mouse and senate sergeant at arms to request the assistance of the national guard and mr. irving stated he was concerned about the optics of having the guard deployed. is that right? am i remembering that correctly? >> that is correct, sir, on the 4th. it wasn't a phone call, it was an in-person visit over to his office where i went and requested the national guard. >> mr. irving could you clarify when you used the term pop ticks, and maybe your recollection is you didn't, so maybe you can speak to that, did you talk about being concerned about the optics of the national guard, and then could you just elaborate on what you meant by that? again, this is monday, january the 4th now. >> yeah, on monday, january the 4th, senator, safety was always the deciding factor of making security plans, and the issue, the issue on the table was whether the intelligence warranted troops at the capitol. and the conversation with mr. sund was not, i did not take it as a request, he was merely informing me that he had received an offer from the
national guard and then when we included mr. stanger, the three of us discussed the specific issue as to whether the intelligence warranted the troops and the answer was no. the collective answer was no and then mr. stanger put forth his recommendation to have them on stand by. and my recollection was mr. sund was very satisfied with that, in fact he briefed the following day that he was satisfied and i heard no concern anytime thereafter. >> were you concerned, this use of the word optics, the appearance, what it would look like to have the guard, this is what mr. sund has testified was a concern on january 4th, that there was a reluctance to request assistance because of the appearance, was there something that you were -- what's the appearance that you were concerned about, mr. irving, if, indeed, you were, were you concerned that having the guard present would look like it was too militarized? were you concerned about the criticism of the guard being deployed in washington during rioting earlier this summer? the summer of 2020. give us insight into your
thinking there as you recall it. >> senator, i was not concerned about appearance whatsoever. it was all about safety and security. any reference would have been related to appropriate use of force, display of force, and ultimately the question on the table when we looked at any security asset is does the intelligence warrant it? is the security plan match with the intelligence and, again, the collective answer was, yes. >> mr. chairman, could i just ask one final question? >> yes. >> thank you, madam chair, thank you. speaker pelosi has asked retired generous sell honore to review security in light of the attack. the general said the leadership of the capitol police, you, mr. sund, and both of you gentlemen, the house and senate sergeant of arms, he's criticizing you for the appearance of complicity
during the attack, and also said that you were potentially undertook complicit actions. those are his words, during the attack. mr. sund, were you complicit in this attack on january 6th. >> absolutely not, sir, i've heard those comments as well and i think it's disrespectful to myself and the members of the capitol police department. >> mr. stanger, were you complicit in the attacks on january 6th? mr. stanger, were you complicit in the attacks on january 6th? mr. irving, were you complicit in the attacks on january 6th? >> absolutely not, senator. >> yeah, of course none of you were, there's absolutely no evidence to that effect and mr. sund, i think your comments are appropriately taken, to allege that you -- any of you were
complicit in this violent mob attack on this building, i think, is not only extremely disrespectful, it's really quite shocking. and this person has no business leading any security review related to the events of january 6th. thank you for your indulgence, madam chair. >> thank you very much, next a new member of both committees, senator padilla. >> thank you, madam chair. there's been a lot of questions -- i've been popping in and out from multiple committees but i understand there's been a lot of questions already about intelligence, what was known, what was assessed, what was shared. et cetera, and differing opinions. i'll try not to be too repetitive. first, a quick question for chief sund and the two sergeant at arms. i imagine, like most people, you saw most if not all of the house impeachment managers' presentations before the united
states senate as they sort of laid out the case, set the impeachment question aside, we know how that was resolved but in terms of how january 6th didn't just happen, but the lead-up to january 6th. is there anything from that presentation that would disagree with? >> to make sure i understand, the video i watched and always information, the video that was portrayed is all accurate video, as far as the -- any of the other commentary associated with the video i can't say i watched every single bit of it but i can tell you a lot of that video was video from the united states capitol police and after all accurate. >> thank you, mr. stanger. mr. irving, same question. >> the video was certainly what i could see from my window on
the day of january 6th. >> and from my perspective, senator, i have not diagnosed the -- why the attack occurred at the time. i would leave it to the after investigation. >> there is an intelligence division within the department, correct? >> yes, sir. >> okay, and now having read your letter to speaker pelosi, you make reference to events on both november 14th as well as december 12th that you had sort of comparable intelligence in terms of risk assessment, threat assessment and the events of november 14th and december 12th, not leading into anything near
what happened on january 6th. is that my correct interpretation of your letter? >> yes, that is the correct interpretation of the letter. both assessments indicated militia groups and extremists in attendance. weapons were recovered during both those events. >> okay. and so to the best of your recollection in the lead-up to january 6th, since it was comparable assessment, comparable intelligence, roughly, you therefore proceeded with comparable preparation and posture? >> yeah, that is absolutely correct. we proceeded with a posture of seeing it could have instances of violence. we knew it was going to be focused on the capitol. we knew that there was going to be members of proud boy, antifa, participating and like i said before, not capitol police, not metropolitan police, not any of our federal agencies had any information we were going to be facing armed insurrection of
