tv MSNBC Live With Craig Melvin MSNBC February 23, 2021 8:00am-9:00am PST
>> yes. >> yes. >> would you agree that this was a highly dangerous situation which was horrific but could have been worse without the courage of the officers that you commanded? >> yes. >> okay. so now let's look at what we knew leading up to it or what you knew leading up to it or people that worked for you knew leading up to it. we knew leading up to it, leading up to january 6th, president trump sent nationwide tweets telling people to come to washington on january 6th and saying, be there, it will be wild. according to public reporting by "the washington post" the fbi's norfolk field office issued a threat report on january 5th that detailed specific calls for violence online in connection with january 6th, including that protesters, quote, be ready to fight, end quote, and quote, go there ready for war, end quote.
i guess i'll start with you, mr. sund. when a critical intelligence report is received by the capitol police from an intelligence community source like the fbi, who usually would receive it? i will start with did you receive this report? >> thank you very much for the question, ma'am. i actually just in the last 24 hours was informed by the department that they actually had received that report. it was received by what we call one of our sworn members that's assigned to the joint terrorism task force, which is a task force with the fbi. they received it the evening of the 5th, reviewed it and then forwarded it over to an official at the intelligence division at the u.s. capitol police headquarters. >> you hadn't seen it yourself? >> no, ma'am. it did not go any further than that. >> was it sent to the house and senate sergeant at arms? >> i don't believe it went any farther than over to the sergeant at the intelligence.
>> mr. irving and mr. stenger, did you get that report? before hand? mr. stenger, did you get the report? >> no. >> mr. irving? >> i did not. >> okay. that may have contributed part to the lack of information but i will leave that for the future. now let's go back to another report. i know on january 3rd, mr. sund, you said in your written testimony that the capitol police published assessments of the event including one on january 3rd. do you mostly rely on your federal partners like the fbi to gather and analyze intelligence on potential threats to the capitol and members of congress? >> yes, i think what's important to realize, as a law enforcement agency, we're a consumer of intelligence and information that's provided by the intelligence community. the intelligence community is 18 federal agencies that collect
information, do the analyzing of the raw data, raw intelligence, and then provide it to us. so we're reliant on that information to be complete and accurate. >> but in that report, we now know, according to your testimony, that tens of thousands of participants were likely to ascend on washington, is that correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> okay. the january 3rd memo, according to the "washington post" made clear that supporters of president trump see january 6th as the last opportunity to overturn the results of the presidential election and, quote, this sense of desperation and disappointment may lead to more of an incentive to become violent, is that correct? >> yes, it is, ma'am. >> the article also quoted the memo as stating that unlike previous post-election protests the target of the pro trump supporters are not necessarily the counter protesters but rather congress itself is the target on the 6th, is that right? >> that is correct. >> did you have any indication
that many of these protesters might arrived armed or members of extremist groups might be there? >> we knew members of extremist groups would be there and there were social media calls for people to come armed, yes. >> you've also said at a january 5th meeting with capitol police the sergeant at arms, military officials, all present at the meeting indicated there was no new intelligence to report for january 6th, is that right. >> that is correct, ma'am. >> but your testimony states that capitol police took a number of steps after these assessments, like what you said was the largest number of civil disturbance units possible, increasing protection coverage, coordinating with the d.c. police and ordering all hands on deck status for capitol police, that is right? >> that is correct, ma'am. we took extensive efforts to prepare for the events based on the information much of which you just reviewed, yes. >> if the information was enough to get you to do that, why
didn't we take some additional steps? why didn't you and others involved, to be better prepared to confront the violence? >> we expanded our perimeter when we expanded the perimeter, again, we knew there was going to be some maybe limited violence, but we did. we expanded the perimeter and we took a number of steps to outfit our personnel with additional hard gear. we developed a plan for if we had protesters that may be armed, and that was one of the reasons the expanded perimeter and the heightened risk that i went to the sergeant at arms and requested the national guard. >> and -- but now you realize it wasn't enough, those security measures, is that right? >> well, that is now hindsight being what it is. you look around the capitol right now and you see the resources that were brought to bear based on the information we now know from january 6th. >> okay. mr. sund, you stated in your written testimony you made a request for the capitol police
board to declare an emergency and authorize national guard support on monday, january 4th, and that request was not granted? >> that is correct, ma'am. >> your testimony makes clear that the current structure of the capitol police resulted in delays in bringing in assistance from the national guard, would you agree with that? >> yes. >> that's one of the things we want to look at. >> yes, ma'am. >> do you think that changes are needed to make clear that capitol police chief has the authority to call in the national guard? >> i certainly do. i think in circumstances there needs to be a streamlined process for the chief of police, for the capitol police, to have authority. >> okay. planned stenger, do you think that reforms are needed to the structure of the capitol police board to make that clear? >> i think a review of the capitol police board and their statutory authorities probably would be a good time to do this now. there's a lot of statutes out there on the capitol police
board that go back many, many years. things have changed and it's probably to make the board a little more nimble it's not a bad time and an idea to take a look at what's there. >> that's probably an understatement with what happened but thank you. mr. irving, your views? >> i would certainly agree with both chief sund and michael stenger. i think a review would certainly be warranted at this time of the capitol police board. >> mr. sund, your written testimony states you had no authority to request the assistance of the national guard without an emergency declaration of the capitol police board. on what rule, regulation or authority did you base that view? >> i would have to go back and look at the specific rule, but it's a standard standing rule that we have. i cannot request the national guard without a declaration of emergency from the capitol police board. it's kind of interesting because it's very similar to the fact, you know, i can't give my men and women cold water on a hot
