to be part of the larger strategy to push back against cyber attacks and hacking's to show them what we are capable of.
nobody wants a confrontation with moscow but mr. can is showing he is not backing down. he is firing arrows right now toward us as the new administration gets settled in and he is testing the europeans and tightening the pressure on cancellation of the nordstrom pipeline. i think that would be a serious blow but also help ukraine that would be deprived of $3 billion of transit fees a year. john: thank you. we have a question from the georgian service. 2021 also marks the 13th anniversary of the putin seizure of the georgia territory. last week a civilian -- [indiscernible] -- was sentenced to 13.5 years.
-- 12.5 years. how can the new administration address the ongoing russian occupation of georgia as well as actions by the occupation regime by these tensions and the creeping border? alexander: what happened in 2008 was a precursor to what we saw in ukraine. the west did not impose any sanctions on the putin regime in 2008. there were no sanctions to date because of russia's continuing occupation of the georgian territory, the creeping annexation and demarcation line. i think there needs to be more pressure on the kremlin over its activities in the entire neighborhood. we need to lay down a line above belarus as well.
so far, russian forces have not invaded in a serious way. we have seen security forces go in. we have seen presenters go in. but mr. putin is also doing a good job of turning all his neighbors against him. one way not to win friends is to invade them. we have to make it clear that if he wants to serve his own interests in continuing occupation of other countries, it is not the way to do it. john: thank you. we have an anonymous question for andry. nato integration is the golden egg of ukraine's leadership. what if europe and the new yet it states does not want that? what if they do not want to extend that to ukraine? andry: the question was what if europe does not want that? john: europe and the united states, the nato countries.
andry: ok. the united states first. i have spoken to a number of different politicians and military personnel and diplomats and so on. i see the majority of the u.s. establishment basically supports the integration of ukraine. i have not seen that somebody would really be against that. obviously there are probably such people, but the clear majority is supporting this. regarding europe, europe is not a country. there is no such thing. we have european agencies but they are asking about nato. we have separate countries and each has an equal voice because they need to have a unanimous rule, such as we received during obtaining the eop.
the situation is we cannot say there's a very coherent approach. some countries are against it, some are against ukraine and nato membership, some countries are clearly supporting that. i am sure it is widely known we wish it. our job is to work together with the countries which are still hesitating or which have some opinions, because very often, explaining diplomacy and talking to them and showing the options and scenarios can actually form their politicians towards this. we are explaining that ukraine is defending not just itself. ukraine defends the western world. ukraine defends the democratic world, including europe, against russia.
if ukraine, in a hypothetical scenario, would not exist or would surrender to russia, they would move on. it would go on to use eastern europe because the russian strategy is basically to prove to the democratic world -- they look at europe as two hockey teams. that is how they see the game. it is not just about ukraine. that needs understanding. they may have many other things to worry about, but we need them to look strategically at the things and think not just one step ahead but several steps ahead. when that works we have seen people who have been changed quite significantly. there are many european
countries that are clearly supporting ukraine nato membership. i have to many ministers of defense of many difficult. i would not say the situation is as bad as it sounds from the question. thank you. john: thank you. we are question. -- have a question. can more be done to help the people of the dnr and lnr in terms of reducing poverty? hanna: that is the question of who is responsible? it can always be done more, but at the same time that is the question of the legal issues as well. it is the obligation of the occupied power for the state
executing effective control of the territory to fulfill obligations of human rights, social protections of people, and all others. we already have quite a number of legal decisions by the international bodies that confirmed russia has effective control over those territories. if we think about those, those people -- they have the right protections. the question is, can they receive them only in the territory of ukraine or the government who controls the territory? just for security. in the very beginning, there was a chance to deliver some of the money for sanctions or for all the subsidies. should they deliver something to the occupied territory while
securingultimately now no one cn guarantee such securities because the central monitors do not have full access to controlled territories. so that is why one is coming up to another. we cannot monitor. the question is how we can do it so we can have the best view. but these questions should be asked. so, definitely the only thing the ukrainian government can do -- they have the proper infrastructure to have the
possibility to have legal services of the state to receive money from atm or from the banks. very close to the line of controlled and uncontrolled territories. but we have russian controlled separatists opening from their side. especially with the pandemic. we heard about more and more cases of not allowing people to cross the line, or even cases where people were left in the grey zone in between. there were not allowed to enter uncontrolled territory. so before asking what the ukrainian government can do more, these practical questions should also be asked. john: sandy, if in one minute
you can ask her -- answer this question. in addition to the stick of sanctions, can anything be offered to putin to get him out? sandy: that is a tough question. and he gets into this issue of ukraine's future role in the euro atlantic community. if russia ever gets serious, it will not only be looking for sanctions relief, but it will be looking for some assurances regarding ukraine's future relationship with the european union and nato and that will be tough for the west to handle. we need to main true to our commitments that every nation has the right to choose its future and choose its security arrangements, including alliances. we should not foreclose ukraine's options in negotiations. but there may be broader
initiatives to give russia more of a sense of involvement in decision-making. whether it's an increased role for the osce, or giving more substance to the russia council so they feel they are getting more out of it. i think that is something we need to start thinking about in case diplomacy succeeds and russia puts those issues on the table. maybe we can negotiate a new code of conduct, which would be a way of getting the russians to recommit to which they have trampled upon in their invasions. so, we should never say never to ukraine's aspirations to join nato and the eu, but we should think about european security architecture as a way of bringing the russians out of th eir defiant posture and back into the mainstream. john: thank you very much. thank you to all of our panelists for joining us today,
and thank you for everyone who tunes in. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2021] [captioning performed by the announcer: monday night on the communicators, longtime amazon executives talk about their book working backwards, insights, stories, and secrets from inside amazon. >> how it has been an eberst -- e-commerce company will become a producer of shows, but this is how we created considerable value. this is why the kindle e-book business, amazon music, and prime video businesses are so popular today because there are devices amazon as developed to enable people to watch and read, and in fact, we are creating content as well.
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