thousands of people. >> if we take our experience with terrorism globally, and looking at case studies, both incidents that have been prevented and those that were successfully executed against the united states, is it plausible? and i know hindsight is 20/20. is it plausible that the november 14th, december 12th incidents may well have been trial runs, the very extremist organizations you've referenced involved with the organizing and participation of november 14th, december 12th, to gain counterintelligence on how you and your partner agencies would be planning and preparing for such incidents. >> as you rightly point out when you look at some of the terrorist attacks that have
occurred there has been pre-planning, there has been pre-surveillance, pre-collection of intelligence on the security features. i don't know if the november and december were two instances of that. but i would suspect with the fact we're finding that was a coordinated attack i wouldn't doubt there was pre-surveillance. >> so we don't know they were, we don't know they weren't. >> correct. >> and other intelligence folks will be here at a subs subsequent hearing but we're all in this together in your letter and testimony earlier today you bluntly said the intelligence community missed this. >> that is correct, sir, that's the way i feel. >> who was commander in chief on december 6th? >> donald trump, sir. >> the intelligence community that missed this. >> for the entire 18 agencies that represent the intelligence community. >> yes, sir. >> that would be the commander in chief. >> and who was that again?
>> president donald trump. >> may i ask a couple questions on a different topic. i think it's obvious to many across the country, i was one of three senators who was not in chambers on january 6th. i had the benefit if you will of watching the events occur in realtime, both inside the capitol and outside the capitol on television. one thing that was not lost on me and many people that i've talked to is the difference in both police presence and response on january 6th compared to events from last summer when peaceful protesters were demonstrating in the nation's capitol in the wake of george floyd's murder. last summer they were met with significant force. a couple of data points to date some 250 individuals who were involved in the capitol insurrection of january 6th have been arrested. more will likely be arrested in
the coming weeks and months but only a small number, about 52 of these individuals were arrested on january 6th. by contrast during the largely peaceful protest of last summer 427 people were arrested. on june 1st, alone, 289 people were arrested. similarly, some 300 protesters were arrested during the kavanaugh hearings in 2018. so question, mr. sund, can you tell us exactly how the capitol police preparations for january 6th differed from preparations for the protests from last summer? and if you can specifically address if they were the same or different use of force guidelines in place on january 6th compared to the protests of last summer, or any criteria for
making arrests on january 6th versus the protests from last summer. >> okay, and if you could do that in about a minute -- >> yes, ma'am. >> thank you, senator. >> i will do that concisely. planning and preparations, we plan for every demonstration the exact same way. doesn't matter the message of the person, doesn't matter the demographics of the grievance involved in the demonstration, we do it the exact same way, we develop our information, we develop our intel and base a response plan on that. so let's transition to preparations. i will tell you we handled the 15 major demonstrations involving black lives matters groups, following the death of george floyd over the summer. we had a total of six arrests, six arrests, no use of less lethal capabilities, no use of lethal force capabilities. the events, everything that we put into place for january 6th far exceeded any planning that we did for any events in 2020, with the full activation of the department, the size of the
perimeter that we expanded, the deployment of additional protective equipment, the deployment of less lethal and the application of less lethal far exceeded any event i can recollect on the nation's capitol. i'll leave it at that. >> thank you. we're going to go, and thank you, senator padilla, we're going to go to senator hagerty and senator king who has been patient and been on with us online for quite a while. senator hagerty. >> thank you, chairman klobuchar, thank you for having us here today and holding this hearing. i want to begin by thanking the law enforcement officers that are represented here today, you and your families, thank you for your sacrifice and certainly my heart goes out to those families and loved ones who have lost their lives in this. in the spring and summer of 2020 many people criticized the use of the national guard to help restore order in washington following some of the worst rioting in decades. mayor bowser said the guard presence was "unnecessary and
maybe counter productive" and a d.c. national guard had to tell his troops, i quote again "some of the d.c. public does not agree with our mission and may have nefarious intentions toward our servicemen," and a "washington post" port said that top pentagon officials emphasized that on january 6th the guard would have a, quote, far more muted presence than in june saying "we've learned our lessons and will be absolutely nowhere near the capitol building," mr. sund has stated that despite attempting to attain national guard support on capitol hill on january 6th he was unable to get approval for such support and several people today have referred to concerns over the optics of january the 6th. so my first question is directed to mr. sund. do you think that the backlash against the use of national guard troops to restore order back in the summertime led to reluctance in advance of january 6th to utilize guard troops to protect the capitol? >> sir, i cannot really testify
to what the inner working was, or working decisions over at the pentagon regarding either the decisions from the over the summer or the memo who was put out by the secretary of the army on the 4th. however, i was very surprised at the amount of time and the pushback i was receiving when i was making an urgent request for their assistance. >> that's regrettable. i'd also like to follow up on a line of questioning that senator hawley broke up. speaker pelosi indicated she intends to establish a commission to examine the events of january 6th. that's why we're here today, examining those issues. and speaker pelosi appointed a retired army general who is going to lead the investigation into what happened but days after the attack that general said i think once all this gets uncovered, quoting him, "it was complicit actions by capitol police" before he added that you, mr. sund, were, quote,