day without a declaration of emergency. it's a process that's in place. >> and to be clear, apart from the capitol police board, you also faced delays in getting authorization to bring in the national guard from the department of defense, that is correct? we'll be hearing from them next week. >> yes, ma'am, that is correct. >> would you agree there were serious issues at the pentagon that contributed to the fact that guard troops did not arrive at the capitol until about 5:40 that day, after most of the violence had subsided? >> i don't know what issues there were at the pentagon, but i was certainly surprised at the delays i was hearing and i was seeing. >> okay. very good. and my last question, just as of all of you in addition to the reforms of the police board, which you're very clear need to be made, any other suggestions that wouldn't involve classified information you have for us, mr. sund? >> in reference to some of the recommendations? >> uh-huh. >> i would look at, you know, again, one of the big things that i think was a contributing factor to this was intelligence.
i think as you meet with the intelligence community and law enforcement in the intelligence community, we have a very good relationship, i think the aperture needs to be opened up a little bit farther. chief contee mentioned january 6th was a new day, a change of what threat we faced and i think getting them to open the aperture and look a little bit harder. internally looking at some of our policies, procedures, processes for how we handle special events, incident command, is stuff we can do. looking at physical security of the building and the grounds, i think is going to be critical. i know a lot of people have talked about, you know, the fencing, the open environment, i understand and i know that goes way back and members of congress like the open environment. i think there are ways to develop a more secure campus while keeping an open environment but i would leave that for a more classified or restricted hearings. >> thank you. anything you would add in addition just any other thing you would add in addition to
what the former police chief laid out here, mr. stenger? >> i would be very supportive of those areas that the chief mentioned. i think he's right on. i think there's maybe another area of use of force that probably needs to be coordinated better in the region here. certainly intelligence needs to be taken a look at as to how it works. we have a lot of people we ramped up since 9/11 and i think maybe it's time to take a look at how efficient it is on the gathering of intelligence and the collection of intelligence. >> okay. thank you. i'm going to allow my colleagues to ask that same question of you, mr. irving, and you, chief contee, because i've gone over my time. thank you. >> thank you. madam chair, mr. sund, you
brought up the issue of intelligence throughout your testimony and the gaps that were there and how we need to strengthen the intelligence. but i was struck by the fact that you said the fbi report, my understanding is that that report had some fairly specific information that was troubling, you said that report did get sent to the capitol police, that it went to the folks in the intelligence department, but then you were not aware of it which raises a really big question, something coming in like that right before an event that i think is significant, it does not get to operational commanders who are there to deal with? how can that not happen? how could you not get that intelligence on the eve of what's going to be a major event? >> thank you, sir. i know that's something that's going to be looked at. i think that information would have been helpful to be aware of. looking at the for the first
time yesterday, it's raw data and raw intelligence information that has come in, seen on a social media post, lots of people posting things on social media that need to be corroborated and confirmed. again, it's coming in as raw data so please keep that in mind. i agree, that's something we need to look at. what's the process and how do we streamline that information getting to where it needs to go. >> i understand it's raw data, but it's the eve of the event. you're not going to have time to do the kind of analysis you would normally like to do. that is information that has to get to you, so that's clearly a major problem. my question is also related to the report that was put out by capitol police, by your intelligence folks on january 3rd. the intelligence division of the capitol police issued an internal report which reportedly stated, and this is some of this has been out in the public domain, that instead of targeting counter protesters as you've seen in the prior events
that occurred that you've referenced earlier, that, quote, this a quote out in the public domain, that congress itself is the target on the 6th by trump supporters. congress. was the target. the report also mentioned that members of the proud boys, white supremacist groups, other extremist groups would be in attendance, quote, out in public sources, may be inclined to become violent. so you have your own report. did you see that report that was put out on the 3rd? >> yes, i did. >> so how is not that a warning of some extraordinary measures? i understand you increased and you had folks there and you increased your presence. but how was that not a real big warning flag? if it was, what exactly did you do when you read that report? >> so that was one of the reports that contributed to the fact that we expanded our perimeter. i reached out and, you know, looking at it, i would reach out to the metropolitan police department just knowing, even before that report, knowing, you
know, that extremists were likely to be there. in the previous reports that have been called for on social media for people to be armed. talking with our partners at the metropolitan police department, i reached out to say hey, are you going to be able to provide us some support and we coordinated that additional support the morning of the 6th. so yeah, we did take all that in consideration as we developed the extensive security plans for this event. >> so you changed plans on january 3rd after getting that report? >> we adjusted our perimeter and did a number of things for it. we were adjusting our perimeter probably a little bit before that as well. >> so that was happening before. we want to know more specifically when you get that. of course, i think we're going to see you got additional information from the fbi, for example, but that did not get to you. >> right. >> i understand that. the other thing that is important for us to understand and i heard all of you mention this in your testimony, that this was not just a -- it was actually in response to chairwoman klobuchar's question,
not just a random, violent attack, it was actually coordinated. i believe in your testimony as well, i'm going to ask other witnesses to respond to this too because all of you mentioned that, how do you define coordinated? what did we actually see from these folks that leads you to believe that it was coordinated? i think in your testimony now you just mentioned military-style coordination. so that would mean command and control. it would mean understanding the layout of the capitol. it may mean knowing the internal operations of tefs perimeters, of folks that are engaged. talk to me, what did you see that leads you to believe this was a coordinated attack? i would like our other witnesses to engage in that as well. >> i'm able to provide you a quick overview of why i think it was a coordinated attack. one these people came specifically with equipment. you're bringing climbing gear to daem stration. you're bringing explosives. you're bringing chemical spray such as what captain mendoza talked about.
you're coming prepared. the fact that the group that attacked our west front attacked our west front 20 minutes before the event over at the ellipse ended, which means they were planning on our agency not being at what they call full strength, you know, watching the other event saying that is ending, they're going to be marching our way, knowing we may not be at full strength at that time. also the fact that we were dealing with two pipe bombs that were specifically set right off the edge of our perimeter to, what i suspect, draw resources away. i think there was a significant coordination with this attack. >> anyone else? chief contee, i think you believe it was a coordinated attack? >> absolutely. my view is from the day of the incident. i think there were hand signals that were being used by several of the insurrectionists. there was radio communication by several individuals that were
involved, the coordinated use of chemical munitions to include bear spray by several people out there. i certainly believe it was coordinated. to chief sund's point regarding the placement of the pipe bombs in the areas, their discovery prior to this event, all of those things, plus adding to that what we know in hindsight now as a result of the ongoing investigation that's being handled by the fbi, you know, as they continue to scrub on social media, i think we're learning more and more this was clearly a coordinated effort. >> real quick, mr. irving and then i'll ask another question real quick. mr. irving? >> based on the information provided by chief contee and chief sund, i would agree, the evidence would indicate a coordinated attack. >> we're looking at folks that were coming out in the intelligence reports, groups like the oath keepers, proud boys, others that were engaged of these violent extremist groups, which we clearly need to
collect more intelligence on, it will be the subject of another hearing that we will do regarding this, but if you look at what the doj is now prosecuting, 200 federal cases, the fbi has linked at least 40 to extremist groups, 59 to other defendants that have connections on social media to violent or extremist rhetoric, conspiracy theories, this is clearly an area that we have to focus on as to why did we not have more information about these groups that were coming here planning and usually you leave a trail when you're planning, either that or you're real sophisticated using encrypted devices and other things, but those are things we will have to be looking at, the national guard presence was critical. you will get a lot of questions related to that but in my remaining time, just a question and you mentioned this in your testimony in an earlier statement, chief, you stated that you were stunned by the, quote, the tepid response of the army officials in response to
chief sund's request for assistance while the violent siege was escalating. clearly here we got a coordinated attack, all of you saw this immediately the way they were doing, i can imagine the conversations with the national guard and, chief, you were stunned by the tepid response. could you clarify that and tell us how those conversations went? >> yeah. so just after some time after 2:00 p.m., i had left the west front of the capitol after initially being at the scene, assessing what was going on, looking at just how violent, looking at the violent actions that were taking place. shortly thereafter, there was a phone call that was convened between several officials, chief sund was on the call literally pleading for there were several army officials on the call, i don't know all by name who were on the call, several officials from district government that were on, chief sund was pleading
for the deployment of the national guard and in response to that, there was not an immediate yes, the national guard is responding, yes, the national guard is on the way, yes, the national guard is being restaged from traffic post to respond. the response was more asking about the plan that, you know, what was the plan for the national guard. the response was more focused on, in addition to the plan, the optics of how this looks with boots on the ground on the capitol. my response to that was simply, i was just stunned, that, you know, i have officers that were out there literally fighting for their lives and we're kind of going through an exercise to really check the boxes and it was not an immediate response. when i asked specifically steve sund, chief sund was he requesting the national guard and was that request being denied the response was no,
we're not -- from the u.s. department of army was no, we're not denying the request, but they were concerned, they did have concerns. i was just again, stunned at that response. >> thank you. >> senator blunt? >> thank you, chairman. chief sund, if i have your testimony correct this morning, i think what i'm hearing you say is based on the intelligence you saw on january the 3rd, after that on january 4th, you decided this was going to be a different kind of protest than you'd seen in november and december and that's when you asked for an expanded perimeter and national guard assistance, is that correct? >> so the information we received, yes, it was very similar to the previous assessments. it was a little bit more detailed. we had been analyzing kind of how we responded to the previous maga marches and decided to expand the perimeter. really, when you expand a perimeter as large as we
expanded it, it creates a large area you have to defend. that was the primary reason, knowing that these protesters were coming here, we were the focus of the protests and the expanded perimeter and knew this was going to be a long day. >> so did you know from the time you expanded the perimeter that you were going to have to have more help in all likelihood to defend that perimeter than your force would be able to provide? >> we knew the additional support would be -- we could utilize the additional support, yes. >> so why did you believe that you needed the approval of mr. irving and mr. stenger to request assistance to the national guard? >> that's always been the case. we only requested the national guard for very specific events, usually the inauguration and that requires a declaration of emergency from the capitol police board to utilize those resources. >> do you know if there's a statutory requirement for that? >> i could look into that and get that to you as a follow-up.