"complicit along with the sergeant-at-arms in the house and senate," my question is do any of you believe that comments like these suggest he is someone well suited to conduct a serious and unbiased review of the events of january 6th? if so, please explain. >> i'll go ahead and start with that response. as i mentioned before i found the comments that he made regarding myself and also the capitol police officers highly disrespectful to the hard working women and men of that police department. and also to myself. i welcome and i look forward to an after action that will move this agency forward, move our partnership with the federal agencies forward but it has to be done in an unbiased fashion. >> i couldn't agree more, mr. sund. any other responses? >> i would disagree with the general's -- what he said. i don't believe that's true. there was a lot of people that
put themselves in very much danger on that day, and i think saying something like that is just not in good taste. >> yeah, i can't imagine that being said, myself, implying that you all were complicit in this. i thank you for your answers and for your service. i yield back, madam chair. >> thank you very much, senator hagerty. next, senator king. you may be muted, senator king. >> i got it. >> great. >> thank you, madam chair, and i want to thank the witnesses, first, for their patience this morning and their thorough answers. this has been a long hearing and i really appreciate it and i appreciate the fact that although you all are no longer -- other than the chief in washington, no longer in your positions you've come forward to give us the benefit of your
observations. it seems to me one of the clear, and i'm not going to plow this ground again, but one of the clear pieces of information we've learned today is an intelligence failure, a failure to communicate intelligence and i think that's something that we all need to think about and you can be very helpful to us in suggesting what should be the chain of communication in terms of intelligence. you can't adequately prepare if you don't have the information. and it clearly seems to me there were some failures. chief sund, i have a specific question for you, and it's more forward looking, but i'd appreciate your insights. the question is, how do we protect the capitol from either an angry mob, or probably more likely one or two or three
malignant actors without turning it into a fortress. how do we allow the american people to go in the rotunda and tour the capitol, to picnic on the grounds, to play with their kids, it seems to me that going forward that's really one of the challenges. we want security but we don't -- i would hate to see the u.s. capitol turned into a fortress. your thoughts, mr. sund? >> i think you need your mic on there. thank you. >> there we go, ma'am, thank you very much. i'll go back to your original comment with the intelligence and the communications. i think we have the process in place for when we have credible intelligence, especially high level credible intelligence to quickly get to where it needs to be. i think my big concern is, you know, on the collection, on how wide we're casting the net to collect our intelligence that would have revealed this was
coming, and we are facing this type of mass insurrection. i definitely want to say the capitol police is well versed, well trained on handling what you're talking about, a mumbai style attack, a couple of attackers armed, active shooter events. those are the type of events we're ready for. it's the thousands of people storming the capitol that creates a big issue with us. when you talk about, you know, physical security and i mentioned in my opening statement in one of the initial questions i think there are options for maintaining an open environment, an open campus type of environment while putting some substantial physical security measures in place, both for the building, the skin of the building, as well as farther out, you know, time and distance is our best friend and the most important thing is to provide some kind of protection farther out so the officers have more -- you know, more time to deal with it. but that's something that i think should be discussed in a closed or classified session.
>> i understand. but -- and i hope that that is a discussion, madam chair, that we can have. i think that's a very important -- because we just, as i say, we don't want the united states capitol to be so protected that it's inaccessible to the american people. amplify on your intelligence. it seems -- intelligence answer. it seems to me you're saying it's communicated adequately, but we didn't have the collection that we needed. for example, the norfolk, virginia letter, is it -- how does it get filtered and where does it get filtered? >> again, the norfolk field office letter, that's something to consider. even on the 5th at noon on the 5th i held a joint conference call with the members of the board, my executive team, a dozen of the top law enforcement
and military officials from washington, d.c. where we discussed the upcoming events on the 6th, the inauguration, any kind of threats and issues we may have. and even though i had -- we had the director of the field office for the washington field office of the fbi, nothing was mentioned about it. so i think my big point is, i think we need to look out. there's significant evidence coming out that the insurrection that occurred on the 6th was planned, coordinated well in advance, coordinated almost to the point where you're looking between number of states where you're having events coordinated and it's that detection that i think would have been key to put the effective security in place for this event. >> finally, when we're talking about providing this level of security, do you -- is there a playbook? is there a contingency plan that's literally sitting on a shelf somewhere that says demonstrations around the
capitol, here's what you do? i mean, some of the timing things, for example the deployment of the national guard, might have been faster had there been a predetermined set of phone numbers, actions, steps to be taken. does that exist? and if not, should it exist? >> to the level where you're including the national guard, there is a process where we handle special events and demonstrations. but i tend to agree that we need to streamline the process that we request the national guard in the future. >> and yeah, because clearly there was an important -- there was a delay there that was an important part of the -- important part of the response at the time. madam chair, again, i want to thank these witnesses. i think they've really made a contribution and they made a contribution when they were serving in their respective positions. thank you, i yield back. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator.
senator synema is recognized for her questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. my first question is for chief contee, what coordinating actions were taken in the weeks leading up to january 6th to share intel across federal and local law enforcement, and what security planning took place, and with which agencies? >> thank you for that question. so there were a series of meetings that took place leading up to the events of january the 6th. weekly law enforcement partners call that takes place where our federal partners are part of that. there's the first amendment coordinating calls that took place, at least two of those, prior to this event. there's a national park service permit call that also took place prior to this event and as chief sund mentioned, several calls involving several of the law
enforcement entities leading up to the events of january the 6th. so there are significant amount of phone calls, or virtual meetings that took place leading up to january 6th. >> thank you. and could you talk a little bit about what you see as the mistakes that were made, or the holes that didn't help connect all those dots in those meetings in coordinating prior to january 6th? >> so i think the major issue, at least from my perspective, i think that in terms of the sharing of information, how it's shared, i think that that -- that is where the focus should be. again, we're talking about a report that came from the norfolk office on the day before, that night, it's around -- after 7:00 p.m., that was sent to email boxes, you
know as the chief of police for the metropolitan police department i assure you that my phone is on 24 hours a day, seven days a week and i'm available for any phone call from any agency that has information with respect to something of this magnitude happening in our city. certainly if there was information about one of our police stations being overwhelmed or a federal building being overrun that was related to the metropolitan police department i assure you that i would be on the phone directly with the officials that are responsible for the law enforcement response to give them that information firsthand. i'm not really relying on technology in the form of an email in hopes that that information makes it to where it needs to -- where it needs to be. so i think that that's critical to chief sund's point, there were several phone calls leading up to this and no specific information that talked about the events that we saw and
experienced on january the 6th. i really do believe that there should be quite a bit of attention given to that. >> i appreciate that. my next question is for mr. sund. so you outlined that the fbi report was sent via email to the capitol police the evening of january 5th, and that you never received the report. is there an understanding within the system of how that report did not make it to you, or to other individuals in leadership in the capitol police the night of january the 5th? >> i appreciate that question, ma'am. actually, as i mentioned earlier, in the discussion, this is a report that i am just learning about within the last -- you know, they informed me yesterday of the report. so i'm not sure of what investigation may be going on. i've since, since january 8th, have left the department. what investigations i know the chief has put additional safeguards in place to make sure something like that doesn't happen again but i'm not sure of
what the outcome of -- why that didn't get pushed up farther. >> was there an expectation or a process or procedure prior to january 6th that should have gotten that memo up to your attention, the night of january 5th? >> there's a process that ensures that information from the joint terrorism task force and through our task force officers gets over to the intelligence division which would be moved up to our intelligence analysts and the director of that intelligence division and then based on that information he could push it then up to the assistant chief or directly to me. he has my cell phone number. we talk regularly. >> and so to your -- you mentioned you were just learning about this recently, but would it have been an expectation that the fbi would have called capitol police or someone on the joint task force to alert the new intelligence in an expedited fashion, knowing that this information made it to the capitol police intel team on the
5th, what i'm trying to understand is, how it did not get to the higher levels to make preparations the night of the 5th. >> right, i'll just go ahead and echo what chief contee mentioned, i think that deserves additional focus. it should get more attention than being handled through email or electronic format. >> was there any intelligence that you did receive in the several days leading up to january 6th that caused you to change any of the security plans amongst the united states capitol police? >> so yeah, just to reiterate, you know, all the intelligence and all the information that we'd been receiving during the development of this -- the event for the 6th outlined very similar to what the intelligence report that we -- that was push published on the 3rd outlined. expecting a large number of protesters coming in, expected a potentially violent group.