>> i don't know that there is, but i know if you get the approval to expand the perimeter and you don't have the assistance to do that, that's obviously a problem. why didn't you contact the third member of the police board, the architect of the capitol, mr. blanton? >> thank you for that question, sir. my conduit to the capitol police board was usually through the house and senate sergeant at arms. they were the ones having the communications with the department, especially law enforcement related issues. they're both law enforcement. also the fact that mr. stenger at the time is the capitol police board chairperson, but usually outside the monthly capitol police board meeting that we would have, unless it was an issue specific to the architect regarding building structures, something like that, my conduit was regularly the house and senate sergeant at arms. >> why do you think the architect of the capitol is on the police board? >> as one of the voting members in providing oversight. >> but apparently not enough
oversight you thought you needed to involve him in the conversation? >> like i said, my usual conduit was going through the house and senate sergeant at arms. that's already two people i have to go to. going to three in the future if that will implement then i will implement it. i was following my usual course of action. >> so mr. irving and mr. stenger both, let's start with mr. irving, why was the request for national guard assistance not approved at the same time you approved the expansion of the perimeter? mr. irving? i think you're muted, mr. irving. now you're definitely muted. now you should be fine. go ahead. >> am i okay now? >> yes. >> thank you. i apologize for that. senator, i did not take the call from chief sund on the 4th as a request. chief sund called me to tell me
that he had received an offer from the national guard to provide us 125 unarmed troops to work traffic control on the perimeter of the capitol. shortly after that discussion, i said, let's include sergeant at arms stenger as chair of the board and another senior official with quite a bit of experience, the three of us talked it through and during that call, the number one question on the table was, did the intelligence support it? did the intelligence support that additional offer for those 125 troops? >> did you -- did you discuss this with anybody except sergeant at arms stenger and chief sund? >> no. it was just this one phone call, and during that call, we all agreed that the intelligence did
not support the troops and collectively decided to let it go. michael stenger then said, how about we put them on standby just in case and that's what we ended up doing. >> okay. >> from what i remember everyone was satisfied that we had a robust plan, security plan, that was consistent with the intelligence that we had at the time. >> mr. stenger, why did you think that the troops were on standby? they must have been standing way away from where we needed them if it took hours to get them here. what did that mean, they were going to be on standby? >> what i did when i spoke to the chief, when the chief attempted to get the national guard and apparently it wasn't going forward, i suggested to him that he reach out, he knew
the national guard commander, previously worked in the metropolitan police department and i suggested that he reach out to the national guard commander for a couple reasons. one of them was, i had read in the paper or heard on the news that national guard in d.c. was rather reticent to engage the demonstrations at this time because of the issues that had arisen during the white house demonstrations of a month ago and that we needed to make sure that the national guard was engaged in this and they would be willing to -- >> do you think you did make sure that they were engaged and would be willing? i have to go to one more question here. did you think they were engaged and would be willing if called on? >> yeah.