we knew they were being focused on the capitol and we knew that someone had -- may be armed. that was driving -- regardless of what was put out the 3rd, we were developing our security plan around that and we looked at, based on our review of the november and december maga events determined we were going to adjust our fence line and push our fence line out. when we wanted to do that that's when i requested the national guard, knowing we were going to need support for the fence line. >> thank you. you know, chief contee you stated the intelligence you received on january 6th didn't differ from the previous maga marches, the two previous. was there any conversation or consideration about the fact that the january 6th was scheduled on a very important day that congress would be in session certifying the results of the election, and was that different in a consideration
around security than the other two marches which had been on weekends without congress being in session. >> absolutely. and that's reflected in the response posture for the metropolitan police department. for the two prior demonstrations that happened, the maga 1 and 2 marches, the metropolitan police department, we did not call up officers from surrounding jurisdictions to be stationed physically, within a footprint of the district of columbia. we did not do that before. the mayor in addition to calling out those additional resources again called up the national guard specifically for the reasons that we outlined to them, which would allow the metropolitan police department to be a lot nimble in our response. that -- and in essence, that enabled us to be able to respond quickly to assist the capitol police officers. so those responses were different. we were disrupting individuals or intercepting individuals who
were armed, with firearms in our city, in violation of the mayor's order, many of whom that brought on federal grounds. so the metropolitan police department's posture certainly was escalated beyond what we did the prior two marches. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i appreciate your intelligence. i see i've gone over my time. i have a few extra questions i'll submit. thank you. >> very good, thank you senator synema and thank you for your emphasis on the fbi report and the issues that everyone here seems to acknowledge with getting that -- that didn't go at the right place and just putting send isn't enough for a report like that. okay, next we have senator cruz. after that will be senator ossoff. if there's any other senators who wish to ask questions who haven't asked questions you should tell us, those are the last two we have. senator cruz. >> thank you, madam chair. and let me say to each of the
witnesses here today, thank you for being hered thank you if your testimony. and thank you also for your service. i want to thank each of you and also each of the heroic law enforcement officers who demonstrated extraordinary courage in fighting to repel the terrorist attack that unfolded on the capitol on january 6th. and we are grateful for the bravery and the courage in the face of a truly horrific attack. in the aftermath of that attack there is naturally a process to assess what could have been done to better prevent that attack, to better secure the capitol. and i think everyone recognizes that hindsight is different from a decision made in the moment facing the threat immediately but this hearing is nonetheless
productive for analyzing the security decisions and law enforcement decisions that were made realtime and for learning from them what can be done differently to ensure that an attack like that never again occurs. chief sund, i want to focus on -- with some detail your written testimony and just walk through what occurred in the days preceding january 6th and then on january 6th. in your written testimony you say on monday january 4th i approached the two sergeant-at-arms to request the assistance of the national guard as ha you had no authority to do so. i first spoke with the house sergeant at arms to request the national guard, mr. irving was concerned about the optics of having the national guard present and didn't feel the intelligence supported it. he referred me to the senate sergeant-at-arms to get his thoughts on the request. i then spoke to mr. stenger and
again requested the national guard. instead of approving the use of the national guard, however, mr. stenger suggested i ask then how quickly we could get support if needed and to lean forward in case we had to request assistance on january 6th. can you describe at more length those conversations with the two sergeant-at-arms on january the 4th? >> absolutely, sir, the first conversation occurred monday morning. i went over. i'd have to refer to my notes, but sometime maybe around 11:00 in the morning. i met with mr. irving in his office. that's where i made the first request for the national guard. he had indicated, i don't know if i really like the optics, you know, i don't think the intelligence really supports it. he had -- like we had said, recommended i talk to the senate sergeant-at-arms. later on in the day, i met with -- i'm trying to recall if it was in person or on the phone, i have to go back to my
timeline where i reached out to him and they may have already talked because he had referred to me said, do you know somebody over at the d.c. national guard, and i said, yes, i do, i have a good friend over there, general william walker and he said can you give him a call, to see if we needed assistance, how quickly we could get assistance and what type of assistance we could get. that evening as i was driving home i called general walker. i don't have authority to request national guard and i want to find out if we needed them on wednesday how quickly could you get them and be prepared for the? he had 125 national guardsmen who are supporting the covid response in the district of columbia and if we needed a response, a quick response, he could, what he called, repurpose them and get them to the armory at which point we could get somebody over to swear them in and get them to us as quick as
possible. next day i met with mr. stenger, he came over to the office for the 12:00 video call. that i had hosted with the dozen of the law enforcement officials from the national capitol -- from d.c. we spoke about it briefly there. and i told him what william walker had told me as well as i had passed on to mr. irving i think later on that afternoon, they both seemed satisfied with that response. >> so mr. irving and mr. stenger, mr. irving as i understand it you have some disagreement with the characterization about the concern about the optics, so i would invite both mr. irving and mr. stenger to relay your best recollection of that conversation on january 4th. >> senator, my best recollection of the conversation on january 4th was a phone call from chief sund indicating that he had received an offer for 125
unarmed guard that could get positioned around traffic perimeter check points at the capitol. my recollection again is as we followed up with mr. stenger, the three of us engaged in a conversation wrap we looked at the offer in light of the existing intelligence and the decision, the collective decision amongst the three of us was that the intelligence did not warrant the national guard. and my recollection that ended the discussion relative to the offer and the only question on the table is, should we perform any follow up? and mr. stenger recommended that we ask that they be placed on standby. that was the end of the discussion. >> so to the best of your recollection did you make the comment about optics, and if so what did you mean by that? >> i cannot remember my exact verbiage. had i used any language to the