that's what i think what i asked the chief to determine from the general. >> all right. mr. irving your said in your testimony that when asked for national guard assistance, you approved it. mr. sund stated he asked for national guard assistance at 1:09, and it was approved at 2:10. why would it take an hour to approve national guard assistance on your part in that moment of crisis? mr. irving? >> senator, from my recollection, i did not receive a request for approval for national guard until shortly after 2:00 p.m. when i was in michael stenger's office. >> let me get that straightened out. mr. sund do you know when you asked for national guard assistance, was it 1:09 or 2:00 p.m.? >> 1:09. >> who did you ask for assistance at 1:09. >> mr. erving in the company of
mr. stenger as well. >> mr. irving, why would you not remember that? >> senator, i have no recollection of a conversation with chief sund at that time. i was on the floor during the electoral college session and my conversation with chief sund in that time frame was shortly before 1:30, when i recall he was describing conditions outside as deteriorating. he may, in fact, be submitting a request and i carried that forward and that was as much as i can tell you. i have no phone record of a call from chief sund, the first record -- >> did you discuss that request at 1:09 or whenever you got it with anybody else or did you and mr. stenger make that decision then? >> i did not get a request at 1:09 that i can remember. the first conversation i had with chief sund in that time
frame was at 1:28, 1:30, and in that conversation, he indicated that conditions were deteriorating, he might be looking to -- for national guard approval and approval of our mutual aid agreements with local law enforcement. is when to mike stenger's office awaiting an update -- >> this is a time, mr. irving, i'm sure my colleagues will want to follow up on this because i'm out of time, but this is a time when the difference in 1:30 and 2:10 or 1:09 and 2:10 makes a big difference. one of the things i'm wondering, and we don't have time for you to answer this but i'm going to tell you what i'm thinking here, is in a moment like this, if your focus is chiefly on the safety of house members and i would certainly understand that, and mr. stinger's is chiefly on the safety of senate members, maybe that's a problem where the board really can't function as a
board because you have such diverse areas of immediate responsibility, but whatever happened here, doesn't seem to me to be an agreement with the various time frames and i'm out of time, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator blunt. i wanted senator peters and i are going to trade off chairing here with the vote and we have a set order that all the senator staff have based on a melded set of rules between the two committees and i would like to submit for the record a written statement from the united states capitol police labor committee dated february 23rd, 2021. thank you. >> without objection, ranking member portman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first of all with regard to the conversation we just had on the discrepancies with regard to national guard assistance, i would request both chief sundu you and mr. irving provide us with those phone records. there's been some interviews
that have been conducted but i'm not sure we have the phone records. that would clear up some of the confusion. i want to shift fweers a little bit and talk about preparedness. chief sund, in your testimony you talked about the need for better intelligence and better coordination. that was your conclusion. i think that's true. certainly everything we have learned indicates that was part of the problem. what about preparedness? we've received information that prior to january 6th, capitol police officers were not trained on how to respond to an infiltration of the capitol buildings building. is that correct, mr. sund? >> when you talk about infiltration, you talk about a large insurrection like we saw on january 6th, no. >> and why not? why wouldn't we be prepared for an infiltration of the capitol given the risks that's out there i would say to mr. irving and mr. stenger, both of you have
had distinguished careers with the secret service, i would ask you all just to give me a quick yes or no answer, does the secret service have training regarding infiltration as an example of the white house? yes or no? mr. stenger? mr. irving? >> senator. >> i will take that as a yes. if it's a no -- >> yes. >> mr. stenger, are you a yes also? >> yes. >> okay. well, it seems obvious that you would have training on responding to an infiltration. so i think if nothing else comes out of this process, we've got to figure out how to deal with, again, the real danger that is out there and it seems to be the intelligence reports, but also just the previous demonstrations would indicate a need for that kind of training. let me ask you about something
else if i could, mr. sund, that has to do with the u.s. capitol police officers that i saw on video and you saw fighting in street uniforms or soft uniforms, many did not have riot gear. i'm told by contrast, d.c. metropolitan police department provides all with helmets, shields, gloves, gas masks. having seen those incredibly disturbing videos and photographs of your brave officers attempting to hold the line to defend the capitol without that kind of riot gear, are all capitol police officers outfitted with riot gear? >> no they are not, sir. >> they are not. why are they not? >> so if you look at the way we outfit our officers, and it will probably be similar to i think you will find even with metropolitan, i've been with
metropolitan a number of years, they will have a certain number of officers, cdu platoon, not the entire force that's outfitted to the level 1 cdu with the big protective gear and helmets, things like that. so we outfit a number of our -- we have seven cdu plat toons we can activate. 40 people in a platoon are activated to the level 1, the full cdu gear and equipment. it requires extensive costs, extensive training, to keep that -- keep and maintain that level. for us, a number of our officers are posted in interior posts, screening posts where that gear wouldn't do them -- wouldn't provide them any support. so we have determined up until january 6th, that that number of cdu plat toons sufficed for the demonstrations we had dealt with. >> i would say obviously those officers who had interior posts needed it that day. it's not accurate to say they didn't need it.
i know you activated seven of the civil disperse -- civil disturbance unit plat toons and only four had riot gear. i don't know why you would have a civil disturbance platoon that didn't have riot gear. but you've just testified that that's true, that only four of them had it, is that correct? >> that is correct. just one additional point since i've been chief, i've actually pushed for every member in the department to have riot helmets. i ordered those back in september that we had been looking at delays because of covid from the manufacturer getting them delivered, and they actually just started being delivery january 4th and distributed to our officers days before this with limited numbers given to the officers prior to this event. >> too late for many of those officers. chief contee the comment was made the metropolitan police department officers didn't have riot gear. i thought they did have access.
can you comment on that? >> we have seven platoons that have the hardened gear. all of our officers have ballistic helmets, all of our officers have batons. all of our officers are deployed with gloves and gas masks. our entire department, are deployed with that level. when you're talking about the hardened, all of the other extras we have seven platoons that have the additional -- that's a different layer of protection. >> every officer has a helmet, every officer has the protective gloves, the batton, is that correct? >> and gas mask, that is correct. >> and gas mask. yeah. >> it appeared to the metropolitan police department, i'm told, that the capitol police officeres did not have the training in civil disturbance tactics that they had. that's what i was told by some of the interviews we've had. chief contee, is that correct?