effect, it was all in reference to whether the intelligence was matched to the security plan. >> and let me ask both mr. irving and mr. stenger, did you all have conversations with congressional leadership, either democratic or republican leadership on this question of supplementing law enforcement presence, bringing in national guard either on january 4th or realtime on january 6th? >> on january 4th, no, i had no follow up conversations and it was not until the 6th that i alerted leadership that we might be making a request and that was the end of the discussion. >> mr. stenger. >> for myself it was january 6th that i mentioned it to leader
mcconnell's staff. >> so there's been some disagreement about what time phone calls occurred. i know senator portman asked earlier, presumably everyone has phone records. i think it would be helpful if each of could forward the relevant phone records to this committee and chief sund you also referenced in your testimony that you sent an email to congressional leadership. if you could forward that to the committee as well, i think that would be helpful. thank you. >> thank you. senator ossoff. >> thank you, madam chair. thank you to our panel. just want to take a moment and echo the sentiments of so many of my colleagues expressing appreciation for the men and women of the united states capitol police who endured a great deal on january 6th and showed great heroism and also madam chair if i might express
an interest in working with you to ensure that they're well taken care of and their needs are met. this discussion of the conversation that the three of you had regarding supplementary security support on january 6th raises the question of who's in charge. is consensus between the two sergeants at arms and the chief of the u.s. capitol police required to make such a request, mr. sund? >> the request for the national guard needs to go to the capitol police board for approval, yes. >> who has ultimate responsibility for the security of the u.s. capitol complex, which individual? >> i believe that falls under the capitol police board. >> the capitol police board. so there is no individual who has personal responsibility for the security of the u.s. capitol complex? >> that's the way i interpret
it, yes. >> had the u.s. capitol police conducted exercises simulating comparable events such as a violent riot on or within the u.s. capitol complex? >> part of our training for civil disobedience units involves dealing with riotous groups so we dodo that training, we dodo training on people attempting to gain entry into the building. officers are trained on how to handle if someone tries to come through your door unauthorized. but training for thousands of armed insurrectionists that were coordinated and well equipped we have not had that training before january 6th but i'm sure they'll find a way to do it now. >> if i understand correctly, mr. sund, you're saying that personnel had engaged in tactical training regarding techniques to repel attempts to breach the complex regarding rules of engagement but had any
comprehensive exercises that included command, that included procedures for coordination with supporting agencies, that included requests for support, that included communications with the department of defense or white house officials or guard units been conducted. >> yes, we have, we do exercises that are very similar to what you're talking about before some of our national special security events. those are the nsses, such as the inauguration. we'll do table top exercises that go through the process of what you're talking about, yes. >> thank you. and had the capitol police held any such exercises, not pertaining to specific national security special events. so in order to deal with emergent contingencies, like a riot, not associated with those specific regarding security response.
>> one of the most important aspects you're talking about that we train our individuals to is what we call the incident command system. that's one of the systems that we feel really under the unprecedented pressure that they exhibited on january 6th, began to break down. the incident command system is established specifically so you have people that have the clearest understanding of what's happening, either in the field or inside the building, in control of the resources to utilize to defend against whatever issue you're having or respond to whatever incident you have. it's really an all hazards approach but that is something that's trained. we have it as part of our general orders that is something that we'll need to look back on and see how it broke under this pressure. >> and i asked this question in part because of the account that's been shared regarding the coordination with the guard unit, which was here for covid-related mission. if i recall correctly you related you had a conversation with the commanding officer and discussed mobilizing that unit
if necessary, first by an intermediary stop at a marine corps facility to then come to the capitol if necessary on january 6th. were there not preexisting channels of communication and procedures in the event you not at a moment such as inauguration over state of the union but any given day needed quick reaction force to provide security support. >> when you refer to it it's the established process where if you're going to request them in advance or request them for an incident i think what we need to look at is those emergency requests. but there is a process for going through the secretary of the army, placing an official request, ultimately we did that. we had to do a letter head after the fact. we did the oral request first and set it up that way but i think what i did by reaching out to general walker was to get an idea, much like as requested to do, if we requested them on the 6th what kind of resources could they give us and what type of time frame would we be looking
at? but i agree, there's already existing process and channels for making the request for national guard. >> right, because you, in fact, anticipated there might be some need based upon intelligence that your department was seeing. but on any given day if a foreign terrorist organization decided to attack this complex, do the procedures exist and are the channels in place such that a quick reaction force can be mustered swiftly, such that someone in your position knows exactly who to call and can do so without talking to the sergeant at arms. >> i'd still be required to consult the aren't at arms to make the request for national guard. >> my time is running short. what is the intelligence budget for the u.s. capitol police and how many personnel do you have in the intelligence division or did you have when you served as the chief? >> i'd have to go back and pull that specific information. we have a number of intel analysts, we have a number of people that work there, but sworn and civilian. i want to give you clear and accurate. >> approximately how many personnel are in the intelligence division.