>> yes, i've heard the same thing with respect to the training of the u.s. capitol police officers. >> are all of your metropolitan police officers trained in civil disturbance tactics? >> we have platoons that are trained for every threat, for every patrol district and special operations division. some officers do not have the civil disturbance training. those officers generally work traffic duties or they work assignments back in control. >> chief sund -- >> if i could add too, one other thing, all of our officers believe the training academy, they get the basic civil disturbance training. all of our officers get the basic training, but we might have some members, for example, who have been on for 30 years and they haven't been cdu trained and they work back at a patrol district. all of our members coming out of the academy they receive the
civil disturbance training. >> mr. sund, is that true with capitol hill police officers are they trained as they go through their training. >> that was a process being implemented. i can check and let you know if that's been implemented for new recruits coming out of the academy. >> we were working on that but this training was not being provided for new officers much less -- >> i believe the new officers were but i need to confirm that. >> yeah. i think the bottom line here is that unfortunately our officers were not given the proper training with regard to infiltration of the building or complex with regard to dealing with civil disturbance and they didn't have the equipment necessary to push back and most importantly to protect themselves. my hope is that, again, one of the ways that this joint hearing and this committee report can be helpful is to bring the capitol
police department up it speed and, look, i appreciate the sacrifice and bravery of that day, but we owe it to those officers to provide them the training and equipment they need to protect themselves and protect the capitol. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you ranking member. the chair now recognizes senator leahy. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would like to follow up on what senator portman said. i agree with this concerns, but i might ask a question from the appropriations committee and i know time is limited so these can be yes or no answers. the appropriations committee has always worked in a bipartisan fashion to get money to the police. so mr. sund, yes or no, appropriations committee, ultimately the congress, have met your requests for salaries
and operating expenses in every fiscal year, is that not correct? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. and mr. stenger, the appropriations committee and ultimately the congress has met your requests for salaries and operating expenses every fiscal year, is that correct? i don't hear an answer. i'll ask mr. irving. mr. irving, the appropriations committee and ultimately the congress has met your request for salaries and operating expenses in every fiscal year, is that correct? >> yes. that is correct. >> mr. stenger? >> yes, that's correct, sir. >> thank you very much. so i have to think that we had -- not that we had inadequate resources, but a
failure to deploy the people that we were supposed to. i look at those who appeared, i looked at the lives that were lost, the police who fought, who protect our capitol. we saw this as a violent and i would say planned and organized attack of the united states and the united states government by domestic terrorists. i hope they're all going to be prosecuted as fully as they can. but those, when we see people encouraging them, including from the former president of the united states who urged his followers to fight and to show strength, i really wonder why we didn't take it seriously enough to be prepared for them. the hours it took to bring in the national guard and
everything else. so i, mr. sund, read your detailed letter to speaker pelosi, but you said there wasn't enough intelligence shared, but in your same letter you stated that intelligence assessment, i'm quoting here, indicated that members of the proud boys, white supremacist groups and antifa and other extremist groups are expected to participate in the january 6th event and they may be inclined to become violent. how much more intelligence do we need than that? >> yes, sir, that is correct. that is what the intelligence assessment said. . it was very similar to the intelligence assessments we had for the november and december maga marches. the intelligence assessments that we had developed for the january 6th event all the way up
until january 6th were saying the same thing and that's what we planned for. we planned for the possibility of violence, the possibility of some people being armed, not the possibility of a coordinated military-style attack involving thousands against the capitol. >> violence strikes me as a pretty strong thing and i would suggest that everybody get together and look at the future because if you have something that goes on for months, a president calling them, everybody else calling them, i worry there was not more there. i think we root out the hate and the rioters to the door that day, no tank or barrier would provides the safety we need. franklin said, those that give
up liberty to safety deserve neither liberty nor safety. but i know a vote is on and before i close i do want to commend chief contee for your response. you don't have an easy job trying to protect the city as large as washington, d.c., and balance the delicate balance of dozens of other law enforcement. but i think that i commend the two chairs and ranking members for holding this hearing. we'll hold more in appropriations. but we're going to look very closely at the request this year and say, what do we do if we have another one of these? i thank you and yield back be my time. >> thank you, senator leahy. the chair recognizes senator johnson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to start off by just thanking our law enforcement witnesses for your service.