>> around 30 to 35 people. >> does the u.s. capitol police have the capacity to do any intelligence collection other than by making requests to executive branch agencies for raw intelligence or analysis? >> again, when you talk about intelligence collection we're a consumer of intelligence from the intelligence committee, or community, i'm sorry. we do have the ability to go and look at, like open source, see what people are talking about on open source but going and collecting in depth specific intelligence is something that we're -- from the intelligence community. >> thank you, appreciate your time, i yield back. >> well, thank you very much. that was our last set of questions. and we're going to conclude this hearing. i wanted to say a few words at the end. first of all, i want to thank chairman peters and senators ranking members blount and portman for conducting this hearing in such a professional
way. we had a bipartisan agreement on how this hearing would be conducted, who our witnesses would be, and also the plan to have additional hearings including one next week that we'll be announcing tomorrow with the department of defense, department of homeland security and the fbi because clearly we have, and our members have additional questions. i want to thank the witnesses as i said for voluntarily appearing before us. i want to thank captain mendoza for her moving words and bravery. in many ways she represents all of the officers that were there that day. a few things that are very clear to me, the first is the statements at the beginning from all the witnesses. they may have disagreed on some details and, you know, okay, but there is clear agreement that this was a planned insurrection. so i think most members here are
very firmly agree with that. and i think it's important for the public to know that. this was planned. we know this was a planned insurrection. it involved white supremacists. it involved extremist groups. and it certainly could have been so much worse, except for the bravery of the officers. secondly, we learned about the intelligence breakdown. so many of the members of both committees asked about that. particularly the january 5th, the fbi report that had some very significant warnings from social media about people who were coming to washington who wanted to wage war. the fact that did not get to key leaders in the sergeant of arms or the capitol police chief is of course very dis turning really on both ends. you can't just push send. as we all know we get tons of emails and hope that it gets to
the right person. especially when we're dealing with something so serious. the january 3rd intelligence report that was -- came right out of the capitol police also contained, according to "washington post" contained and information some pretty foreboding details that i would have thought would've resulted in planning and more preparation. the delays in the proving a request for national guard assistance, both from the capitol police board and the department of defense. the fact that the sergeant at arms were focused on keeping the members safe in both chambers while the chief was trying to get some emergency approval. to me, you can point fingers, but you can also look at this as a process that is not prepared for a crisis. and i think out of that there's some general agreement just based on talking to a number of
members that there should be changes to the capitol police board, the approval process, and the like. and it's clear that that action must be taken not only to protect our capitol but also to protect the brave officers charged with protecting this citadel of democracy. better intelligence sharing, always an outcome when there's failures of intelligence. we know that. but i think we'll get more details in the coming week. some security changes at the capitol, requests that have been made for a while on those changes that i think we have to seriously consider. and, no, it does not have to be barbed wire. and, of course, this is a public building and you want the school groups and you want the veterans and you want people to be able to visit here. but that doesn't mean that we don't make some smart security changes to the building. the use of the national guard. we know after 9/11, the national guard helped for quite a while.