i know there's -- 2020 is hindsight and monday morning quarterback and i want to make sure we guard against doing so. what i've seen from testimony seems like there's a fair amount of thought and due diligence that went into this. i appreciate your service. i also want to say, i find the videos as you said, chief sund, sickening. the violence reprehensible, the racial slurs repugnant and want to make sure that the people engaged in the violence are prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. i've got a long list of questions which this format really doesn't lend itself to asking, so what i will be doing is preparing a letter for the committee chairman and hoping that they will ask those questions and investigate these issues that ought to be listed. i want to do in terms of asking some questions, i want to start out by reading excerpts from what i thought was a very
interesting eyewitness account by jay michael waller. he is a senior analyst for a strategy at the center of security policy, his areas of concentration include political and psychological warfare and subversion, a former professor and instructor at the naval postgraduate school, lecturer at the john f. kennedy school at ft. bragg and wrote this piece titled i saw provocateurs at the capitol riot on january 6th and basically arrived on scene by 11th from union station and i will start reading, 11:30 walked from near union station and noticed a small number of capitol police dressed in riot gear with shin guards and shoulder guards. then i walked up pennsylvania avenue toward an empty freedom park. he noticed that the speech had broken up and so a crowd was walking down constitution avenue. he joined them at 13th street. but he said the mood of the crowd was positive and festive. of the thousands of people i
passed or who passed me along constitution avenue some were indignant and contempt shus of congress but not one appeared angry or incited a riot. many were families with small children, elderly, overweight, tired or frail, traits not attributed to the riot prone. many wore pro police shirts or carried pro police black and blue flags. although the crowds represented working class by appearance and manner of speech some people stood out. a few didn't share the jovial friendly earnest of the great majority. some obviously didn't fit in and he describes four different types of people. plain clothed militants. agents pro voc tours. fake trump protesters and disciplined uniformed attackers. these are the people that probably planned this. he goes on, the d.c. metropolitan police were their usual professionally detachedselves standing on curbs
or street crossings and exchanging occasional greetings. when we crossed first street to enter the capitol grounds where capitol police had jurisdiction i noticed no police at all. several marchers expressed surprise. it seemed like a courtesy gesture from congress which controls security. that appearance of low threat level made no sense, yet no capitol police appeared anywhere from what we could see. i'm taking these excerpts in order but there's a lot more to this piece. what looked like tens or hundreds of thousands of people surged down the avenue as far as one could see, but almost everyone seemed talkative and happy. no police could be seen on the platform for now. no police could be seen anywhere. people kept surging in from constitutional avenue and the plaza overflowed on to the lawn. everyone squeezed closer together with most in high spirits. some trouble began up in the front near the base of the inaugural platform itself but we could not see what was happening.
then something happened at the front of the crowd. it seemed like a scuffle but from 40 feet back i couldn't see. people started chanting, "usa usa" and other slogans. for a few seconds i saw what looked like police in a tussle with marchers up front. what appeared to be an some up d group in civilian clothes. i call them the plain-clothes militants that fit right in with maga people. the anti-riot police on the platform visibly tensed up. one fired a tear gas canister not at the plain-clothes militants at the front line but into the crowd itself, then another. flash grenades went ouf in the middle of the crowd. the tear gas changed the crowd's demeanor. there was an air of disbelief as people realized that the police whom they supported were firing on them. what are you doing? we support you, someone yelled. all of a sudden, pro-police people felt the police were attacking them and they didn't know why. more tear gas.