we also know that we have to have a plan going forward as well as consider what happens when we need a greater number of national guard in a crisis and how those approvals are made. those are just some of my takeaways. i'm sure many others will have more. but i do want to make it clear that there are some items of agreement between most of us on this committee. i don't think we should let the words of a few become the story here, because i think this has been a very constructive hearing. and i want to thank our witnesses for coming forward as they did. and i want to thank senator peters. and we look forward to more hearings. thank you. >> well, thank you, chair klobuchar. i have enjoyed this hearing. it's been good and working with you and your entire team with rules and administration committee. i want to thank ranking member blunt and portman and all of the members who came here today to work in a bipartisan way to ask
tough questions and to get answers. i want to thank captain mendoza for sharing her experiences, certainly very powerful way to start this hearing. but i truly appreciate each of the witnesses that were here today who came here today willingly and knew you would be asked tough questions, and you were willing to do that. and certainly we appreciate you for that effort. and while this hearing certainly shed some new light and offered some new information on what happened to the lead-up as well as to the response to the january 6th attack on our capitol, it's also raised a number of additional questions that need to be asked. for the past two years, i've been working to draw attention to the rise of domestic terrorism. and specifically violence driven by white supremacists. we have only seen the threat of this violence grow, not just from white supremacists but also
from anti-government groups and people who have been swept up by conspiracy theories, and just simple outright lies. the events of january 6th and the answers that we heard today only further highlight a grave national security threat that our current homeland security apparatus is clearly not fully equipped to address. our national security agencies were overhauled, and they were forged in the aftermath of the september 11th attacks. and they're basically built around responding to foreign terrorist attacks. and they have been slow to adapt to this evolving threat of domestic terrorism that we have seen in the last few years. the homeland security, oversees to fix the failures that led to the january 6th attack. there's no question our federal counterterrorism resources are
not focused on effectively addressing the growing and deadly domestic terror threat. the january 6th attack marked a once-in-a-lifetime failure. now we have the duty to ensure that the federal government is doing everything in its power to make sure another attack like this never happens again. we must align our counterterrorism resources and our intelligence gathering efforts to ensure we're focused on this dire threat, the fbi, the department of homeland security, and the national counterterrorism center. right now are eight months late on a report to assess the threat posed by domestic terrorism. and we're going to continue to push them to complete this report as soon as possible so that we can take meaningful action. there's no question in my mind that there was a failure to take this threat more seriously despite widespread social media content and public reporting that indicated violence was extremely likely. the federal government must
start taking these online threats seriously to ensure they don't cross into the real world violence. i also plan to keep the pressure up on social media companies to work harder to ensure that their platforms are not used as a tool to organize violence. so this investigation does not end here today. and i look forward to our next hearing where we will continue to seek answers to important questions that were raised today and others that need to be answered. before we adjourn, however, i have to do a bit of quick housekeeping. it's my privilege to announce the members of the subcommittees of the homeland security and government affairs committee for the 117th congress. the following senators will serve on the permanent subcommittee on investigations. jon ossoff will be chair. ron johnson ranking member. tom carper, magee hassan, alex
padilla, rand paul, james lankford and rick scott. the following senators will serve on the emerging threats and spending oversight subcommittee. magee hassan, rand paul -- magee hassan will be chair. >> as you can see there, this first congressional hearing on the january 6th attack is wrapping up. we are going to get more hearings as has been promised. look, the big -- couple of big takeaways i want to unpack here with pete williams in the remaining minutes that i have here. and, pete, let me go through them sort of point by point. one was sort of a general observation that chief sun made. and i want to read the quote exactly because we have a little bit of a time issue here. but here was the quote itself. and he said, we properly plan for a mass demonstration with possible violence. what we got was a military-style coordinated assault on our officers and a violent takeover
of the capitol building. pete, it's that first part of this phrase. we properly planned for a mass demonstration with possible violence. did they? were they successful in making that point today? >> we know now that's not the case. and i think he would admit that today. what he was saying is all the intelligence that we had through the formal channels was that, at most, what was going to happen on january 6th was sort of the plus up, maybe a little more violent expression than happened in the previous two maga demonstrations that were in washington, not the picture that you're seeing here today. so he said the intel agencies failed us. they noefr never told us to expect this. and the one new thing that we learned today is that in fact what the fbi said is accurate that there was a piece of raw intelligence that came from the fbi office in virginia that said
that there were groups talking about a violent attack on the capitol and talking about tunnels in the capitol and talking about war. and the chief disclosed today that that never got to him. he said it did get to his intelligence people, but it was not circulated to the upper levels of capitol police leadership. then he never saw it until 24 hours ago in preparation for this hearing. so, that was one message that came through. and the metropolitan police chief here said it was an email to him on the night before, too. and the former chief's son said if the federal government was really worried that that kind of thing would happen, why would the secret service have allowed mike pence to be in the capitol without more protection? >> and, pete, very quickly in our remaining minute here. the other development that i feel like we've at least got a lot more details on is the communication and trying to get the national guard there.
that feels like it has opened up more questions than we got answers. >> right. the chief and the former sergeant at arms of the house disagree on when they got the calls. and then of course they all agree that the government was very sluggish in responding. >> that's for sure. a lot more to unpack. but i don't have a lot more time, pete williams, thank you. stand by. my friend on the other side would like to talk with you because msnbc's coverage continues right now with my friend katy tur. it's all yours, kate. >> we got a lot of time to unpack. it is 11:00 a.m. out west and 2:00 p.m. in washington where there is high drama as congress tries to fill in the gaps of how in the world rioters were able to overrun the capitol on january 6th. >> of the multitude of events i've worked in my nearly 19-year career in the department, this was by far the worst of the