a canister struck a girl in the face drawing blood. the crowd kwhent from disbelief and confusion to anger. pi eel stop there. the last five pages is titled "provocateurs turn unsuspecting marchers into a mob." i recommend everyone in the committee read this account. i ask it be entered into the record. chief, i want to ask you, the house managers made a big deal that this was predictable, this was foreseeable, which i don't believe. do you believe that the breach of the capitol, did you believe that was foreseeable and predictable? >> no, i don't, and other partner agencies, acting chief conte made the statement that the breach of the capitol was not something anybody anticipated, nor do i think some of our federal partners expected it. i don't think the secret service or the vice president expected it. >> is that because of what you experienced in the past,
mr. waller experienced, the vast majority of trump supporters are pro law enforcement and the last thing they would do is violate the law? >> information i received from my auflszers is they were trying to prevent people from getting into the building. >> i've got a long list. i want to close with the two former sergeant of arms. i knew these committees were going to start investigation. i waited a couple weeks. i didn't see an oversight let gore out so i wrote my own on the 21st. i just have a question for both the former sergeant of arms, did you get my oversight letter with my questions? >> i did not receive your letter. i left town right after i resigned, but i certainly look forward to working with you and your staff to answer your questions. >> okay. if you'd give us an address,
because we sent it to the acting sergeant of arms. they won't even let us know if they passed that letter to you. apparently they didn't. mr. stringer, did you receive my letter? >> i don't recall. it might have come, but i don't recall. >> chief, one last question for you. do you regret resigning? >> yes, i do, sir. i certainly do regret resigning. i love this agency. i love the women and men in this agency. i regret the day i left. >> mr. irving and mr. stinger, first of all, look for my letter and i'd like an answer to that as quickly as possible. thank you. >> thank you, senator johnson. we're waiting for senator warner and any other member. i see senator rosen. would you like to go ahead? your the first member on. senator? >> thank you very much, senator klobucar. thank you, everyone, for being here today and bringing this
hearing. it's much needed and i think it's the first of many. i'd like to start off by expressing my thoughts are with the brave capitol police officers who put their lives on the line to protect us on january 6th and their heroic actions like the ones of goodman, they redirected those violent rioters away from us. they're going to forever be embedded in our minds. we know that so many of these courageous men and women, they're really hurting in the aftermath of the insurrection. and i've been particularly heartbroken to hear about the death of capitol police the police officer, protecting since 2005. my prayers are with him and his family and his loved ones. the insurrectionists, when they came to storm our capitol on january 6th, they came not only with weapons but also with hate. mere weeks before international holocaust remembrance day, the world watched in horror as a
rioter inside the capitol wore a camp auschwitz shirt as he and others violently pushed forward on the house and the senate floors. all the while, the rioters were waving confederate flags, hanging nooses on the front lawn, verbally assaulting a jewish reporter outside the capitol, saying, you are cattle. that refers to car cows that were used to transport jews to nazi death camps during the holocaust. this violent attack on the capitol features from the anti-semitic qanon conspiracy. the leader of the racist anti-semimittic proud boys hate group was arrested. fbi claims the next day it shared concrete intelligence about its treatment plans for violence on january 6th including specific threats on
members of congress. maps of the tunnels of the capitol complex. mpd was tracking white supremacist activity, then what exactly did he know on january 5th and why didn't he alert anyone? >> thank you for that question. what the fbi said, ma'am, on january the 5th was in the form of an email. i would certainly think that something as violent as an insurrection of the capitol would warrant, you know, a phone call or thing, but as the chief mentioned earlier, the information was uncorroborated information. it was raw information that we had that we received through the same lines, through the jttf, not fully vetted and haven't been yet through the
metropolitan police department. what they were prepared for was the larger violence and demonstrations we expected to see in our city. >> i have to ask mr. son the same question now. what did you know as of tuesday night, january 5th? because i have a follow-up for both of you on this one. so quickly, mr. son, what did you know on january 5th and were you alarmed or not alarmed? what did you expect? >> so, yeah. i was concerned. we had the intelligence that was coming out, the intelligence we'd been planning for. again, keep in mind, the temgs assessments we had developed at the end of december, the one for january 3rd were very, very stim. they just provided a little bit more specificity, so we had already been planning for the threat for violence, the threat for armed people protesting. that's what we were planning for. now, if you're referring to the norfolk letter, again, i just became aware that the department was aware of that 24 hours ago, so on the 6th or the 5th or the
4th i was not aware of that memo existing. >> so you're saying there's a breakdown between you and the fbi, because we have rallieses, protests and things happen in washington all the time. how many -- could both of you just maybe give a guess, how many do you think are usually armed insurrectionists or come heavily armed out of the hundreds, perhaps thousands of rallies that we see in washington through the year? >> we know the last three incidents, the first two, men and women of the metropolitan police department recovered firearms from several people who were attending the demonstrations at the first maga rally as well as the second one. metropolitan police department aside from that, those have been the demonstrations of what we're seeing individuals coming armed.
>> do you think this was an intelligence breakdown or a resource issue? >> i think the intelligence did not make it where it needed to be. >> you think the fbi did not raise this to the level they needed to with the metropolitan police department in your mind? >> we received it in the form of an email that came as an alert bulletin at 7:00 p.m. the day before. our posture as the metropolitan police department, again, i think, you know, it's reflected in deployment in terms of not just the national guard that was deployed but as well as other officers in surrounding jurisdictions p than reflected the seriousness we took with respect to the threats we were expecting to see in the city. >> mr. sund, can you tell me, do you think this was a resource issue or intelligence breakdown or something else? this is very important. >> yes, ma'am. i'll be very brief. it was part of my introduction. i think it was more than just the norfolk letter. i think we need to look at the
whole entire intelligence community and the view they have on the domestic extremists and the effect they have. i look at this as an intelligence problem that impacted this event, yes. >> so what information would you have had to have heard to have raised up the flag to get more resources for the capitol police? because thank goodness -- i mean, we saw loss of life and thank goodness there wasn't more, but one is too many. so what is your threshold, then? what should be the threshold for the capitol and to protect your officers? >> mm-hmm. i did an advance reachout to the washington, d.c., police to coordinate resources and i also went to the house and senate sergeant at arms to request the national guard. >> mr. contee, i think i have five seconds and we can take this off the record. i believe there are some plans by qanon for something to happen at the